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General introduction and thesis outline
“We can’t see the beauty in everything that we are because  
we’ve been taught to first see everything that we’re not.” 
Megan Jayne Crabbe 
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Case formulations     
Ms. S. (66 years) has experienced two remitted depressive episodes. Currently, a stressful 
year could have served as an eliciting factor of the current mild depressive episode. 
Additionally, she has a genetic predisposition to depression from her father’s side: Her 
father and three cousins who suffered from depression committed suicide. She reports 
negative thoughts, feelings of worthlessness and shame about her depressive episode, a 
depressed mood throughout the day, and symptoms of anhedonia. As well as vegetative 
symptoms such as a diminished ability to think and concentrate, sleep disturbances, 
restlessness and physical tension, and diminished appetite with weight loss. She, however, 
does not report recurrent thoughts or ideations of death. She currently does not go to work 
and avoids social commitments. At the moment she receives both pharmacotherapy and 
cognitive behavioral therapy. 
Mr. P. (49 years) experiences the ability to hyper-focus on areas of his interest, lacks the 
ability to perform small talk, and is sensitive to (loud) sounds. As a child, he was bullied 
and excluded from social activities, resulting in the development of a negative attitude 
towards specific social situations (i.e., a more negative interpretation and attentional 
focus on social cues). Deficits in social cognition are also present, such as problems with 
emotion recognition and identification (i.e., alexithymia) and empathy. Later, because 
of personal and work-related problems, he experienced more stress, which resulted in 
feelings of sadness and hopelessness, concentration problems, and negative moods and 
thoughts. He indicates that he is drawn towards negative thinking about himself and the 
future. Vegetative symptoms including insomnia and weight gain are also present. As a 
result, he recently was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) with comorbid 
(recurrent) depression. 
These two different cases highlight the difference in clinical profile when additional 
psychiatric comorbidity is present. Specifically in the second case, and also in general, it is 
possible that symptoms of ASD work as a predisposing vulnerability factor for developing 
depressive symptoms later in life. However, the question arises if this is due to specific 
characteristics of ASD (e.g., neuropsychological dysfunctions or, for instance, interpersonal 
problems due to ASD) that could pose as a vulnerability factor for developing depression 
or because of the presence of negative cognitive biases (i.e., the preferential processing 
of negative information) that contribute to the onset and maintenance of (symptoms of ) 
depression? 
Major depressive disorder (MDD)
Major depressive disorder (MDD; or depression) is an emotional disorder and one of 
the most common psychiatric disorders; the global point prevalence is estimated at 
approximately 5% (Ferrari et al., 2013). MDD is often recurrent with long-term estimates 
of recurrences as high as 80% (Pettit, Lewinsohn, & Joiner Jr, 2006). With each successive 
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depressive episode the risk for recurrence seems to increase (Boland & Keller, 2009), an 
increasing vulnerability which has been interpreted as scarring. MDD is characterized by a 
heterogeneous set of clinical symptoms and the expression of these depressive symptoms 
can vary considerably between individuals (American Psychiatry Association, 2013). 
Hallmark emotional symptoms of depression include sad mood, loss of interest or pleasure 
in normally enjoyable events (i.e., anhedonia), feelings of hopelessness and misplaced 
guilt, and suicidal thoughts and ideation. Vegetative symptoms are also often present, 
including hyper- or insomnia, significant weight change and/or appetite disturbances, as 
well as fatigue (American Psychiatry Association, 2013). 
The World Health Organization proclaims depression as the most debilitating disorder 
worldwide in terms of total years lost due to disability (World Health Organization, 2012). 
Depressive symptoms frequently lead to impairments in daily functioning in the domains 
of personal, social, and school- or work-related functioning. Besides the symptomatic 
and functional personal costs, societal costs are high, especially due to productivity 
loss and (outpatient) mental health care (Ekman, Granström, Omerov, Jacob, & Landen, 
2013). Treatment of depression most commonly exists of antidepressants, psychotherapy 
(e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy; CBT), or the combination of both (Schene, Sabbe, 
Spinhoven, & Ruhé, 2016). However, variability in the long-term treatment response for 
depression exists: 10-15% of depressed individuals will develop a chronic unremitted 
depression, regardless of several trials of antidepressant medication (Schene, Sabbe, 
Spinhoven, & Ruhé, 2016). For cognitive behavioral therapy, it has been estimated that half 
of the patients will relapse without the continuation of the therapy (Vittengl, Clark, Dunn, & 
Jarrett, 2007). The severe disability and disease burden of MDD combined with the diverse 
response to treatment underlines the need for more insight in potential markers involved 
in the vulnerability to the development, recurrence, and maintenance of MDD. Enhancing 
this knowledge might improve targeted personalized treatment options and the possible 
prevention of depression.
A substantial episode and lifetime comorbidity of other psychiatric disorders exists in 
depressed individuals (Kessler et al., 2003; Rohde, Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1991), which 
additionally adds to the disease burden of having depression. The most prevalent lifetime 
comorbid psychiatric disorders with lifetime MDD are anxiety disorders (59%; Kessler et al., 
2003), autism spectrum disorder (53-77%; Hofvander et al., 2009; Joshi et al., 2013), and 
substance use disorders (24%; Kessler et al., 2003). The focus of this thesis is mainly the 
comorbidity of depression and autism spectrum disorders because of the high prevalence 
and impact of this specific comorbidity and the dire need to find potential markers that 
could underlie the higher vulnerability for developing depressive symptoms in ASD (see 
also: De-la-Iglesia & Olivar, 2015). 
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Comorbidity MDD and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): 
Prevalence and impact
ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder. While being heterogeneous in overall presentation, 
core symptoms according to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) are deficits 
in social interactions, verbal and nonverbal communication abilities, alterations in sensory 
sensitivity, and restricted or repetitive behaviors and interests. In addition, individuals 
with this neurodevelopmental disorder can experience specific alterations in cognitive 
processing styles, such as executive dysfunctioning (e.g., Geurts, Verté, Oosterlaan, 
Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004). For diagnosing ASD, a level of deficit in development needs 
to be present before three years of age (Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015). The lifetime 
prevalence of ASD is estimated at more than 1% of the general population. 
Individuals with ASD commonly experience higher rates of psychiatric comorbidities 
(Lugnegård, Hallerbäck, & Gillberg, 2011) of which depressive disorder is one of the 
most prevalent (Ghaziuddin, Tsai, & Ghaziuddin, 1992; Lugnegård et al., 2011). More 
specific, individuals with ASD experience higher levels of depressive symptoms and are 
more frequently diagnosed with MDD in contrast to a typically developing population 
(Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015; Gotham, Unruh, & Lord, 2015; Mazefsky, Folstein, & 
Lainhart, 2008). Approximately 80% of individuals with ASD referred to psychiatry 
departments have a lifetime comorbidity of MDD, and around 30% have a current 
depressive episode (Joshi et al., 2013). The presentation of common depressive symptoms 
such as anhedonia in ASD may manifest as a decreased interest in previously preferred 
preoccupations (Stewart, Barnard, Pearson, Hasan, & O’Brien, 2006) or the content of 
the interest may become morbid (e.g., an individual preoccupied with space can become 
obsessed with more dark themed subjects related to space such as dark holes or dying in 
space) (Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015). Another clinical symptom is the worsening of core 
features of ASD when comorbid depression is present including an increase in compulsive 
behavior (Gotham et al., 2015).  
Although there is high prevalence of MDD in ASD, diagnostic difficulties arise because 
of masking of depressive symptoms by pre-existing features of ASD, such as social 
withdrawal, abnormal communication of affect through facial expression or intonation, 
and preservative rumination. As said, adding to this diagnostic problem is that common 
features of depression (i.e., dysphoric mood, anhedonia, sadness) are difficult to 
recognize in ASD for clinicians. The reason for this could be that individuals with ASD have 
problems recognizing their own mental states as well as those of others (i.e., alexithymia), 
thus they may be less aware of and experience trouble expressing more complex feelings 
such as feelings of worthlessness, hopelessness, and excessive guilt (Bird & Cook, 2013; 
Stewart et al., 2006). In addition, clinicians lack diagnostic tools and specific treatment 
options (Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015). Thus, improving recognition and diagnosing, 
and increasing possible treatment options are necessary since individuals with symptoms 
of MDD and ASD have lower global functioning (Mazzone et al., 2013) and lower quality 
of life (Matson & Nebel-Schwalm, 2007) compared to individuals with only ASD. Adding 
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complexity to this clinical presentation of ASD with MDD is the relatively high prevalence 
of co-occurring other psychiatric disorders (e.g., anxiety disorders and attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder) with ASD and MDD, which we will discuss in the next paragraph. 
Comorbidity with (other) neurodevelopmental & emotional 
disorders: Prevalence and impact  
Both ASD and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are neurodevelopmental 
disorders (ND) that are defined by an onset in the developmental period and the possible 
persistence into adulthood (Ozonoff, Heung, Byrd, Hansen, & Hertz-Picciotto, 2008). The 
comorbidity between ADHD and ASD is relatively high: 14-78% (Gargaro et al., 2011). 
Other emotional disorders, next to depressive disorders, are anxiety disorders (e.g., 
generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety disorder, and panic disorder). These emotional 
disorders (ED) are specified by a dysregulation of emotions (Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, & 
Campbell, 2001) and have a later onset, namely during adolescence or early adulthood 
(Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, & Angold, 2003; Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005). The 
co-occurrence of anxiety and depressive disorders in adults ranges from 40%-80% (De 
Graaf, Bijl, Spijker, Beekman, & Vollebergh, 2003; Spinhoven, van Balkom, & Nolen, 2011). 
High comorbidity also exists between the neurodevelopmental and emotional clusters 
of psychiatric disorders. For instance, for ADHD and anxiety disorders the lifetime co-
occurrence or comorbidity prevalence is around 15% (Gillberg et al., 2004), and for ASD 
and depressive disorders this varies between 53-77% (Hofvander et al., 2009; Gagan Joshi 
et al., 2013). The high prevalence of comorbidity within and between diagnostic clusters 
indicates that various psychiatric disorders may have common and overlapping causes 
(Harkin et al., 2016).
Comorbidity in general has a high negative impact on the psychological functioning of 
individuals: Enhanced severity of symptoms (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005), worse 
treatment outcome (Merikangas & Kalaydjian, 2007), and increased suicidal risk (Sartorius, 
Üstün, Lecrubier, & Wittchen, 1996). The presence of comorbid psychiatric disorders also 
increases the rate of help seeking compared to single psychiatric disorders (Jacobi et al., 
2004). Besides implications for the individual patient, societal and economic costs of 
psychiatric disorders are high when an individual has two or more comorbid psychiatirc 
disorders (Charlson, Charlson, Briggs, & Hollenberg, 2007). Overall, additional psychiatric 
disorders can negatively alter the clinical course and treatment outcome as well as have 
a negative impact at the individual’s social level (e.g., loss of friendships). Thus, it is of 
importance to investigate potential markers involved at the vulnerability for developing 
(comorbid) psychopathology. 
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An alternative diagnostic approach of (comorbid) psychiatric 
disorders 
Since both traditional classification systems (i.e., International Classification of Diseases 
[ICD] and Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [DSM]) classify and 
describe psychiatric disorders based on a number of well-defined (self-report measures 
of ) clinical symptoms or functioning (Casey et al., 2013), it is quite complicated, if at all 
possible, to investigate potential underlying markers that may represent a vulnerability for 
comorbid psychopathology. With these classification systems, a combination of multiple 
symptoms is required for the diagnosis of a specific disorder, resulting in a high number of 
varying clinical presentations of that disorder (i.e., heterogeneity). In addition, a diagnostic 
overlap in symptoms of different disorders is also present (e.g., fatigue, restlessness, and 
concentration problems in both anxiety and depression). A problem with this artificial 
grouping of different symptom clusters with distinct pathophysiological mechanisms (e.g., 
sleep problems can have different underlying mechanisms) into one psychiatric disorder is 
the generally low success rate of pharmacotherapy and behavioral therapies (Cuthbert & 
Insel, 2013). 
To tackle these diagnostic and therapeutic problems, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) 
project posits an alternative approach of conceptualizing and classifying psychiatric 
disorders established by observable behavioral and neurobiological markers based on 
findings from behavioral science and neuroscience (NIHM, 2008). One characteristic of 
the RDoC project is to look beyond the traditional categorical classification and towards a 
more dimensional approach. In other words: To identify particular symptoms or clusters of 
symptoms that cut both within and across the diagnostic groups to identify possible shared 
markers (Curthbert & Insel, 2013; Insel, 2014; Watkins et al., 2015). This dimensional 
approach could provide a more homogeneous clinical target (both for pharmacotherapy 
and psychotherapy) and, as a result, a potentially higher success probability for treatment 
directed towards a particular mechanism or symptom that might occur in several 
disorders (Casey et al., 2013). Further, this approach can improve the precision of the 
diagnostic assessment, stimulate the development of (personalized) targeted therapies 
for psychopathology, and (relapse) prevention interventions (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013; Insel, 
2014; Watkins et al., 2015). 
However, previous studies aiming to clarify potential cognitive and neurobiological 
markers underlying different psychiatric disorders mainly included either patients without 
common psychiatric comorbidities (i.e., single psychiatric disorders) or did not assess 
and describe the presence of possible comorbidities. So, to increase the translatability 
and generalizability of the research findings into clinical practice in specialized treatment 
settings – where comorbidity is high – research in well-defined, large, naturalistic 
patients samples is needed. In addition, an increase in studies examining symptoms or 
symptom clusters and not classifications of psychopathology – i.e. adopting a dimensional 
approach – is essential for a better translation of research results into clinical practice. 
So, further research is necessary to identify shared markers and mechanisms involved in 
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the development and maintenance of different psychiatric disorders, while simultaneously 
attempting to increase the generalizability of the research findings. One such cognitive 
marker is biased processing of information (a focal point of this thesis) which we will 
explore in the next paragraph. 
Cognitive biases: Beck’s cognitive model 
Cognitive bias: Depression   
Substantial research has shown that negative cognitive biases can function as a latent 
cognitive vulnerability factor for developing and maintaining (sub)clinical depressive 
symptoms and depressive disorders (i.e., major depressive disorder and persistent 
depressive disorder) (Beevers & Carver, 2003; De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Johnson, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2007; LeMoult, Kircanski, Prasad, & Gotlib, 
2017). According to the cognitive model of Beck (Beck, 1974; Beck & Bredemeier, 2016) 
adverse events experienced mainly during childhood contribute to the development of 
dysfunctional beliefs and attitudes about oneself, the social environment, and the future. 
These beliefs and attitudes are embedded within schemata, and when activated by a 
negative mood or a stressful event, these schemata affect how information is processed, 
resulting in biased processing of information.  
Research has demonstrated that depressed individuals show a tendency towards 
processing negatively valenced information and do not exhibit preferential processing 
of positively valenced information (Beck, 1967; Beck & Bredemeier, 2016; Bower, 1981; 
LeMoult & Gotlib, 2019; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). In addition, cognitive 
biases have been observed in patients with depressive disorder independent of the current 
depressive state; the so called trait effect (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Bourke, Douglas, 
& Porter, 2010; Matt, Vazquez, & Campbell, 1992; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). 
Furthermore, these cognitive biases have been demonstrated in individuals at increased 
(genetic) risk of MDD (Chan, Goodwin, & Harmer, 2007; Hayden et al., 2013; Williams et 
al., 2010) and in never-depressed first-degree relatives of individuals with depression 
(Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; van Oostrom et al., 2013; Watters, Gotlib, Harris, Boyce, 
& Williams, 2013). These findings suggest that a cognitive bias is not solely a symptom of 
current depression (i.e., state effect) or a scar of (a) previous depressive episode(s), but 
functions as a risk factor for the development and maintenance of depression.  
The presence of negative cognitive biases has been established in different cognitive 
domains of which attention, interpretation, and memory are most frequently studied in the 
emotional disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In this thesis, we mainly focus on biased 
attentional processing as a marker in clinically (remitted) depressed patients and in patients 
with (symptoms of ) other psychiatric disorders (e.g., ASD), since research has shown that 
attentional bias could represent a possible vulnerability factor for depression (e.g., Gotlib 
& Joormann, 2010) as well as for other psychiatric disorders (e.g., Ouimet, Gawronski, & 
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Dozois, 2009).  Depressed individuals have demonstrated both impaired disengagement of 
negative information and reduced maintained attention towards positive information (for 
reviews see: Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Maintained attention 
for negative information is also demonstrated in subclincially depressed individuals 
with higher depressive symptom severity (Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2010). Depressed 
individuals generally do not show automatic initial direction of their attention towards 
negative stimuli (i.e., initial engagement), but when negative stimuli have captured their 
attention, they have problems disengaging from it. Negative attentional biases are also 
observed in remitted depressed patients (Joormann & Gotlib, 2007; Soltani et al., 2015), 
which supports the idea that attentional bias might be a vulnerability for the recurrence of 
depression (i.e., a trait marker) rather than simply reflecting a state marker or symptom of 
the illness. However, others found no association between attentional bias and depressive 
symptoms (Beevers et al., 2019; Marchetti et al., 2018), currently depressed individuals 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), or remitted depressed individuals (Vrijsen, van Oostrom, 
Isaac, Becker, & Speckens, 2014). 
Cognitive bias: Current evidence in neurodevelopmental (ND) and emotional 
disorders (ED)  
Besides the frequently studied depressive disorders, negative cognitive biases are also 
prevalent in other disorders such as anxiety and neurodevelopmental disorders (ADHD and 
ASD). For instance, it appears that (clinically) anxious individuals tend to automatically 
focus their attention towards negative or threatening stimuli (i.e., initial engagement) (Bar-
Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007). Individuals with 
ASD experience problems in reciprocal social interactions, thus, most studies focused on 
exploring a potential bias for social information. In general, these studies demonstrated 
less attentional bias towards social cues and information (e.g., eyes, gestures, [emotional] 
faces, persons) in ASD individuals than in typically developing individuals (e.g., Chita-
Tegmark, 2016; Sasson, Turner-Brown, Holtzclaw, Lam, & Bodfish, 2008). In contrast, 
others found no such results (Guillon, Hadjikhani, Baduel, & Roge, 2014). One study 
included emotional stimuli and found more negative attentional bias in both individuals 
with ASD and depressed individuals compared to controls (Unruh, Bodfish, & Gotham, 
2018). In ADHD, studies have found associations between ADHD symptoms and negative 
memory bias (d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 2007; Vrijsen et al., 2018). However, no 
studies have yet examined attentional bias in (symptoms of ) ADHD. Altogether, these 
findings indicate that negative bias is present in different psychiatric disorders and 
might therefore be a transdiagnostic process. However, more research is needed to 
provide further insight into the potential role of attentional bias as a vulnerability factor 
in (comorbid) neurodevelopmental disorders. In addition, more studies exploring the 
possible relationship of symptoms of (comorbid) psychiatric disorders and attentional 
biases are required. 
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Alexithymia as a moderator of attentional bias
Because equivocal evidence is found for negative attentional processing of information 
in depression, it is interesting to examine individual differences which may affect how 
attention bias presents itself. Several influencing factors and processes have been studied 
so far, e.g., attentional control (see for example: Bardeen & Orcutt, 2011; Taylor, Cross, 
& Amir, 2016), stress (see for example: Field & Powell, 2007), and adverse childhood 
events (see for example: Vrijsen, Becker, et al., 2014). Alexithymia could additionally be an 
influencing factor on the relationship between attentional bias and depression. Alexithymia, 
a deficit in the cognitive processing of emotions (Taylor, 2000), is a highly associated and 
stable trait in depressive disorders (Luminet, Bagby, & Taylor, 2001). Because alexithymic 
individuals experience difficulty identifying and recognizing emotions of themselves and 
others, it could be suggested that emotional cues are less attended by these individuals. 
In turn, alterations can occur in biased (attentional) processing of valenced information. 
Research in community samples have shown that high levels of alexithymia are associated 
with less bias for negative stimuli than low levels of alexithymia (e.g., Meltzer & Nielson, 
2010; Mueller, Alpers, & Reim, 2006; Suslow, Junghanns, Donges, & Arolt, 2001). However, 
studies investigating the association between alexithymia and cognitive biases in 
depressed individuals are lacking. Expanding knowledge about potential moderators, such 
as alexithymia, on the relationship between attentional bias and depression are needed to 
partially explain the inconclusive evidence found for attentional bias in depression.
Attentional bias assessment
Behavioural attentional bias tasks 
Biased attentional processing of valenced information in depressive disorders has mostly 
been investigated using behavioural tasks such as the dot-probe task (e.g., Peckham, 
McHugh, & Otto, 2010), the emotional Stroop task (e.g., Peckham et al., 2010), the 
exogenous cuing paradigm (e.g, Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & Crombez, 2005), 
and the visual search task (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2005). In these tasks, bias is measured 
using reaction times (RT). Although these bias tasks have a wide-spread use, problems 
arise with the psychometric properties of these paradigms. Studies have shown that RT-
based behavioural measures generally show poor test-retest reliability (Schmukle, 2005; 
Staugaard, 2009; Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen, & Cramer, 2005) and poor internal reliability 
(Kappenman, MacNamara, & Proudfit, 2014; Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009; Waechter, 
Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). 
A main methodological limitation is the distal relationship between attention and key 
pressing. Thus, measuring attentional bias with RT is susceptible to the confounding 
influence of motor impairments on manual reactions (Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 
1996). Especially for depression research, psychomotor retardation – a charateristic of 
depressed individuals – may confound attentional bias (Mathews et al., 1996). Another 
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limitation is that RT tasks provide a snapshot of attentional focus at one time point within 
a trial, which results in questionable reliablity (Dear, Sharpe, Nicholas, & Refshauge, 
2011). Specific for the study of attentional bias in depressed individuals, longer stimulus 
presentation times are generally used to enable the elaborative processing of the stimuli 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), such as the repetitively shifting of attention between 
stimuli. By including RT measures, these attentional patterns remain undiscovered. These 
limitations combined might explain the low reliablity of using RT measures in attentional 
bias research (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 
2014).  
Differences in the stimuli used in attentional bias paradigms are also apparent. Stimuli that 
are used include: Pictures or drawings of (non-)social scenes (e.g., García-Blanco et al., 
2014) or (drawings of ) faces (e.g., sad, neutral, angry, happy; e.g., Ashwin, Wheelwright, 
& Baron-Cohen, 2006; Isaac, Vrijsen, Rinck, Speckens, & Becker, 2014) or emotional 
words (e.g., Felmingham, Rennie, Manor, & Bryant, 2011). Generally speaking, pictures 
convey more affective information than words (Glaser & Glaser, 1989), which is why many 
researchers prefer them. Including more naturalistic stimuli, such as photographs, is 
recommended, since they exhibit greater ecological validity and increased sensitivity to 
depression-linked differences (e.g., Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004). For depression, attentional 
bias has mostly been demonstrated for depression-related stimuli (i.e., sad or dysphoric 
stimuli; Mogg & Bradley, 2005) as well as a general negative attentional bias (Naranjo et 
al., 2011). However, attentional bias is generally not associated with biases for threatening 
stimuli in depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). Thus, the selection of the stimuli is also 
important for increasing the sensitivity of the task. 
Eye-tracking methodology
The relationship between attention and eye movements as measured with an eye-tracker 
is much closer than the association between attentional processing and the manual 
responses we discussed. Eye movements are also unhindered by the other limitations 
posed by the RT tasks described earlier. Because an eye-tracker allows for the nearly 
continuous and direct measurement of attentional deployment, it is a reliable attention 
assessment (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), and is even more reliable than the traditional 
behavioural paradigms such as the dot-probe and emotional Stroop task (Waechter et 
al., 2014). An eye-tracker also yields the disentanglement of several attentional indices 
within a single trial as well as multiple parameters of each index, such as the latency and 
location of first fixation, thus providing a spatial and temporal parameter of initial orienting 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). For instance, Sears, Thomas, LeHuquet, and Johnson (2010) 
found a negative orienting bias in (remitted) depressed individuals compared to healthy 
controls. In contrast, depression does not seem to be associated with the initial allocation 
of attention, but mainly with the later stages of attention (i.e., (dis)engagement) (De Raedt 
& Koster, 2010; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Wisco, 2009). Therefore, many depression studies 
include an engagement index as measured by the total gaze duration on each stimulus. 
Those studies found longer gaze durations for negative stimuli (e.g., Caseras, Garner, 
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Bradley, & Mogg, 2007; Leyman, De Raedt, Vaeyens, & Philippaerts, 2011) and shorter 
gaze durations for positive stimuli (e.g., Ellis, Beevers, & Wells, 2011) in individuals with 
depression relative to healthy controls.
The majority of the eye-tracking literature in depression employs a free-viewing paradigm 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012), which we also used in the eye-tracking studies in this thesis 
(see Figure 1 for a schematic overview of this specific task). In this paradigm, participants 
are instructed to focus on the centrally presented fixation cross to ensure the stimuli 
are presented equally. Afterwards, arrays of stimuli are simultaneously presented for a 
certain duration at which the participants need to look freely. This paradigm enables the 
assessment of attentional bias in depression at later stages of attentional processing. 
The majority of the studies including a free-viewing paradigm confirm the evidence of a 
negative attentional bias in (remitted) depressed individuals relative to healthy controls 
(Caseras et al., 2007; Eizenman et al., 2003; Ellis et al., 2011; Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, 
& Wells, 2008; Leyman et al., 2011; Sears, Newman, Ference, & Thomas, 2011; Sears et 
al., 2010). Conclusively, eye-tracking methodology is well suited for measuring selective 
attention to visual stimuli. When these stimuli are presented simultaneously, it competes 
for the participant’s attention, thus, providing a good methodology for assessing biased 
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Alternative neuropsychological vulnerability factors for 
depression in ASD
The neuropsychological model zooms in on the relationship between brain (dys)functioning 
and cognitive (dys)functioning to understand behavioral problems (see: Swaab, Bouma, 
Hendriksen, & Köning, 2016). In this brain-behavior relationship, the interaction with the 
environment could function as a facilitating as well as an inhibiting factor. In both MDD 
and ASD, (specific) neuropsychological dysfunctioning exists. Thus, besides cognitive 
bias, the interplay of co-existing alterations in cognitive processing styles, such as 
deficits in executive functioning (EF), weak central coherence (CC), and deficits in theory 
of mind (ToM) ability in patients with ASD and MDD, may express as an alternative 
neuropsychological vulnerability to MDD. Although different genes, brain structures, and 
the environmental context are critical factors adding to the vulnerability for developing 
and (re)occurring of (comorbid) psychopathology, they did not fall within the scope of this 
thesis. However, they are still essential to mention to provide a more complete overview 
of the vulnerability factors possibly leading to (comorbid) psychopathology. In the current 
thesis, this interplay of EF, ToM, and CC in individuals with ASD and/or MDD is primarily 
discussed in the systematic review, but is not empirically researched.
EF refers to the general-purpose control processes regulating an individual’s thoughts 
and behaviors (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Depressed patients show impairments in the 
executive functions of attentional switching, cognitive flexibility, response inhibition and 
fluency compared to healthy individuals whilst planning and organization are moderately 
affected (Lee et al., 2014; Wagner, Doering, Helmreich, Lieb, & Tadic, 2012). EF impairments 
are also repeatedly shown in neurodevelopmental disorders such as ASD. These patients 
often have more difficulties with inhibition (Geurts, Bergh, & Ruzzano, 2014), cognitive 
flexibility (resulting in increased rigidity and perseveration; Hill, 2004; Lopez, Lincoln, 
Ozonoff, & Lai, 2005; South, Ozonoff, & Mcmahon, 2007), and attentional switching 
(Polderman et al., 2013). These EF impairments could serve as a cognitive vulnerability 
for developing depression (Snyder, 2013). Related to EF is a weak CC:  A processing bias 
towards local cognitive processing instead of the global context (Happe & Frith, 2006). A 
weak CC is both present in depressed individuals (Basso, Schefft, Ris, & Dember, 1996) 
and ASD individuals (Happe, Briskman, & Frith, 2001). Likewise, problems in social 
cognition, such as difficulty identifiying feelings (i.e., aleixthymia) and poor understanding 
of the mental states of others (i.e., Theory of Mind), are also common in ASD (Kogan et 
al., 2009; van Elst, Pick, Biscaldi, Fangmeier, & Riedel, 2013) and depression (ToM: Wang, 
Wang, Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 2008; Wolkenstein, Schönenberg, Schirm, & Hautzinger, 2011; 
Alexithymia: Luminet, Bagby, & Taylor, 2018). The interrelation of these three domains, 
which are linked with the neuropsychological deficits presented in ASD, might pose 
as an alternative cognitive vulnerability factor for developing MDD opposed to biased 
information processing.  
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Aims and outline of this thesis 
Biased processing of negative information has been posed as a cognitive vulnerability 
factor for depression. Specifically, an attentional bias at a later stage of information 
processing has been suggested as a significant factor in depression vulnerability (De 
Raedt & Koster, 2010). However, more recent evidence has also been found for negative 
bias in other psychiatric disorders (e.g., ASD: Unruh et al., 2018; ADHD: Vrijsen et al., 
2018). Although research has demonstrated biased attentional processing in depression 
and recently also in other psychiatric disorders, the results are still equivocal and 
methodological limitations (e.g., including less reliable paradigms to measure attentional 
bias) are restricting the interpretation of the research results. Additionally, most studies do 
not include a naturalistic patient sample (i.e., allowing the presence of possible additional 
comorbidity besides the disorder of interest), thus diminishing generalization of the 
findings to the clinical population in which comorbidity is highly prevalent (Kessler, Chiu, 
Demler, & Walters, 2005). 
Thus, the general aim of this thesis is to systematically study the role of attentional bias as 
a potential marker not only for depression, but also for (symptoms of ) neurodevelopmental 
disorders (ASD, ADHD) and anxiety sensitivity. We emphasize the comorbidity of ASD and 
depression in Chapters 2 and 3, because of the dire need to investigate potential cognitive 
markers for the vulnerability of developing depression in ASD. We also examined the 
potential moderating effect of alexithymia, which is highly prevalent in depression (and 
other psychiatric disorders), on attentional bias in depressed patients, which may partially 
explain the mixed results found in the attentional bias research in depression. Although 
the prevalence of depression in ASD is high and recent evidence for biased processing 
of information in ASD has been demonstrated, it is not yet clear how bias for emotional 
stimuli is manifested in ASD (with comorbid depression). 
Therefore, in Chapter 2 we want to investigate how cognitive biases are manifested in 
ASD and subsequently if these biases play a role in the increased cognitive vulnerability 
for depression. We do so by means of a systematic review of the empirical literature. The 
results of the systematic review fed the design of the study of Chapter 3, in which we aimed 
to investigate if negative attentional bias might be a marker for depression in ASD and 
whether this bias is driven by a comorbid depression. Therefore, we used an eye-tracking 
task that included valenced social and non-social stimuli to increase the sensitivity for 
possibly finding an attentional bias in patients with ASD and/or depression. 
To further explore the findings of Chapter 3, we employed a dimensional approach of 
symptomatology, in line with the RDoC initiative (Cuthbert, 2014), of other psychiatric 
disorders (i.e., anxiety sensitivity and ADHD) in addition to ASD and MDD in Chapter 4. 
In this chapter, we explored if attentional bias for social and non-social valenced stimuli 
was associated with symptom severity indices of neurodevelopmental and emotional 
disorders. Specifically, we aimed to investigate if attentional bias might be associated 
with of symptom severity indices of ADHD, ASD, depression, and anxiety sensitivity in 
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three common psychiatric disorder groups (neurodevelopmental disorders, emotional 
disorders, and comorbidity between the two). If evidence is found, this could provide 
further evidence for attentional bias as a potential transdiagnostic marker which may 
instigate more research into examining the relationship between psychiatric symptom 
severity indices and (attentional) bias as a possible transdiagnostic marker in (comorbid) 
psychiatric patients. 
The study in Chapter 5 was designed to examine if the mixed results found for attentional 
bias in depressed individuals could be explained by a moderating role of alexithymia. If 
so, this could partially explain the inconclusive results found in the evidence of attentional 
bias in depressed samples. In Chapter 6 the findings of the different studies in this thesis 
are summarized and discussed taking previous research into consideration. Further, a 
discussion of the strengths, limitations, and implications of these studies is presented, 
followed by recommendations for future research and a general conclusion of this thesis. 
See Table 1 for a schematic overview of the chapters and the respective paradigms and 
samples. 
Table 1  An overview of the studies and respective samples and (bias) constructs measured in this 
thesis. ASD = autism spectrum disorder. MDD = major depressive disorders. ADHD = attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. AS = anxiety sensitivity. AB = attentional bias. IB = interpretation bias. 
MB = memory bias. 




Bias index Additional  
construct
Chapter 2 ASD AB, IB, MB
Chapter 3 ASD and/or (remitted) MDD X AB
Chapter 4 ASD, ADHD, MDD, AS X AB
Chapter 5 MDD X AB Alexithymia
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Background: Cognitive theories of major depressive disorder (MDD) assume that cognitive 
biases engender and maintain depressive symptoms. Given the higher prevalence of 
MDD in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) than in the general population, we performed 
a structured review of the empirical literature on cognitive biases in ASD to examine the 
possible role of biases in the increased cognitive vulnerability for MDD.
Method: We reviewed the recent literature on cognitive biases in individuals with ASD. 
Literature searches were conducted by using the databases PubMed and PsycInfo 
consistent with Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses 
(PRISMA) standards. The 31 identified studies meeting our inclusion criteria were 
evaluated for quality using a modified version of the Systematic Assessment of Quality in 
Observational Research (SAQOR) rating system.
Results: The results show that half of the studies included did not find differences in 
cognitive biases in individuals with ASD compared to controls. In the studies that did 
establish differences in cognitive bias, individuals with ASD were reported to show less 
pronounced negative biases. A closer inspection reveals that Theory of Mind demands of 
the task and developmental age might partially have influenced these results. Importantly, 
most of the studies included did not control for symptoms of depression and/or anxiety.
Conclusions: Although, based on the current literature, differential cognitive biases 
may not be a marker for MDD in ASD, more research is needed taking specific potential 
confounders, and distorting influences into account.
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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder with a large diversity 
in symptomatology and clinical presentation. Core symptoms, according to the DSM-5, 
are problems in reciprocal social interactions and stereotyped, repetitive behaviors and 
interests (American Psychiatry Association, 2013). Some level of differences in development 
needs to be present before three years of age (Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015). Although 
ASD criteria do not include affective symptoms, adults with ASD report more depressive 
symptoms and in turn are more frequently diagnosed with major depressive disorder 
(MDD) in comparison with the general population. A recent longitudinal study found that 
ten-year-old children with ASD showed more depressive symptoms than did the general 
population and this difference remained throughout adolescence (Rai et al., 2018). Ratings 
differ per study, but lifetime prevalence of MDD in adults with ASD is approximately 53–
77% (Hofvander et al., 2009; Joshi et al., 2013), as opposed to estimations of 16–18% in the 
adult general population (Snyder, 2013). Despite this high prevalence, MDD is often difficult 
to diagnose properly in individuals with ASD, so it frequently remains underdiagnosed and 
undertreated (Henry et al., 2014).
There are different possible reasons for this diagnostic problem. First, we see that MDD 
and ASD include more or less comparable clinical and neuropsychological symptoms, such 
as problems with the communication of affect through facial expression or intonation, 
perseverative rumination, sleep disturbances, social withdrawal, and attention deficits 
(Gotham, Unruh, & Lord, 2015; Hofvander et al., 2009; Stewart, Barnard, Pearson, 
Hasan, & O’Brien, 2006). This overlap in symptomatology makes it difficult to categorize 
depressive (like) symptoms as either MDD, ASD or both. Adding to this problem is the 
lack of standardized diagnostic tools to assess MDD adapted for ASD symptomatology 
(Cassidy, Bradley, Bowen, Wigham, & Rodgers, 2018; Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015; 
Stewart, Barnard, Pearson, Hasan, & O’Brien, 2006). Second, individuals with ASD may be 
less aware of their own feelings and inner states and therefore have difficulty expressing 
depressive thoughts and feelings about worthlessness, sadness or guilt (Bird & Cook, 
2013; Gotham et al., 2015; Stewart et al., 2006b). Underdiagnosis and undertreatment of 
MDD in ASD may result in an increase of depressive symptoms, development of additional 
morbidity over time and even death due to suicide (Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015; Richa, 
Fahed, Khoury, & Mishara, 2014). In order to find suitable interventions to treat MDD in 
autism, it is of importance to better understand the underlying factors that link ASD and 
MDD, particularly for specific and shared vulnerability factors for the increased risk of 
developing MDD in ASD. Hence, related to the diagnostic categorization but theoretically 
more fundamental is the question whether MDD in ASD has to be considered as an 
independent, co-occurring condition, possibly stemming from a similar vulnerability and 
developmental trajectory as MDD in the general population, from a DSM-5 point of view. 
Alternatively, MDD in individuals with ASD may be viewed as a unique variant of MDD 
with specific underlying factors, altered by the developmental processes of ASD and its 
symptomatology and (cognitive) deficits. In order to learn more about the relation between 
ASD and MDD and find suitable interventions to treat MDD in ASD, it is important to 
disentangle the interplay between behavioral symptoms and underlying (neuro) cognitive 
factors to increase the understanding of the high prevalence of MDD in ASD. To contribute 
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to this further specification of MDD in ASD, we will review the evidence for cognitive biases 
in ASD and compare this to the pattern of results found in MDD research. Thus, we will 
investigate whether individuals with ASD have a similar vulnerability for developing MDD 
as the general population.
A prominent cognitive model of MDD proposes specifically a role for cognitive biases in 
the onset, maintenance and recurrence of MDD (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Beck, 2008). This 
model suggests that an interplay between neurobiological factors (such as genes) and 
adversities experienced during childhood contribute to the development of dysfunctional 
beliefs and attitudes about oneself, the social environment and the future. These beliefs 
and attitudes are embedded within schemata, and when activated by a negative mood 
or a stressful event, these schemata affect how information is processed, resulting in 
cognitive biases (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Beck, 2008). A negative cognitive bias, which is a 
tendency to preferentially process negatively rather than positively valenced information, 
can in turn contribute to negative mood and ultimately a depressed state (Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). The existence of cognitive biases have been 
established in different cognitive domains such as attention, interpretation, and memory 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). With regard to attentional bias, individuals with MDD have 
shown impaired disengagement of negative information and reduced attention towards 
positive information (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). A negative 
interpretation bias is the preferential encoding of negative or threatening interpretations 
of, for instance, ambiguous sentences or homophones. Nevertheless, mixed evidence for 
negative interpretation biases in MDD are found (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011; LeMoult & Gotlib, 
2018). Negative memory biases are robust findings in MDD; individuals with MDD display 
more successful and frequent encoding and retrieval of negative information (Marchetti et 
al., 2018; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Moreover, both attentional and memory biases have 
been observed in individuals at increased risk of MDD (Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; 
Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014).
As explained, negative biases and schemata are assumed to originate from adverse 
childhood events in neurobiologically more vulnerable individuals (Beck, 2008). 
Individuals with ASD may suffer more than neurotypical individuals from these adverse 
childhood events, such as being bullied by peers (Bond, Carlin, Thomas, Rubin, & Patton, 
2001; Rai et al., 2018; Zablotsky, Bradshaw, Anderson, & Law, 2013). Based on a cognitive 
model of depression (e.g., Beck & Haigh, 2014; Beck, 2008) it is conceivable that negative 
childhood experiences and events result in a negative bias, which is akin to depressotypic 
bias in children with ASD. This, in turn, may contribute to the development of co-occurring 
MDD later on. In addition, individuals with ASD are generally aware of their social 
difficulties and their lack of social success (Mayes, Calhoun, Murray, Ahuja, & Smith, 2011; 
Sterling, Dawson, Estes, & Greenson, 2008). This awareness of repeatedly failing in social 
situations may activate existing negative schemata about oneself and could result in lower 
self-esteem and heighten social discouragement (Barnhill & Myles, 2001), which may 
contribute to the development of (more) negative biases. It can thus be suggested that 
negative cognitive biases may potentially be a risk factor for developing affective problems 
in ASD.
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Besides biased information processing, the cognitive vulnerability for developing MDD in 
ASD might also derive from co-existing alterations in cognitive processing styles associated 
with ASD such as deficits in executive functioning (EF), weak central coherence (CC) and 
deficits in Theory of mind (ToM) ability. EF and CC are related to the cognitive elements 
underlying ToM abilities and these mechanisms are in close interaction with each other 
(Kimhi, 2014; Pellicano, 2010). ToM refers to the ability to make mental representations of 
one’s own and others’ inner emotional worlds. ToM allows individuals to connect observed 
external situations with internal mental states, and as a result to predict behavior (e.g., 
Bauminger-Zviely, 2013; Frith, 2003). Substantial empirical evidence has shown that ToM 
delays are present in both children and adults with ASD (Baron-Cohen, 2000). These delays 
combined with social communication deficits, often present in individuals with ASD, may 
add to the high prevalence of social-emotional problems in ASD (Kimhi, 2014). These social-
emotional problems, partially engendered by differences in ToM ability, are associated with 
the occurrence of MDD (Ghaziuddin, Ghaziuddin, & Greden, 2002). Moreover, studies have 
shown that poorer ToM abilities are prevalent in individuals with MDD (e.g., (Wang, Wang, 
Chen, Zhu, & Wang, 2008; Wolkenstein, Schönenberg, Schirm, & Hautzinger, 2011). 
Further, EFs allow people to control and adjust their behaviors in order to achieve (long-
term) goals and control their behavior in daily living (Diamond, 2013). According to Miyake 
and Friedman (2012), inhibitory control, updating information in the working memory 
and cognitive flexibility are considered core components of EF. EF impairments are often 
present in neurodevelopmental disorders, such as ASD, which likely involve congenital 
deficits in the frontal lobes (Hill, 2004). For instance, individuals with ASD often have more 
difficulties with prepotent response inhibition compared to healthy controls (Geurts, Bergh, 
& Ruzzano, 2014), which could lead to problems with suppressing inappropriate actions or 
vocalizations characteristic of ASD (Kana, Keller, Minshew, & Just, 2007). Research also 
showed that individuals with ASD often experience impairments with cognitive flexibility 
resulting in increased rigidity and perseveration (e.g., Hill, 2004; Lopez, Lincoln, Ozonoff, 
& Lai, 2005; South, Ozonoff, & Mcmahon, 2007). These impairments could lead individuals 
with ASD to develop a negative processing style (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Hollocks 
et al., 2014) and to rigidly stick with this specific processing style. Several studies propose 
that EF impairments may represent a cognitive vulnerability factor for developing MDD 
(e.g., Snyder, 2013). Specifically, for individuals with ASD, greater inflexibility was found to 
predict more anxiety and depressive symptoms (Lawson et al., 2015; Wallace et al., 2016). 
Another important information processing style related with ASD, and associated with 
both ToM and EF deficits, is that of the weak CC. CC refers to the detail-focused cognitive 
style typical of individuals with ASD. More specifically, CC is a processing bias for local 
and featural information, resulting in a failure to allocate attention to the global form that 
could, for instance, lead to preoccupations with certain parts of objects (Happé & Frith, 
2006). Basso, Schefft, Ris, and Dember (1996) reported that individuals with traits of MDD 
and anxiety showed a tendency for a local processing style. It is therefore likely that a 
weak central coherence processing style and EF deficits, which are strongly associated 
with the cognitive differences presented in ASD, might be related to the vulnerability for 
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developing affective problems in ASD. Thus, the differences in social and communication 
ability and restricted and repetitive behaviors compared to neurotypical individuals, which 
are, among other symptoms, characteristic of ASD, might in part be an interplay between 
cognitive deficits such as ToM, EF, and CC in addition to (neuro)biological factors related 
to ASD. Thus, it might be suggested that deficits in these three cognitive domains, which 
are linked with ASD, might present as an alternative cognitive vulnerability factor for 
developing MDD.
Since cognitive functioning reflects neurological processing in the brain, investigating 
cognitive processing should provide an understanding of the relationship between brain 
and behavior. In ASD and in MDD, abnormalities in similar brain regions are reported, 
which are not found in neurotypical individuals. In turn, this could partly explain the 
diverse and overlapping cognitive and behavioral symptoms of ASD and MDD. Research 
in MDD has shown that anomalies of limbic structures such as the amygdala (ventral 
network), together with anomalies of the prefrontal cortices (dorsal network) may lead 
to cognitive biases (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011). As a result of abnormalities 
in prefrontal functioning, cognitive control is diminished; concurrently, alterations in 
activity of the amygdala can result in hyperreactivity to negative information (Beck, 
2008). Aside from abnormalities in the amygdala and prefrontal cortices, abnormality in 
the hippocampus is also reported in MDD (Nestler et al., 2002). In ASD, anomalies of the 
amygdala, hippocampus and prefrontal cortices have similarly been found (Bauman & 
Kemper, 2005; Gliga, Jones, Bedford, Charman, & Johnson, 2014). Abnormalities in these 
structures in individuals with ASD are presumed to play a role in social behavioral and 
executive dysfunctions.
In view of the high prevalence of MDD in ASD and the overlap in symptomatology between 
the two disorders, we would like to enhance our understanding of the possible cognitive 
risk factors, which could increase the vulnerability of individuals with ASD for developing 
MDD. Since it is unclear whether MDD in ASD is an independent co-occurring condition, or 
whether MDD in ASD is a variant altered by developmental- and cognitive processes in ASD, 
we will study the presence of cognitive biases in ASD in the current literature to investigate 
if MDD in ASD indeed derives from a similar vulnerability as in the general population, 
in line with a cognitive theory of MDD (e.g., Beck, 2008; Beck & Haigh, 2014). To do so, 
we will conduct a structured review with a twofold aim: (i) to investigate the evidence for 
the presence of cognitive biases in individuals with ASD and, if these biases exist (ii) to 
examine whether these cognitive biases are a cognitive risk factor for individuals with ASD 
for developing MDD. Furthermore, if there is evidence for cognitive biases in ASD, we seek 
to strengthen the evidence of an increased risk for developing MDD in ASD due to similar 
vulnerability as MDD in the general population pursuant to a prominent cognitive theory of 
MDD (e.g., Beck, 2008; Beck & Haigh, 2014). In turn, if cognitive biases are not manifested 
similarly in ASD as in MDD, this could strengthen the model that cognitive vulnerability for 
developing MDD might be a result of alterations in cognitive processes associated with 
ASD, such as EF impairments, weak CC and, ToM deficits.




To identify studies investigating cognitive biases in individuals with ASD, we conducted 
a systematic review following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and 
Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) standards (Liberati et al., 2009). A broad selection of search 
terms were used to ensure finding a great variety of studies on ASD and cognitive biases. 
The following search terms were included: (affective bias OR affective stimuli OR emotional 
processing OR emotional arousing OR emotion word OR threat detection OR affect 
processing OR social attention OR emotional bias OR processing bias OR negative bias OR 
positive bias OR cognitive bias OR interpretation bias OR memory bias OR recall bias OR 
attention* bias OR working memory bias OR implicit bias OR approach bias OR perception 
bias OR emotional working memory) AND (autistic disorder OR autistic OR autism OR ASD 
OR autism spectrum disorders OR Asperger syndrome OR Asperger OR child development 
disorders OR pervasive OR pervasive developmental disorders OR autistic spectrum OR 
Asperger* disorder OR high-functioning autism). All articles published in English from 1997 
until December 2017 were included if they reported a comparative or observational study 
about cognitive bias in autism spectrum disorders. Subsequently, articles were included if 
they used affective stimuli (i.e., not only abstract stimuli). Single case studies and articles 
which included participants with a lower range IQ (≤80) or a mean age of 65 or higher 
were excluded. We excluded individuals with a lower range IQ because cognitive biases 
may not be measured in a valid way with current paradigms in these individuals as they 
often rely on reaction times, reading skills or verbal skills. Moreover, studies that reported 
only neuroimaging data, physiological data or electroencephalographic data (thus, no 
behavioral data) were also excluded. Furthermore, review studies or studies that did not 
contain original data were excluded. A systematic review of published articles of cognitive 
biases in ASD was conducted using PubMed and PsycInfo. In addition, a backwards 
literature search was also conducted that consisted of scanning references cited in 
identified articles to evaluate if these references might be relevant to the search criteria. 
The search results were combined and duplicates were removed using a citation manager 
program.
Quality assessment
All selected articles were assessed for methodological quality using a checklist based on 
the Systematic Assessment of Quality in Observational Research (SAQOR) system, which 
was developed specifically for assessing quality in psychiatry research (Ross et al., 2011). 
The SAQOR consists of six domains: sample, control group, outcome measures, follow-up, 
distorting influences, reporting of data. Since follow-up measures are not common in bias 
research and/or no longitudinal studies were used; we revised the overall scoring rubric 
such that the follow-up domain was discarded. All domains consisted of multiple criteria; 
the number of criteria varied across domains. The following criteria were adapted or 
discarded because they were irrelevant methodological assets for cognitive psychological 
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research: ‘the sample method is described’, ‘explanation of missing data is given’ and the 
criteria of the ‘distorting influences’ domain. Each criterion was rated as ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘unclear’ 
or ‘not applicable’ and the relevant domain was then graded as ‘adequate’, ‘unclear’ or 
‘inadequate’ depending on the number of positive responses given to the criteria within the 
domain (e.g., if three of the five criteria were met; the domain was deemed adequate). An 
overall grade of quality (high, moderate, low or very low) is assigned based on adequacy in 
the five domains. Two of the authors (MAB and IvO) completed the ratings, with >95% inter-
rater agreement; all discrepancies between the raters were resolved through discussion. 
See Tables 2 and 3 for the SAQOR criteria and the level of evidence of reviewed studies.
Paradigms assessing cognitive bias & Theory of Mind (ToM)
Attentional bias
Attentional bias is a cognitive bias which entails the tendency to preferentially focus 
attention towards specific information. In the current study different paradigms to 
measure attentional bias are included, see the following sections for more specific details 
per paradigm.
Dot-probe task
In a dot-probe task, pairs of stimuli (i.e., pictures of faces or words) are depicted, of which 
one is affective (i.e., threatening or positive words, angry or happy facial expressions) 
and the other neutral. These stimuli are followed by a small visual probe appearing at the 
location occupied by one of the two stimuli. Participants have to indicate the location of 
the probe by pressing a button.
Attentional bias is measured by deducting mean reaction time (RT) of the trials with the 
probe appearing at the location of the emotional stimuli from the mean RT of the trials 
with the probe appearing at the location of the neutral stimuli. Three studies used variants 
of the dot probe task, i.e., the implicit emotional face processing task (Leung, Ye, Wong, 
Taylor, & Doesburg, 2014; Leung, Pang, Cassel, Brian, & Smith, 2015) and the exogenous 
cueing task (Zhao, Zhang, Fu, & Maes, 2016).
Visual search task
In a visual search task (i.e., face-in-the-crowd-task), schematic images or photographs 
of emotional facial expressions are used as stimuli, with the target being a happy or an 
angry face in an angry or a happy crowd (distracters). Some studies also incorporated 
sad, fearful, surprise, disgust and/or neutral facial expressions or non-social stimuli (i.e., 
snakes and flowers). Attentional bias is operationalized as the difference in mean RT for 
correctly identifying the target emotion among the distracters (other emotions) compared 
to the mean RT for identifying non-target emotions. The target-distracter-task (Ashwin, 
Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2006) and the search recognition task (Isomura, Ogawa, 
Yamada, Shibasaki, & Masataka, 2014) were both included as visual search tasks.
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Emotion recognition task
In an emotion recognition task, the participant is instructed to match a specific emotional 
facial expression with the correct emotion word or face. Most studies used sad, happy, 
fearful and neutral facial expressions; some also used disgust, sad and/or surprised 
expressions. To measure attentional bias, mean RTs for recognizing affective expressions 
were compared to those for neutral or other affective expressions. This paradigm also 
contained the Ekman-Friesen test of Facial Affect (Corden, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2008).
Emotional Stroop task
In the modified Stroop task (i.e., emotional Stroop task), affective (i.e., angry) and neutral 
words are depicted with different ink colors. The participants have to name the ink color. 
If mean RTs for naming affective words (i.e., negative words) are slower than for neutral 
words, this indicated interference of the affective words and hence stronger attentional 
bias (Ashwin, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2006).
Eye-tracker (ET) task
Using an eye-tracker allows researchers to directly gather visual attention data concerning, 
for example, the initial orientation measured with the duration of first fixation or location 
of first fixation. It also allows them to monitor the maintenance of attention measured with 
the (relative) fixation time or glance duration; see, for an example Santos et al. (2012). First 
fixation preference and longer fixation time on affective stimuli compared to neutral stimuli 
were used as measures of attentional bias.
Memory bias
Memory bias is a cognitive bias which entails recalling specific information better and more 
frequently than other information. Memory bias was generally assessed using recall tasks 
with emotional words or scenes. In these tasks, participants were shown multiple stimuli 
(i.e., words, images or stories). Memory bias is measured by the number of negative (i.e., 
emotionally arousing words such as profanities, negative pictures, and emotionally salient 
statements), positive and/or neutral stimuli correctly recognized (recognition) or recalled 
by the participants (for an example of both, see Gaigg & Bowler, 2009). Memory bias was 
operationalized by more correct recall of one affective stimulus compared to other affective 
and/or neutral stimuli.
Theory of Mind (ToM)
ToM was defined as the ability to make mental representations about one’s own and others’ 
inner emotional worlds. ToM ability can be measured using the accuracy of the recognition 
of affective facial expressions, errors and/or misinterpretations in the recognition of 
affective facial expressions, or classical or modified ToM tasks (for an example, see 




The literature searches revealed 450 relevant publications, 336 excluding duplicates. 
Another 193 articles were excluded based on re-examination of titles, as they did not 
meet the necessary criteria, or full-text articles were not available. After comparison of the 
abstracts with the inclusion criteria, another 87 articles were excluded. For full-text article 
screening, 143 articles were selected based on their titles, and 56 based on their abstracts. 
Subsequently, 31 articles were included in the final selection. A summary of the studies 
reviewed can be found in Table 1; the process of the article selection and exclusion reasons 
can be found in Figure 1.
Methodological quality
Quality assessment of the articles is shown in Table 3. Ten of the 31 studies were considered 
to be of high to moderate quality based on the SAQOR quality assessment (Corden et al., 
2008; Garcia-Blanco et al., 2017; Hollocks, Ozsivadjian, Matthews, Howlin, & Simonoff, 
2013; Kim et al., 2015; May, Cornish, & Rinehart, 2015; May, Cornish, & Rinehart, 2016; 
Miyahara, Bray, Tsujii, Fujita, & Sugiyama, 2007; Sasson, Pinkham, Weittenhiller, Faso, & 
Simpson, 2015; Weng et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2016). Six of these ten studies met all criteria 
and were rated as high. Twenty-one studies were rated as being of low to very low quality. 
Most studies were inadequate with regard to the following criteria: sample, distorting 
influences and reporting of data (i.e., reporting of outliers). The majority of these studies 
did not assess possible co-occurring affective disorders or symptoms of depression and/
or anxiety or did not describe possible medication use of the participants. Sample size 
was another important criterion, which was often deemed inadequate. Almost half of the 
studies had a small sample size (fewer than 20 participants per group).
Attentional bias
Dot-probe task
Of the seven studies using the dot-probe task or variants, the majority did not find 
significant differences between individuals with ASD and controls with regard to mean 
RTs for negative stimuli compared to positive stimuli or for affective (i.e., negative or 
positive) compared to neutral stimuli (Hollocks et al., 2013; Leung et al., 2014, 2015; May 
et al., 2015; Monk et al., 2010). One of these studies also investigated facilitated attention 
and disengagement indices based on the RTs but did not find significant differences 
between individuals with ASD and controls (May et al., 2015). A minority of the studies 
found differences in affective information processing between individuals with ASD and 
controls. One study showed a bias away from threat (i.e., angry faces), whereas controls 
demonstrated no significantly different mean RTs for angry compared to neutral faces 
(Garcia-Blanco et al., 2017). This bias away from threat in individuals with ASD was found 
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only at the longest stimulus presentation rates. Another study reported in two experiments 
an attentional bias towards the faces expressing disgust; an effect not observed in the 
controls (Zhao et al., 2016). More specifically, in the second experiment (exogenous cueing 
task) this attentional bias was only seen at  the earlier attentional stages. In the latest 
attentional stages, only individuals with ASD responded faster to the location where the 
target was not presented, regardless of the facial expression. These results suggest an 
initial hypervigilance for disgust but eventually avoidance of all facial expressions. In 
summary, these results suggest that, generally, individuals with ASD demonstrate similar 
attentional biases as controls on dot-probe tasks. Only one study found evidence for 
more attentional bias towards negative emotional faces, whilst another study (Garcia-
Blanco et al., 2017) reported an attentional bias away from negative emotional faces. The 
methodological quality of these two studies was rated high to moderate (Garcia-Blanco 
et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2016); the two other high-rated studies did not find any group 
differences (Hollocks et al., 2013; May et al., 2015).
Visual search task
Three out of eight studies reported no differences in mean RTs between the individuals 
with ASD and controls. Both groups responded faster to negative stimuli (i.e., angry) than 
to positive stimuli (i.e., happy; Isomura, Ogawa et al., 2014; May et al., 2016). One study 
showed a lack of a pop-out effect for angry facial expressions for the individuals with 
ASD compared to the controls, based on the search slope. Nevertheless, no significant 
differences were found in mean RTs between the individuals with ASD and the controls 
for finding angry facial expressions and happy facial expressions, suggesting a similar 
anger superiority effect (i.e., faster RTs for angry facial expressions than for happy 
facial expressions; Ashwin et al., 2006b). Five out of eight studies did report significant 
differences in mean RTs between the individuals with ASD and controls. Three of these 
studies reported a lack of the anger superiority effect in individuals with ASD. In these 
studies, no differences were found in mean RTs for a negative (i.e., angry) compared to a 
positive (i.e., happy) facial expression in the individuals with ASD, whereas the controls 
had faster mean RTs for negative compared to positive facial expressions (Isomura, Ito, 
Ogawa, & Masataka, 2014; Krysko & Rutherford, 2009; Sasson, Shasteen, & Pinkham, 
2015). Another study demonstrated a happy face advantage effect (i.e., faster RTs for 
happy facial expressions compared to angry facial expressions) for both groups, but the 
individuals with ASD showed longer mean RTs for negative facial expressions (i.e., fear, 
anger and sadness) compared to only one of two control groups, which was not matched 
with regard to IQ (Farran, Branson, & King, 2011). These results may indicate less negative 
bias in the individuals with ASD. The last study, which used non-social stimuli, found slower 
RTs in the individuals with ASD than in the controls for positive stimuli among negative 
stimuli, indicating less positivity bias. No differences were found between groups in finding 
negative stimuli among positive stimuli (Isomura, Ogawa, Shibasaki, & Masataka, 2015). 
Overall, the above results show that half of the studies (one study of high quality, and three 
of lower quality) found evidence for a lack of the anger superiority effect in the individuals 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of these studies (one article of high quality, and three lower quality articles), including one 
study using non-social stimuli, showed that both groups displayed, generally, more bias 
towards negative than towards positive stimuli.
Emotion recognition task
Five out of eight studies retrieved reported no differences between mean RTs for positive 
and negative stimuli in recognizing the emotional expressions, indicating no evidence 
for differences in cognitive biases between controls and individuals with ASD (Corden 
et al., 2008; Fink, de Rosnay, Wierda, Koot, & Begeer, 2014; Wang, Dapretto, Hariri, 
Sigman, & Bookheimer, 2004; Weng et al., 2011; Wong, Beidel, Sarver, & Sims, 2012). 
One study found overall slower RTs for individuals with ASD compared to the controls 
for all emotional facial expressions but in particular for neutral facial expressions 
(Eack, Mazefsky, & Minshew, 2015). Two out of eight studies showed less positivity 
bias for individuals with ASD. One study showed that individuals with ASD positioned 
themselves (i.e., by using a joy-stick) further away from happy facial expressions than 
controls (Kim et al., 2015); another study (Miyahara et al., 2007) found that only four 
out of twenty individuals with ASD demonstrated a happy face advantage compared to 
thirteen out of twenty controls. Concluding, a small minority of the studies demonstrated 
less positivity bias in individuals with ASD compared to the controls; these studies were 
rated of moderate quality (Kim et al., 2015; Miyahara et al., 2007). The majority of the 
studies did not find any differences between individuals with ASD and controls; two of 
these studies were rated high to moderate.
Emotional Stroop task
Only one study retrieved used an emotional Stroop task (Ashwin et al., 2006a). In this 
study, the individuals with ASD showed no bias for angry emotional faces, while the 
controls demonstrated increased interference of angry faces (called the anger superiority 
effect), suggesting less negative bias in individuals with ASD. Surprisingly, individuals 
with ASD showed increased interference for all facial stimuli compared to the non-social 
stimuli (i.e., chairs), an effect not seen in the controls. The methodological quality of this 
study was rated as very low.
Eye-tracker (ET) task
Only two studies reported ET data besides relevant behavioral data (Santos et al., 2012; 
Sasson, Pinkham et al., 2015). Other ET studies that only reported behavioral data, 
were discussed in the relevant result sections. The results of the two studies are mixed: 
one study found no difference in attentional biases between the group with ASD and 
the controls; both groups displayed more attentional bias towards fearful emotions 
compared to the other emotions, as measured by the total fixation time (Sasson, 
Pinkham et al., 2015). In the other study, the findings suggested that, initially, there 
was less negative bias in the group with ASD compared to controls as shown by fewer 
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and shorter first fixations on the negative emotional social scenes relative to the neutral 
social scenes; the overall fixations, however, suggested that both groups demonstrated 
a negative bias. In conclusion, only one of the two retrieved studies that used ET reported 
some evidence for less negative bias in the group with ASD; the other study did not find 
significant differences between individuals with ASD and controls in attentional bias. 
Both studies were rated of lower methodological quality.
Memory bias
Three out of five studies using a recall task did find less bias for negative affective 
stimuli in individuals with ASD. The controls recalled negative affective stimuli better 
than neutral stimuli, while the individuals with ASD recalled negative stimuli to the 
same extent as neutral stimuli (Beversdorf et al., 1998; Deruelle, Hubert, Santos, & 
Wicker, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, 2009), One study found that the individuals with ASD 
recalled more negative affective arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli compared to the 
controls, but the forgetting rate of these arousing words was higher for the individuals 
with ASD (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). Another study using both an emotional story (not per 
se negative or positive) and a neutral or an arousing negative short film, did not find 
any differences in memory bias between the two groups; both groups remembered the 
emotional and arousing stimuli better than the neutral (Maras, Gaigg, & Bowler, 2012). 
In conclusion, the majority of the studies have shown that the individuals with ASD 
display less memory bias for negative affective stimuli, than controls who recall more 
negative affective stimuli. Only one study found opposite results. All studies were rated 




Figure 1  PRISMA diagram showing selection of studies for inclusion in systematic review.
Potential risk factors and explaining factors
Symptoms of depression and anxiety
Since depression and anxiety symptoms are known to influence cognitive biases (Beck & 
Haigh, 2014), the severity rates of these symptoms were taken into account by 15 out of 
31 studies. Approximately half of 15 studies controlled for a possible influence of anxiety 
symptoms on the bias results (Corden et al., 2008; Garcia-Blanco et al., 2017; Hollocks 
et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2015; May et al., 2015, 2016; Sasson, Shasteen et al., 2015; Weng 
et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2012). Neither bivariate nor multivariate analyses showed any 
relationships between the severity of anxiety symptoms and bias, indicating that anxiety 
symptoms probably did not influence the results. Only one study (Kim et al., 2015) 
reported that ASD participants with higher social anxiety scores positioned themselves 
further away from avatars displaying disgust, using a joy-stick, in contrast to the other 
emotions. This effect was not found for the ASD participants with low scores on social 
anxiety and control participants. Only three studies controlled for depressive symptoms 
Records identified through
database searching (N = 386)
Additional records identified
through other sources (N = 64)
Records after duplicates removed
(N = 336)
Records screened (title) 
(N = 336)
Records screened 
(abstract) (N = 143)
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility (N = 56)
Studies included in 





Full-text articles excluded, with reasons (N = 25):
• 1 used a patient group with only ASD traits
• 13 did not (substantively) address cognitive bias
•  9 used an experimental task which was not 
sufficient to test cognitive bias or different 
emotional facial expression stimuli were not 
specified/used
• 1 no behavioural data was available
• 1 measured only effect of medicine on patient group
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(Hollocks et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2015; Weng et al., 2011). Kim et al. (2015) found that 
participants with ASD and higher internalizing problems (e.g., depression and anxiety) 
positioned themselves at greater interpersonal distance from avatars depicting disgust 
compared to the other emotions. Two studies demonstrated a trend for significantly 
higher depressive symptoms in individuals with ASD than controls but did not adjust 
for these symptoms in the relevant analyses (Hollocks et al., 2013; Weng et al., 2011). 
These two studies found no significant differences in cognitive biases between the 
participants with ASD and the control participants. Hence, overall, only a few studies 
controlled for symptoms of depression and/or anxiety in their analyses. Most of these 
studies did not find an influence of anxiety on their results. Only one study controlled 
for the effect of depressive symptoms on their results; this study found a bias away from 
faces displaying disgust in individuals with ASD and higher internalizing problems.
Medication use
The use of psychotropic medication was categorized in selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), (a-typical) antipsychotics (AP), 
stimulants, anticonvulsants, and anxiolytics. Ten out of 31 studies controlled for the 
use of medication or reported the prescribed medication use. Participants were free of 
psychotropic medication at the time of testing in four studies (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008, 
2009; Garcia-Blanco et al., 2017; Santos et al., 2012). The other six studies provided 
specific information about the medication used in the participants with ASD (Leung 
et al., 2014, 2015; Monk et al., 2010; Sasson, Pinkham et al., 2015; Weng et al., 2011; 
Wong et al., 2012). Most prescriptions were stimulants, SSRIs and (atypical) AP in these 
studies. The four studies that used participants who were free of medication reported 
differences between the ASD and control groups in attentional- or memory bias. These 
studies found both less as well as more negative bias for the individuals with ASD (Gaigg 
& Bowler, 2008, 2009; Garcia-Blanco et al., 2017; Santos et al., 2012). Inspecting the 
other six studies that specified the medication used, no group differences for fixation 
times, mean RTs or attentional bias scores for the affective stimuli were found. In 
summary, studies with participants free of medication found differences in cognitive 
biases for the ASD group. However, the studies that described the medication used 
found no group differences in the results.
Severity of ASD symptoms
Some studies corrected their results for the severity of ASD symptoms by including the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron- Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001) and/or Autism Diagnostic Observation Scale (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) scores as 
covariate in the analyses (Corden et al., 2008; Eack et al., 2015; Isomura, Ito et al., 2014). 
Neither bivariate nor multivariate analyses of the relationship between the severity 
of ASD symptoms and cognitive bias results showed any differences in the results, 
indicating that the severity of ASD symptoms probably did not influence cognitive biases 
in these studies.
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Theory of Mind (ToM)
Eleven out of 19 studies using the attentional bias tasks reported no differences in 
ToM ability between the individuals with ASD and the controls on the tasks used. Eight 
studies found differences in ToM ability between the experimental groups (Corden et 
al., 2008; Eack et al., 2015; Hollocks et al., 2013; Krysko & Rutherford, 2009; Leung 
et al., 2015; Sasson, Pinkham et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 2016) in 
individuals with ASD compared to controls. Of the studies using the memory bias tasks, 
only one study investigated ToM ability. A trend for fewer correct responses was found 
in the answers regarding the ToM stories for the individuals with ASD compared to the 
controls (Beversdorf et al., 1998). Six out of nine studies that showed differences in 
ToM ability (Corden et al., 2008; Eack et al., 2015; Hollocks et al., 2013; Leung et al., 
2015; Sasson, Pinkham et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2004) did not find differences between 
the groups in cognitive bias for the varying affective stimuli. The studies that reported 
differences in cognitive bias reported less negative bias (Beversdorf et al., 1998; Krysko 
& Rutherford, 2009) or more negative bias (i.e., towards disgust) in individuals with 
ASD (Zhao et al., 2016). In conclusion, over half of the twenty studies that measured 
ToM ability showed no differences in ToM ability between controls and individuals with 
ASD. When differences in ToM ability were reported, two-thirds of the studies did not find 
differences in cognitive biases, one-third reported less bias (both positive and negative) 
or more negative bias.
Developmental age
Fourteen out of 31 studies included children and/or adolescents (younger than or equal 
to 18 years; Fink et al., 2014; Garcia-Blanco et al., 2017; Hollocks et al., 2013; Isomura, 
Ito et al., 2014, 2015; Isomura, Ogawa et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015; Leung et al., 2015, 
2014; May et al., 2015, 2016; Weng et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2012; Zhao et al., 2016); one 
study (Wang et al., 2004) used both children and adults. Of the fifteen studies in children 
and adolescents, five studies demonstrated differences in cognitive biases, mostly less 
cognitive biases (both positive and negative), in the individuals with ASD (Garcia-Blanco 
et al., 2017; Isomura, Ito et al., 2014, 2015; Kim et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2016). One 
study reported bias towards negative stimuli in children with ASD (Zhao et al., 2016). Of 
the seventeen studies in adults (over 18 years of age), ten studies found differences in 
cognitive biases (Beversdorf et al., 1998; Deruelle et al., 2008; Eack et al., 2015; Farran et 
al., 2011; Gaigg & Bowler, 2008, 2009; Krysko & Rutherford, 2009; Miyahara et al., 2007; 
Santos et al., 2012; Sasson, Shasteen et al., 2015). Nine of these studies demonstrated 
less cognitive biases (both positive and negative) in participants with ASD; only one 
study found more negative bias in the individuals with ASD (Gaigg & Bowler, 2008). 
In conclusion, one third of the studies in ASD children and adolescents mainly showed 
less cognitive biases. In contrast, more than half of the studies in adults with ASD 
showed less cognitive biases.
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Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first systematic review of studies on the presence 
of information processing biases in individuals with ASD aiming to expand our 
understanding of the possible presence of cognitive biases in ASD and to investigate 
if these biases could be a possible explaining factor for the high prevalence of MDD in 
individuals with ASD. Our analysis showed that half of the studies retrieved did not find 
differences in information processing biases between individuals with ASD and controls. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that only one third of the studies were of higher quality; 
the other two-thirds of the studies were of lower methodological quality. The studies 
that found differences in affective information processing between the two groups 
showed inconsistent findings. Two-thirds of these studies found less negative biases 
in individuals with ASD as opposed to controls. For the interpretation of these results, it 
is important to note that the overall quality of these studies was low. Conversely, some 
studies found evidence for more processing of negative information or less processing 
of positive information in individuals with ASD compared to controls; these studies were 
of moderate to lower methodological quality.
Taking potential confounders into account, we found little evidence that current mood 
state influenced the presence of bias. Although a small number of studies adjusted 
for this important variable in the analyses, these studies were generally of higher 
methodological quality. Almost all studies that controlled for anxiety in the analyses 
reported no effect of the presence of anxiety on cognitive bias. Furthermore, we found 
evidence that differences in ToM ability might possibly have influenced the findings in 
some of the paradigms used. Studies reporting a diminished ToM ability and differences 
in biased information processing between individuals with ASD and controls generally 
reported less cognitive biases (both positive and negative). Another finding was the 
difference in developmental age and the results of the included studies: nearly all 
studies including adults that found differences in biased information processing showed 
less cognitive biases (both positive and negative), while only some studies including 
children reported less cognitive biases. No evidence for distorting influences of the 
symptom severity of autism or of psychotropic medication was found. It should be noted 
that only a small number of studies controlled for these variables. Thus, ToM demands of 
the specific tasks used and developmental age may possibly influence the findings and 
might in part explain the mixed findings in the current literature.
Applying a standardized assessment of the methodological quality of the studies 
included, we found that a third of the studies were of high to moderate methodological 
quality. The other studies had low to very low quality ratings. The most important and 
frequent methodological weaknesses we encountered were small sample sizes, no 
adequate or reported matching of the controls with regard to age, IQ and/or gender 
and no reporting of or adjusting for distorting influences. These inadequacies in the 
lower rated studies might also partially explain our mixed findings. Small sample sizes 
may have influenced the findings in particular. More than one third of the studies 
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included fewer than 20 participants per group; two thirds of these studies with a 
small number of participants reported no significant differences in biased information 
processing between the two groups. Therefore, some of these studies might have been 
underpowered and might have reported false negative results. Adequate matching of the 
experimental groups, also with regard to verbal IQ, is of particular importance for studies 
using these paradigms. Studies matching individuals with ASD and controls on non-
verbal IQ generally tend to find deficits in emotion recognition, while in studies matching 
on verbal IQ, these deficits in emotion recognition tend to disappear (Braverman, Fein, 
Lucci, & Waterhouse, 1989; Krysko & Rutherford, 2009; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 
1990).
One of the aims of this review was to investigate if biased information processing could 
be a cognitive risk factor for developing MDD in individuals with ASD, in line with a 
cognitive theory of depression (e.g., Beck, 2008; Beck & Haigh, 2014). We found little 
evidence for an increased cognitive vulnerability to MDD in individuals with ASD in 
the current literature: few studies showed more negative or less positive bias. These 
results might suggest that vulnerability for developing MDD could partially be a result 
of alterations in cognitive and/or (neuro)biological processes associated with ASD, 
meaning that MDD in individuals with ASD might represent a unique variant of MDD. 
For instance, the high prevalence of MDD in individuals with ASD might be in part due 
to cognitive vulnerability factors for MDD such as EF deficits (Lawson et al., 2015) and a 
weak CC (Snyder, 2013). In addition, differences in social communication in children with 
ASD are associated with MDD (Rai et al., 2018). Hence, the relationship of cooccurring 
cognitive differences in ToM ability, EF and a weak CC might possibly contribute partially 
to the increased risk for developing MDD in individuals with ASD. It is crucial to consider 
that the models proposed above are possibly not competitive but rather complementary 
and potentially integrative. In fact, MDD may not have a single cause but a (multiple) 
causal chain including (neuro)biological, psychological, environmental and social risk 
factors (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001).
The interpretation of the results found in this review is complicated by the large variability 
between studies in participant characteristics (e.g., IQ, age, and gender), tasks and 
stimuli and may also be due to the heterogeneity of the disorder. Cognitive biases and 
emotion recognition ability have been reported to be different in men and women and 
to change across the lifespan (Demenescu, Mathiak, & Mathiak, 2014; Isaacowitz, 
Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006). Furthermore, ToM may develop at another pace in 
children with ASD compared to typically developing children (Happé, 1995). This might 
result in more differences in tasks using emotion recognition or stimuli with interactive 
components (Kimhi, 2014) and consequently could mask possible cognitive biases. 
In addition, the stimuli used in most paradigms used in the studies included were 
generally negative in content but not specifically designed for ASD research (for example, 
the use of facial or social stimuli); these may not be sensitive enough to capture the 
negative cognitive biases that are assumed to increase the cognitive vulnerability of 
MDD. Differences in the tasks used to assess biases and the methodological quality 
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of these tasks could also partially explain the mixed results found in the literature. For 
example, a dot-probe task is supposed to have a lower reliability compared to an eye-
tracker task (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014) and tasks using mean 
RTs as a measure of attention, such as the dot-probe task and the emotional Stroop 
task, are generally more vulnerable for confounding effects such as response execution 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012).
This review is an attempt to integrate existing knowledge using a neuropsychological 
framework, in order to investigate possible explanatory factors for the high prevalence 
of MDD in ASD. Strengths of this systematic review are the inclusion of potentially 
distorting or explaining factors such as symptoms of depressions and anxiety, ToM 
ability and the systematic assessment of the methodological quality of the retrieved 
studies. Several weaknesses also have to be taken into account. Since only a fair number 
of studies directly investigated cognitive biases with affective stimuli in individuals 
with ASD, we included studies that indirectly studied cognitive biases, such as the 
emotion recognition task or tasks using affective stimuli in general. These tasks may 
not have been sensitive enough to assess possibly existing cognitive biases in ASD. 
For future studies, it is recommended to control for common co-occurring symptoms or 
disorders such as affective disorders, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Matson 
& Cervantes, 2014), and current mood state, since these factors may influence affective 
information processing. It might be crucial to include a measure of ToM or emotion 
recognition ability when using emotional faces or social stimuli as an addition to the 
cognitive biases tasks. Furthermore, it is recommended to include a sufficient number of 
participants per experimental group to ensure adequate statistical power and to match 
the groups with regard to age, gender and (verbal) IQ.
Implications
The current literature, in general, found no differences in affective information processing 
between individuals with ASD and controls and when studies did show cognitive biases, 
they reported less negative biases in individuals with ASD. Based on the results of 
these studies, differential cognitive biases may possibly not be a cognitive marker for 
MDD in ASD. Nevertheless, studies reporting less negative biases were mostly of lower 
methodological quality and might have been influenced by high ToM demands of the 
tasks and developmental age. Methodological flaws such as small sample sizes and a 
large variety in sample characteristics, paradigms and stimuli used may possibly have 
influenced the findings. More research is needed to clarify the specific characteristics of 
biased information processing in individuals with ASD, taking all relevant confounding 
variables into account and specifically designed for ASD symptomatology.
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Abstract
Heightened attention towards negative information is characteristic of depression. 
Evidence is emerging for a negative attentional bias in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), 
perhaps driven by the high comorbidity between ASD and depression. We investigated 
whether ASD is characterised by a negative attentional bias and whether this can be 
explained by comorbid (sub)clinical depression. Participants (n = 116) with current 
(CD) or remitted depression (RD) and/or ASD, and 64 controls viewed positively and 
negatively valenced (non-)social pictures. Groups were compared on three components 
of visual attention using linear mixed models. Both CD individuals with and without ASD, 
but not remitted depressed and never-depressed ASD individuals showed a negative 
bias, suggesting that negative attentional bias might be a depressive state-specific 
marker for depression in ASD.
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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by a 
triad of deficits involving communication, reciprocal social interactions, and restricted 
and repetitive behaviours and interests (American Psychiatric Association 2013). The 
estimated prevalence of ASD is almost 1% in the general population (Baxter et al. 
2015). ASD frequently co-occurs with other mental disorders such as attention-deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anxiety disorders and depression (Matson and Nebel-
Schwalm 2007; Simonoff et al. 2008). For instance, the co-occurrence of depression 
in individuals with ASD is four times as high as in neurotypical individuals (Hudson et 
al. 2019) and ASD individuals, moreover, tend to experience high levels of depressive 
symptoms even when a clinical diagnosis of depression is absent (Gotham et al. 2015). 
This comorbidity is associated with functional burden and clinical implication (Joshi et 
al. 2013; Mazefsky et al. 2012) and higher suicidal risk (De-la-Iglesia and Olivar 2015). 
Depression in ASD is often underrecognised and, thus, undertreated (Chandrasekhar 
and Sikich 2015). Characteristics of ASD can complicate the assessment and 
diagnosis of depressive symptoms in ASD, such as concentration problems and 
difficulties in communicating affect through facial expressions or intonation (Stewart 
et al. 2006). Despite the high prevalence and impact of depression in ASD, the factors 
contributing to the comorbidity between these disorders are not well understood. 
This lack of knowledge hinders innovations in the diagnostics and treatment of comorbid 
ASD and depression. In this study, we aim to expand this knowledge by investigating 
negative attentional bias, a well-known cognitive vulnerability factor for developing 
and maintaining depression (De Raedt and Koster 2010; Gotlib and Joormann 2010), 
in individuals with ASD who either have or have not developed a comorbid depression.
According to a prominent cognitive model of depression (Beck 2008; Beck and 
Bredemeier 2016), the experience of adverse events during childhood may contribute 
to the development of dysfunctional assumptions about oneself, the future, and the 
world. These assumptions are integrated into cognitive schemata. When activated (e.g., 
by stress), these schemata affect how information is processed, which may result in 
cognitive biases (Beck 2008). These biases are studied in different cognitive domains, 
such as attention, interpretation, and memory (LeMoult and Gotlib 2018; Mathews and 
MacLeod 2005). 
Negatively biased attentional processing is the automatic tendency to focus more on 
negative information and is a hallmark feature of depression (Beck 1967; Beck and 
Bredemeier 2016; Bower 1981; LeMoult and Gotlib 2019; Williams et al. 1988). This 
feature has generally been examined in depression using behavioural tasks such as the 
dot-probe task (e.g., Peckham et al. 2010), the emotional Stroop task (e.g., Peckham et 
al. 2010), the exogenous cuing paradigm (e.g., Koster et al. 2005), or the visual search 
task (e.g., Rinck and Becker 2005). However, a main methodological limitation of these 
tasks is their reliance on reaction times; these are susceptible to confounding influences 
of manual reactions (Mathews et al. 1996). An eye-tracker can be used to measure 
attentional bias more continuously and directly (Armstrong and Olatunji 2012), and is 
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therefore a good alternative to the reaction time tasks (Waechter et al. 2014). Moreover, 
using an eye-tracker enables researchers to examine attention at several stages of 
processing, from initial engagement and shifting of attention to overall engagement 
(Armstrong and Olatunji 2012). An eye-tracking task was therefore employed in the 
current study.
Depressed individuals show increased maintained attention (i.e., overall engagement) 
towards negative and away from positive information compared to never-depressed 
individuals, which is interpreted as a difficulty in disengaging from negative information 
(e.g., Armstrong and Olatunji 2012; Gotlib and Joormann 2010; Kellough et al. 2008; 
Peckham et al. 2010). Discrepancies exist in the attentional bias literature for individuals 
who have recovered from a depressive episode (i.e., remitted depression). A number of 
studies have shown similar attentional bias patterns using reaction time tasks in both 
current and remitted depressed individuals; namely, either more negative or less positive 
attentional bias (e.g., Peckham et al. 2010; Joormann and Gotlib 2007). Additionally, 
Sears et al. (2011) found in their eye-tracking study negative bias in the first stage but 
not in later stages of processing (i.e., measured by the number of fixations) in remitted 
depressed and current dysphoric individuals compared  to never-depressed individuals. 
In contrast, other eye-tracking studies found no difference in initial attention (i.e., first 
fixation location) between remitted and never-depressed individuals (e.g., Isaac et al. 
2014; Li et al. 2016). However, Isaac et al. (2014) found evidence for a positive bias on 
overall gaze duration in both remitted and never-depressed individuals, as opposed to 
Li et al. (2016) demonstrating a less positive attentional bias for the remitted depressed 
individuals, but no differences in negative bias compared with the healthy controls. 
Given that the evidence for negative attentional bias in remitted depressed patients is 
mixed and findings may differ depending on the eye-tracking index used (e.g., overall 
gaze duration, number of fixation), we aimed to differentiate between currently and 
remitted depressed patients on various frequently used eye-tracking indices. 
Children with ASD are more prone to encounter adverse events compared to neurotypical 
children, such as being frequently victimised by peers (Zablotsky et al. 2014) as well as 
having other types of social difficulties such as loneliness (Bauminger et al. 2003). As 
described in the cognitive model by Beck (2008), adverse events during childhood can 
result in negative cognitive biases. The frequent experience of adverse childhood events 
may form the basis for the development of negative attentional bias in ASD. Research on 
cognitive biases in ASD is limited (Bergman et al. 2020), with the available studies mainly 
showing reduced attentional bias towards social information (e.g., persons, faces, eyes) 
relative to non-depressed individuals (Chita-Tegmark 2016; Dubey et al. 2017; Sasson 
et al. 2008), although contradictory findings have also been reported (for a review, see 
Guillon et al. 2014). This makes sense because ASD is characterised by impairments in 
reciprocal social interaction (Dawson et al. 2004). When it comes to affective stimuli, the 
few studies available show equivocal results, with most evidence (mainly from reaction 
time tasks) in favour of a more positive bias in ASD compared to individuals without SD 
(see review by Bergman et al. 2020). A more recent eye-tracking study, however, found 
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that both individuals with ASD and depressed individuals oriented faster to negative 
stimuli and spent less time overall on positive stimuli than non-clinical individuals 
(Unruh et al. 2018).
In the current study, we aimed to examine if individuals with ASD show a negative 
attentional bias and whether the negative bias is explained by comorbid clinical and 
subclinical depression. For this purpose, we employed a free-viewing eye-tracking task 
assessing attentional bias for positive and negative, social and non-social stimuli. 
Five groups of participants were compared using the eye-tracking indices: Individuals 
diagnosed with ASD (ASD), currently depressed individuals with no ASD (CD), remitted 
depressed individuals with no ASD (RD), individuals with ASD and comorbid current 
and/or remitted depression (ASD+CD/RD), and healthy controls (HC). We expected that 
CD would attend longer to negative stimuli compared to positive stimuli, whereas HC 
were expected to show a positive attentional bias. RD individuals were expected to show 
a negative bias, albeit somewhat weaker than CD (cf. Isaac et al. 2014; Peckham et al. 
2010). Based on previous eye-tracking studies (Chita-Tegmark 2016; Unruh et al. 2018), 
participants with ASD—both with and without concurrent depression—were expected 
to exhibit a negative attentional bias, specifically for non-social stimuli. By comparing 
participants with ASD and RD to those with ASD and CD, we examined the trait-like 
feature of attentional bias in ASD. Since attentional bias for valenced information in ASD 
and ASD with comorbid depression has not been frequently investigated, we additionally 
examined if a similar pattern of attentional bias is present in attentional indices besides 
overall engagement (i.e., initial engagement and shifting). This will provide a more 
complete and sensitive overview of the possible presence of attentional bias at different 
stages of information processing of valenced information in ASD (and depression).
Methods
Participants
This study is part of the MIND-Set study (Measuring Integrated Novel Dimensions in 
Neurodevelopmental and Stressrelated Mental Disorders): An ongoing observational 
crosssectional study that takes place at the outpatient unit of the Psychiatry department 
of Radboud university medical center (Radboudumc), Nijmegen, the Netherlands. 
The study has been approved by the Ethical Review Board of the Radboudumc. Adult 
clinical patients (18 and older) with a clinical diagnosis of a stress-related disorder 
(mood disorder, anxiety disorder, and/or substance use disorders [SUD]) and/or a 
neurodevelopmental disorder (ASD and/or ADHD) were eligible to participate. 
An additional healthy control (HC) group was recruited by advertising in the community 
(e.g., social media and websites), via the Radboud Research Participation System as 
well as verbally through researchers’ personal networks. In this group, the absence of 
a lifetime history of the aforementioned mental disorders was verified via a telephone 
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screening interview, using the same measurement instruments for the MIND-Set 
population as described below in the Clinical and Demographic Characteristics section. 
All participants had normal or corrected to-normal vision. Participants with a current 
psychosis, sensorimotor handicaps, an estimate IQ below 70, insufficient mastery of 
the Dutch language, epilepsy (only for the eye-tracker task) or participants who were 
mentally incompetent to sign informed consent were excluded. All participants signed 
informed consent before taking part.
A subset of the MIND-Set sample used in the current study which was collected from 
August 2016 to May 2018 and consisted of the following five final groups: Participants 
diagnosed with ASD (ASD; n = 15), currently depressed participants with no ASD (CD; n = 
40), remitted depressed participants with no ASD (RD; n = 24), participants with ASD and 
comorbid current and/or remitted depression (ASD+CD/RD; n = 37), and healthy control 
participants (HC; n = 64). Eye-tracking data from nine participants from the ASD+CD/
RD group, nine from the CD, and one participant from the HC group were discarded due 
to excessive artifacts and calibration problems. A patient was given the diagnosis of 
remitted depression if at least one previous depressive episode was present and the 
patient was currently not meeting the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV) criteria for a major depressive disorder. Remitted 
depression included full and partial remission (one till four depressive symptoms 
according to the DSM-IV). Previous episodes were assessed with the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I; First et al. 1996). Subsequently, to examine 
whether the bias in ASD remains after remission, the ASD+CD and ASD+RD groups were 
compared in additional post hoc analyses.
To increase the validity and generalizability of our results, we used a naturalistic clinical 
patient sample as included in the larger MIND-Set population. Thus, the participants 
in the subsample of this study could, besides (remitted) depression and/or ASD, have 
additional comorbid mental disorder(s), such as ADHD, anxiety disorder(s) and/or SUD. 
Participants with only a diagnosis of dysthymia or bipolar disorder were excluded from 
this subsample. A final subsample of 116 participants with ASD and/or depression and 
64 HC was included in the analyses. All participants were between 18 and 65 years of 
age. For the demographic variables of the final groups, see Table 1; for the comorbid 
disorders present in the participants with ASD and/or depression, see Table 2.
Clinical and demographic characteristics
The MIND-Set study was conducted during the transition period from the DSM-IV to 
DSM-5. All individuals were diagnosed and classified by a trained and experienced 
clinician. Stress-related disorders and ADHD were classified according to DSM-IV and 
ASD according to DSM-5. Mood disorders and anxiety disorders were assessed with the 
SCID-I (First et al. 1996) and SUD with the Measurements in the Addictions for Triage and 
Evaluation and criminality (MATE-Crimi; Schippers et al. 2010). The SCID-I was also used 
to exclude individuals with psychotic disorders. Neurodevelopmental disorders were 
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assessed during a two-step diagnostic screening procedure, using the World Health 
Organization Adult ADHD Self-report Scale (ASRS)-short version for ADHD (Kim et al. 
2013) and the Autism-Spectrum Quotient-50 (AQ- 50; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001) for ASD 
screening. When screening was positive (six items, cut-off > 3), we used the Diagnostic 
Interview for ADHD in Adults Version 2.0 (DIVA 2.0; Kooij and Francken 2010) for ADHD 
diagnosis. When an individual scored positive on the AQ-50 (50 items, cut-off > 25), we 
used the Dutch Interview for ASD in Adults (in Dutch: Nederlands Interview ten behoeve 
van Diagnostiek Autismespectrumstoornissen bij volwassenen; NIDA; Vuijk 2016) for 
ASD diagnosis. If possible, both the DIVA and NIDA were completed in the presence of 
a partner and/or family member of the individual to be able to retrospectively gather 
information on a broad range of symptoms in childhood and adulthood, following the 
Dutch guidelines (Kan 2013). If an individual was previously diagnosed with ASD or 
(an) other disorder(s) by another institution, the diagnostic information was retrieved 
and examined by the treating clinician (this was applicable for 19% of the partcipants 
with ASD included in this study). In addition, every participant was asked to complete 
the Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology (IDS-SR; Rush et al. 1996) to measure 
depressive symptom levels. Sociodemographic information concerning the participant’s 
gender, age, and education level was acquired by using online questionnaires.
 
 
Table 1  Group comparisons on demographic variables (means and standard deviations [SD]), 
including test statistics for the group comparisons.
 
Group
Variable ASD (n = 15) CD (n = 40) RD (n = 24) ASD+CD/RD (n = 37) HC (n = 64) Group comparisons
Gender, female (%) 47 45 42 37 58 χ2(4) = 4.54, p = .338
Age, mean (SD) 39 (12.06) 43 (14.09) 41 (10.79) 37 (13.46) 35 (14.69) F(4, 175) = 2.33, p = .058
Education level1 χ2(8) = 17.67, p = .024
   Low (%) 13 28 21 15 2
   Middle (%) 40 30 29 41 34
   High (%) 40 35 50 35 58    
IDS-SR 25 (13.84) 43 (11.01) 27 (10.61) 32 (11.13) 5 (4.34) F(4, 171) = 105. 25, p < 
.001
ASD = autism spectrum disorder. CD = current depression. RD = remitted depression. ASD+CD/RD = autism spectrum disorder with current 
and/or remitted depression. HC = healthy controls. IDS-SR = Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology - Self Rated.
1Adjusted classification based on the classification by Ikram et al. (2014). Low: no education or elementary education and lower vocational and 
general secondary education combined. Middle: intermediate vocational and higher secondary education. High: higher vocational education 
or university. 
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Table 2  Prevalence of comorbid mental disorders in the ASD and/or depression participants.
 
ADHD = attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. SUD = substance use disorder.
Materials and apparatus
Free-viewing task
The free viewing task comprised of 96 pictures selected from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al. 1997) and the Nencki Affective Picture System (NAPS; 
Marchewka et al. 2014). Pictures were selected to fit a social stimulus category (i.e., one 
or more individuals) and a non-social stimulus category (i.e., landscapes, animals and 
objects). Moreover, based on the valence ratings, pictures in the negative (M = 2.51, 
SD = 0.42) and positive (M = 7.79, SD = 0.33) categories were selected. For both the 
social and non-social pictures, half of all the stimuli were positively valenced and the 
other half were negatively valenced. These stimulus categories were chosen to capture 
both attentional bias for negative information and bias for social information in ASD, 
as previously demonstrated (Chita-Tegmark 2016; LeMoult and Gotlib 2018). The final 
stimulus groups were thus: negative non-social (NNS), negative social (NS), positive non-
social (PNS), and positive social (PS). An independent-samples t-test was performed on 
valence ratings of negative (NNS & NS) and positive (PNS & PS) pictures, demonstrating 
a significant effect of valence (t (95) = 19.06, p < 0.001). A separate ANOVA conducted for 
arousal ratings of NNS (M = 6.78, SD = 0.42), NS (M = 6.36, SD = 0.81), PNS (M = 3.79, 
SD = 0.82), and PS (M = 4.73, SD = 0.72) showed a significant effect of arousal (F (3, 
92) = 92.79, p < 0.001). Post hoc analyses demonstrated that all pair-wise comparisons 
were significant (p < 0.048). Negative stimuli, in general, were rated with higher arousal 
levels compared to positive stimuli, since, for example, a picture of a tropical island 
is less arousing than a mutilated animal. In addition, high arousing (i.e., threatening) 
stimuli are mainly associated with biased attentional processing in anxiety disorders 
and not in depression (Peckham et al. 2010). Since we are only interested in attentional 
bias for valence, we conducted the experiment with the set of stimuli as included in this 
study. Each trial began with a 1000 ms centrally presented fixation cross, followed by the 
simultaneous presentation of one slide (i.e., one trial) containing four pictures for 30 s. 
Group
Comorbid disorder ASD (n = 15) CD (n = 40) RD (n = 24) ASD+CD/RD (n = 37)
ADHD (%) 27 20 50 27
Anxiety disorder (%) 20 25 38 38
SUD (%) 0 23 17 0
Number of diagnoses, 
indicating level of 
comorbidity (%)
1 = 53; 2 = 27, 3 ≥ 13 1 = 50, 2 = 28, 3 ≥ 23 1 = 13, 2 = 54, 3 ≥ 33 2 = 43, 3 ≥ 57
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A total of 12 trials per block (i.e., a block contained all the social or non-social stimuli) 
were presented. Two pictures of the same valence were not presented consecutively. 
Blocks were presented in a random order across participants and not per participant 
group. For an example of a slide, see Figure 1. 
Eye-tracker 
A remote eye-tracking system (SMI RED500) was used to measure participants’ eye 
movements; a free range of head movements was allowed. The sampling rate was 
500 Hz. Data were collected using a velocity-based algorithm with a minimum fixation 
duration threshold of 100 ms and a peak velocity threshold of 40◦/s. The areas of interest 
(AOIs) were identified for each trial, and corresponded to the total area for each of the 
four pictures plus the areas in the outer corners of the four pictures to take recording 
noises into account. A total of four AOIs were constructed, corresponding to the picture 
categories: positive social, negative social, positive non-social, and negative non-social. 
Eye-tracking data were preprocessed using SMI BeGaze Version 3.7 (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, Inc., Teltow, Germany). The data were visually inspected for abnormalities 
and checked for distributional anomalies; these were not found in the current sample.
Procedure
Prior to the start of the eye-tracking task, participants were placed in a height-adjustable 
chair approximately 60 cm in front of the table-mounted eye-tracker with a 22″ Dell TFT-
monitor on which the stimuli were presented. The experiment started once the nine-
point calibration procedure was completed successfully (i.e., the mean of the error was 
1.5◦ or less of the visual angle for each calibration point; in line with García-Blanco et 
al. 2014). Between blocks, the calibration procedure was repeated. The participants 
were instructed to focus their gaze on the fixation cross. Upon presentation of the four 
pictures, participants were instructed to view the pictures naturally in preparation of a 
recognition task. The eye-tracking task consisted of two parts: a free-viewing task and a 
recognition task. Beforehand, the participants were told that the recognition task would 
be administered after the free-viewing task. The recognition task contained the same 
stimuli and had to be completed by the participant to obscure the nature of the task. 
In this task, participants were instructed to click on the image that had changed from 
its initial location in the free-viewing task. In the current study, we present the results 
of only the free-viewing task. The total duration of the eye-tracking task including the 
calibration procedures was approximately 20 min.
Eye movement data preparation
A distinction can be made between different components of attentional bias (Cisler 
and Koster 2010; Yiend 2010). Based on prior studies (e.g., García-Blanco et al. 2014; 
Isaac et al. 2014; Mo et al. 2019), the following three attentional indices were computed: 
(1) Overall engagement: total gaze duration (ms) per AOI (i.e., the total duration in ms 
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that each participant’s gaze remained fixated within the boundaries of a given AOI). 
(2) Initial engagement: the location of the first fixation on a given AOI in each trial. (3) 
Shifting: total revisits per AOI (i.e., number of fixations returning to the given AOI). The 
three attentional indices: gaze duration, first fixation location, and revisits were used as 
dependent variables.
Figure 1  Left: an example slide from the non-social block, in which two positively valenced pictures 
(top left and bottom right) and two negatively valenced pictures are depicted (top right and bottom 
left). Right: an example slide from the social block, in which two positively valenced pictures (top 
left and bottom right) and two negatively valenced pictures (top right and bottom left) are depicted. 
Statistical analyses
We conducted separate linear mixed-effects analyses for each different attentional 
variable. Visual inspection of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from 
homoscedasticity or normality for the between-subjects factor ‘Group’ (ASD, CD, RD, 
ASD+CD/RD, and HC) and the within-subjects factors stimulus categories ‘Social’ (non-
social vs. social), and ‘Valence’ (positive vs. negative). These variables were included 
as fixed effects in each model. As a random effect, the intercepts for the individual 
participants were included. Gender, age and education level were included as covariates 
in all analyses, since these variables can affect mood disorders and attentional 
processing (Bjelland et al. 2008; Isaacowitz et al. 2006; Kendler et al. 2004). Data were 
analysed using Statistical Package of the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 25.0.




The five groups did not differ significantly with respect to gender or age; however, the 
participants did differ significantly on education level (see Table 1). The depressed 
participants (CD and RD) had lower education levels compared to the ASD, ASD+CD/RD, 
and HC groups.
Group comparisons on gaze duration for affective social and non-social 
information
Testing the inclusion of the random intercept in the model 
To test the model fit, the likelihood ratio of the full model with the random effect was 
tested against the likelihood ratio of the model without the random effect, resulting in 
a significant difference, χ2 (1) = 634.78, p < 0.001. Thus, adding the random intercept 
significantly improved the fit of the model.
Linear mixed effects analysis of gaze duration 
A linear mixed effects analysis was conducted with the dependent variable Gaze Duration, 
the between-subjects factor Group and the within-subjects factors stimulus categories 
(Social and Valence) and the random intercept for Participant. The three-way interaction 
between Group, Social, and Valence was not significant, F (4, 13,102.08) = 1.88, p = 
0.111. The interaction between Group and Valence was significant, F (4, 13,102.08) = 9.0, 
p < 0.001, as was the interaction between Valence and Social interaction, F (1, 13,102.08) 
= 16.69, p < 0.001. The interaction between Group and Social was not significant, F (4, 
13,237.25) = 0.71, p = 0.586. The analysis further revealed a main effect of Valence, which 
indicated that participants looked longer at negative compared to positive stimuli, 
F (1, 13,102.08) = 9.70, p = 0.002, mean differences (Mdiff) = 190.64 ms, 95% CI [70.67, 
310.61]. The main effects of Group and Social were not significant, Group: F (4, 145.97) = 
1.96, p = 0.104; Social: F (1, 13,246.40) = 0.028, p = 0.867. 
Post hoc analyses of the Group*Valence interaction were conducted. First, we looked 
within each group to compare the total gaze duration for positive and negative 
pictures (collapsed over the social and non-social blocks). Both the CD and RD group 
had a significantly longer total gaze duration for negative than positive stimuli, RD: 
F (1, 2088.72) = 30.55, p < 0.001, Mdiff = 732.82 ms, 95% CI [472.82, 992.82]; CD: F (1, 
1613.87) = 9.9, p = 0.002, Mdiff = 533.71 ms, 95% CI [200.90, 866.51]. The total gaze 
duration for positive and negative pictures did not differ significantly in the other groups 
(ASD, ASD+CD/RD and HC): ASD: F (1, 1281.15) = 2.46, p = 0.117, Mdiff = − 318.70, 95% 
CI [−717.36, 79.95]; ASD+CD/RD: F (1, 2989.95) = 0.44, p = 0.510, Mdiff = 75.85, 95% CI 
[−149.62, 301.32]; HC: F (1, 5127.31) = 0.13, p = 0.718, Mdiff = − 29.22, 95% CI [−187.84, 
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129.40]. When comparing all groups on negative stimuli and positive stimuli only, we did 
not find group differences, F (4, 147.64) = 1.56, p = 0.189 and positive stimuli, F (4, 146.16) 
= 1.26, p = 0.287. Subsequently, post hoc analyses of the Valence*Social interaction 
revealed that, across groups, participants looked longer at negatively valenced social 
than non-social stimuli, F (1, 6569.66) = 10.95, p = 0.001, Mdiff = − 243.40, 95% CI 
[−387.61, −99.19] and longer at positively valenced non-social than social stimuli, F (1, 
6591.62) = 10.91, p = 0.001, Mdif = 245.19, 95% CI [99.69, 390.68]. No other post hoc 
comparisons reached significance, with all p-values > 0.561. See Figure 2 for the total 
gaze durations per valence for each group. 
IDS-SR as a covariate in the linear mixed effects analysis of gaze duration 
Because the IDS-SR scores of the ASD group (mean: 25; clinical range 14 – 26, indicating 
mild depressive symptoms) are significantly higher compared to HC (mean: 5; clinical 
range 0 – 14, indicating no depressive symptoms), see also Table 1, we wanted to 
examine whether the negative bias found in ASD could be explained by comorbid 
(subclinical) depressive symptoms. Therefore, the IDS-SR total scores were added as a 
covariate in the linear mixed effects analysis of gaze duration. Entering the depressive 
symptoms as a covariate did not alter the within group differences found: both the CD 
and RD group looked significantly longer at negative than positive stimuli.
Examing the correlations of symptoms seveirity scores of depression and ASD 
with total gaze durationzc
Visual attention patterns might vary with either depressive and/or ASD symptom 
severity scores. We, thus, examined the correlations between the symptom severity 
scores of ASD (AQ-50) and depression (IDS-SR) and attentional bias for social and non-
social stimuli. Therefore, two bias scores were calculated (i.e., the total gaze duration for 
negative stimuli (in ms) minus the total gaze duration for positive stimuli (in ms) for both 
social and non-social categories). Neither the IDS-SR or AQ-50 total scores correlated 
significantly with these bias scores for social (IDS-SR: r (3454) = − 0.03, p = 0.081; AQ-
50: r (3454) = − 0.03, p = 0.052) and non-social stimuli (IDSSR: r (3310) = − 0.01, p = 
0.787; AQ-50: r (3310) = − 0.02, p = 0.399). 
Comparing ASD participants with current vs. remitted depression
We further divided the ASD+CD/RD group into ASD+CD and ASD+RD groups to examine 
whether the bias in ASD remains after remission (see Figure 2 for the group means). The 
ASD+CD group (n = 15; 33% female) had a mean age of 39 years (SD = 16.29) and were 7% 
low, 60% middle, and 20% highly educated. The ASD+RD group (n = 22; 37% female) had a 
mean age of 34 years (SD = 10.73) and were 23% low, 27% middle, and 46% highly educated. 
The groups did not differ significantly on gender, age, and education level, gender: χ2(1) = 
0.04, p > 0.850; age: F (1, 35) = 1.40, p > 0.246; education level: χ2(2) = 5.46, p = 0.065. 
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A linear mixed effects analysis was conducted with the dependent variable Gaze 
Duration, the between-subjects factor Group (ASD+CD and ASD+RD) and within-subjects 
factors stimulus categories (Social and Valence) and the random intercept for Participant. 
This analysis revealed no significant three-way interaction between Group, Social, and 
Valence, F (1, 2990.01) = 0.72, p = 0.397. A significant interaction effect between Group 
and Valence was found, F (1, 2990.01) = 33.61, p < 0.001. The other interaction effects 
were not significant, Group*Social: F (1, 3022.98) = 0.10, p = 0.322; Valence*Social: 
F (1, 2990.01) = 2.01, p = 0.156. The main effects of Group, Valence, and Social were 
not significant, Group: F (1, 33.62) = 1.49, p = 0.231; Valence: F (1, 2990.01) = 2.90, p = 
0.089; Social: F (1, 3022.98) = 0.34, p = 0.562.
Post hoc analyses revealed that participants with ASD+CD had longer total gaze durations 
towards negative than positive stimuli, F (1,1235) = 20.41, p < 0.001, Mdiff = 870.37, 95% 
CI [492.38, 1248.35], while the ASD+RD participants showed significantly longer total 
gaze durations for positive stimuli than negative stimuli, F (1,1755.27) = 11.89, p = 0.001, 
Mdiff = -482.46, 95% CI [−756.84, −208.08]. A significant difference between the groups 
for positive stimuli was found; the ASD+RD participants looked longer at positive stimuli 
than did the ASD+CD participants, F(1, 33.98) = 4.92, p = 0.033, Mdiff = − 1089.64, 
95% CI [− 2087.63, − 91.65]. No significant results were found for negative stimuli, F (1, 
34.20) = 0.17, p = 0.682. For an overview of all means, standard errors and 95% CIs for 
the three-way interactions across all analyses per attentional index, see the Appendix 
Table 3.
First fixation location
Because we aimed to compare the diagnostic groups, only analyses qualified by 
significant group interactions for both the first fixation location and revisits indices will 
be presented. In addition, due to the blocked design of the task, a comparison between 
the social and non-social stimuli does not make sense for the dependent variable First 
Fixation Location (i.e., all stimuli were social in the social block and non-social in the 
non-social block). Therefore, Social was not included as a factor in these analyses. 
The random effect in the full model did not improve the fit of the model significantly, 
χ2(1) = 2.00, p > 0.05; thus, we did not include this random effect. The Group*Valence 
interaction was not significant, F (4, 574.00) = 1.84, p = 0.120, indicating that the groups 
oriented their initial attention to the valenced stimuli in a comparable manner. 
IDS-SR as a covariate in the linear mixed effects analysis of the location of the 
first fixation 
The IDS-SR scores of the participants were included as an additional covariate in a post 
hoc linear mixed effects analysis of the location of the first fixation. Including the IDS-SR 
as an additional covariate did not alter the results significantly. The groups did not differ 
in allocating their initial attention to the valenced stimuli. 
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Figure 2  Total gaze duration (ms) per valence (positive vs. negative) for each group. ASD = autism 
spectrum disorder. CD = current depression.  RD = remitted depression. ASD+CD/RD = autism 
spectrum disorder with depression. HC = healthy controls. ASD+CD = autism spectrum disorder 
with current depression. ASD+RD = autism spectrum disorder with remitted depression. Asterisks 
highlight significantly different mean comparisons, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Error bars represent 
standard errors.
Revisits
Including the random effect in the full model improved the fit of the model significantly, 
χ2(1) = 1949.61, p < 0.001. A linear mixed effects analysis showed no significant three-
way interaction of Group, Valence, and Social, F (4, 12,661.02) = 0.75, p = 0.556. No 
interaction effects were found, Group*Valence: F (4, 12,661.10) = 1.55, p = 0.186; 
Group*Social: F (4, 12,768.60) = 0.13, p = 0.972.
IDS-SR as a covariate in the linear mixed effects analysis of the revisits
The IDS-SR scores of the participants were added as an additional covariate in a post 
hoc linear mixed effects analysis of the revisits variable, in which we entered IDS-SR 
as a covariate; this did not change the results significantly. The groups did not differ 
significantly in the three-way interaction of Group, Valence, and Social and in the two-
way interaction effects (i.e., Group*Valence and Group*Social).
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Discussion
The purpose of this eye-tracking study was to gain insight in cognitive factors 
contributing to the high comorbidity of depression in ASD. We examined whether ASD 
is characterised by a negative attentional bias and whether this can be explained by 
comorbid clinical and subclinical depression. Three different component processes 
of attentional bias (overall engagement, initial engagement, and shifting) were 
investigated. With regard to the total gaze duration (overall engagement), we replicated 
previous research (e.g., Peckham et. al. 2010) demonstrating that both remitted and 
currently depressed participants show a negative attentional bias, possibly indicating 
difficulty in disengaging from negative stimuli (Gotlib and Joormann 2010). Considering 
a negative attentional bias is still present after remission in our neurotypical depressed 
sample, this bias might function as a trait-like characteristic in individuals vulnerable to 
depression (e.g., De Raedt and Koster 2010; Gotlib and Joormann 2010). 
A negative bias (i.e., longer gaze durations) was also found in the ASD participants with 
a current comorbid depression, corroborating previous findings in currently depressed 
individuals with comorbid psychopathologies (Dozois and Dobson 2001; LeMoult 
and Joormann 2012; Vrijsen et al. 2017). Such a depressotypic attentional bias was 
not observed in the whole group of participants with ASD or in healthy controls, as 
they showed no significant differentiation in attentional bias. This finding of the ASD 
participants is in contrast to the results of Unruh et al. (2018); however, this might be 
due to the inclusion of varying types of stimuli (i.e., valenced [non-]social scenes versus 
emotional or neutral facial expressions). Differences in the types of stimuli used in 
attentional paradigms may affect the observed attentional bias (Peckham et al. 2010). 
Finally, because examining the influence of subclinical depressive symptom levels on 
the gaze pattern is informative for the depression specificity of our results, especially 
with regard to the attentional bias pattern in ASD, we included the IDS-SR total 
score. This showed that the results of this study were independent of the presence of 
subclinical depression. Moreover, because patterns of visual attention may vary with 
either depressive and/or ASD symptoms independent of the diagnostic group, we 
examined the correlations between the symptom severity scores of ASD (AQ-50) and 
depression (IDS-SR) and attentional bias (as measured with the overall engagement 
index) for social and non-social stimuli. This showed that neither the IDS-SR or AQ-
50 total scores correlated significantly with the bias scores for social and non-social 
stimuli. Thus, the relationship between negative attentional bias and the diagnostic 
groups does not extend beyond the depression or ASD diagnosis border. So, it might be 
that attentional bias is not a characteristic for the disorder-specific symptom severity 
indices as measured in this study. 
Exploratory additional analyses demonstrated a negative bias in ASD participants with 
a comorbid current depression, but not in ASD participants remitted from depression. 
In fact, remitted depressed ASD participants looked longer at positive than negative 
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stimuli. The results suggests that a similar gaze duration pattern was found in never-
depressed ASD participants. Although these participants did not differ significantly from 
controls, it is noteworthy that the unstandardised effect size of this group comparison was 
comparable to that of the significant difference between CD and RD on attentional bias. 
These findings may imply that a depressotypic attentional bias might not persist beyond 
a depressive episode in individuals with ASD. ASD individuals might be characterised 
by a rather positive information processing style. Therefore, this possible premorbid 
positive information processing style of the ASD individuals might be less affected by 
the lingering effect a depressive episode can have on bias, as seen in the neurotypical 
remitted depressed individuals (i.e., indicated by the presence of a persistent negative 
attentional bias). 
Further, the healthy controls did not show a differential attentional bias towards valenced 
stimuli for any of the attentional indices, in contrast to our expectations and previous 
findings (e.g., De Raedt and Koster 2010). An explanation for the lack of a positive bias 
in the healthy controls might be that the negative stimuli were more arousing in this 
study, and therefore attracted relatively more attention (Vogt et al. 2008). In addition, 
the groups showed no differences between social/non-social valenced content of the 
stimuli for any of the attentional indices, which is likely due to the blocked design of the 
task (i.e., presenting the social and non-social blocks separately, thus non-competing). 
The groups did not differ on the initial or shifting indices. All individuals allocated their 
initial fixation on and number of revisits towards the different affective stimuli in a similar 
fashion, which is in line with previous research (Armstrong and Olatunji 2012; Gotlib and 
Joormann 2010). In contrast, Santos et al. (2012) demonstrated differences between the 
location of the first fixation in individuals with ASD and controls; the ASD individuals did 
not have an initial preference for the negative threatening social stimuli compared to 
TD. However, the negative stimuli included in their study were threating social scenes, 
which were compared to neutral social scenes, instead of the more general negative 
scenes (i.e., threatening, dysphoria-related, and disgusting scenes) that were compared 
to positive scenes in our study. This could explain the differences between our results 
and those by Santos et al. (2012). Moreover, the location of the first fixation is a vigilance 
based outcome measure, which is generally associated with anxiety disorders (Gamble 
and Rapee 2010; Mogg and Bradley 2005). 
If replicated, the present findings may have implications for clinical practice. Current 
treatment innovations designed for depressed individuals that target negative bias 
by means of computerised (add-on) treatment, such as Attentional Bias Modification 
(ABM), can be administered in addition to treatment as usual. Since we found a negative 
bias in currently depressed individuals with ASD, ABM could likewise be beneficial for 
these individuals. Offering a tailored (add-on) ABM treatment based on a patient’s 
diagnosis may expand the limited efficacious treatment options specifically designed 
for this patient group. Subsequently, ABM, or a similar treatment option, may also be 
used to index (symptoms of) current depression in ASD, and may thereby possibly aid 
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in improving the problem of underdiagnosis of depression in ASD. This needs more 
research. Since our study demonstrated that, in addition to the well-investigated 
neurotypical depressed individuals, the presence of negative attentional bias may 
extend to currently depressed ASD participants, future studies could advance our 
knowledge about underlying mechanisms, such as attentional bias, of comorbid mental 
disorders, by investigating the association between attentional bias and severity levels 
of symptoms of mental disorders. This is in line with initiatives such as the National 
Institute of Mental Health’s Research Domain Criteria project (RDoC; NIHM 2008) and is 
aiming towards a transdiagnostic approach to mental health. 
A strength of the current study is the inclusion of a well-defined naturalistic clinical 
patient sample which facilitates generalization of our findings to the clinical population 
in which comorbidity is common (Kessler et al. 2005). A limitation is the limited number 
of never-depressed participants with ASD in this study, thus, caution regarding the 
interpretation of this result is advised and the study is in need of replication. Because, 
the unstandardised effect size of the group comparison f never-depressed ASD 
and remitted depressed ASD was comparable to the significant difference found in 
attentional bias between CD and RD. The current study is a first step to help explain 
the high comorbidity of depression in ASD, and will hopefully instigate further research 
into attentional bias and other cognitive markers in ASD. Moreover, the neurotypical 
depressed individuals were lower educated than the individuals with ASD (and 
depression) and healthy controls in the current study, which may have influenced the 
results. To further explore attentional bias for social stimuli, a future study could include 
competing social and non-social, positive and negative stimuli within each slide. For 
this first exploration, we chose to present the social and non-social stimuli in a blocked 
design. In conclusion, attentional bias to negatively valenced stimuli seems to be only 
present in ASD individuals with current depression and is most likely absent in ASD who 
are currently not depressed (either in remission or never-depressed). This suggests that 
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Appendix 
Table 3  Means, Standard Errors (SE), and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for the three-way 
interactions between Group, Valence, and Social for the three attentional indices (gaze duration 
(ms), first fixation location, and revisits).
Gaze duration (ms)
Group Valence (Non-)Social M SE 95% CI
HC
Negative
Non-social 5034.27 159.59 [4719.93, 5348.61]
Social 5268.82 158.27 [4957.03, 5580.60]
Positive
Non-social 5373.06 159.59 [5058.72, 5687.40]
Social 4999.72 158.27 [4687.93, 5311.51]
CD
Negative
Non-social 5558.13 258.93 [5048.57, 6067.69]
Social 5950.05 250.99 [5455.87, 6444.22]
Positive
Non-social 5555.23 258.93 [5045.67, 6064.79]
Social 4944.51 250.99 [4450.34, 5438.69]
RD
Negative
Non-social 5977.39 228.66 [5527.37, 6427.41]
Social 6124.28 223.36 [5684.53, 6564.02]
Positive
Non-social 5213.02 228.66 [4763.00, 5663.04]
Social 5420.27 223.36 [4980.52, 5860.02]
ASD
Negative
Non-social 5448.55 292.19 [4873.40, 6023.71]
Social 5736.65 286.89 [5171.77, 6301.53]
Positive
Non-social 6062.49 292.19 [5487.33, 6637.64]
Social 5781.21 286.89 [5216.33, 6346.09]
ASD+CD/RD
Negative
Non-social 5389.03 189.88 [5015.24, 5762.83]
Social 5630.41 191.09 [5254.25, 6006.57]
Positive
Non-social 5500.67 189.88 [5126.87, 5874.46]




Non-social 5533.73 324.34 [4883.81, 6183.65]
Social 5786.67 324.34 [5136.76, 6436.59]
Positive
Non-social 4729.51 324.34 [4079.59, 5379.43]
Social 4850.16 324.34 [4200.24, 5500.07]
ASD+RD
Negative
Non-social 5311.51 255.25 [4801.36, 5821.67]
Social 5525.62 258.01 [5010.29, 6040.95]
Positive
Non-social 6049.78 255.25 [5539.63, 6559.94]




Group Valence (Non-)Social M SE 95% CI
Social 5.67 .26 [6.20, 7.52]
RD
Negative
Non-social 6.86 .34 [6.29, 7.42]
Social 5.48 .32 [4.85, 6.11]
Positive
Non-social 5.15 .34 [4.49, 5.80]
Social 6.52 .32 [5.90, 7.15]
ASD
Negative
Non-social 7.67 .89 [5.93, 9,41]
Social 4.00 .89 [2.20, 5.74]
Positive
Non-social 4.32 .89 [2.59, 6.07]
Social 8.00 .89 [6.26, 9.74]
ASD+CD/RD
Negative
Non-social 6.89 .27 [6.34, 7.41]
Social 6.33 .28 [5.78, 6.90]
Positive
Non-social 5.08 .27 [4.53, 5.60]
Social 5.67 .28 [5.11, 6.22]
Post hoc analysis
ASD+CD Negative Non-social 7.62 .43 [6.76, 8.48]
Social 6.54 .43 [5.69, 7.40]
Positive
Non-social 4.39 .43 [3.53, 5.24]
Social 5.46 .43 [4.61, 6.32]
ASD+RD
Negative
Non-social 6.41 .36 [5.67, 7.08]
Social 6.18 .37 [5.45, 6,92]
Positive
Non-social 5.56 .36 [4.83, 6.24]
Social 5.82 .37 [5.10, 6.57]
Revisits
Group Valence (Non-)Social M SE 95% CI
HC
Negative
Non-social 2.00 0.11 [1.78, 2.22]
Social 2.03 0.11 [1.81, 2.25]
Positive
Non-social 2.19 0.11 [1.97, 2.42]
Social 2.08 0.11 [1.86, 2.30]
CD
Negative
Non-social 1.77 0.18 [1.42, 2.12]
Social 1.77 0.18 [1.43, 2.12]
Positive
Non-social 1.90 0.18 [1.54, 2.25]
Social 1.72 0.18 [1.37, 2.07]
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Table 3 Continued
Group Valence (Non-)Social M SE 95% CI
RD
Negative
Non-social 2.06 0.16 [1.75, 2.38]
Social 2.00 0.16 [1.69, 2.31]
Positive
Non-social 2.18 0.16 [1.86, 2.49]
Social 2.08 0.16 [1.77, 2.39]
ASD
Negative
Non-social 2.02 0.20 [1.62, 2.42]
Social 1.97 0.20 [1.57, 2.36]
Positive
Non-social 2.30 0.20 [1.90, 2.70]
Social 2.28 0.20 [1.88, 2.68]
ASD+CD/RD
Negative
Non-social 1.96 0.13 [1.70, 2.22]
Social 2.05 0.13 [1.79, 2.31]
Positive
Non-social 2.20 0.13 [1.93, 2.46]




Non-social 2.13 0.24 [1.63, 2.62]
Social 2.20 0.24 [1.70, 2.69]
Positive
Non-social 2.13 0.24 [1.64, 2.63]




Assocations between attentional bias and 
symptom severity in a highly comorbid 




Background: High comorbidity is apparent within and between emotional and neuro-
developmental disorders. Thus, possible shared markers, such as attentional bias (AB), 
could exists which contribute to the onset and maintenance of (symptoms of ) 
psychopathology. 
Methods: A network approach was conducted to investigate associations between 
symptom severity levels of depression, anxiety sensitivity, autism spectrum disorders 
(ASD), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD) with AB for valenced (non-)
social stimuli. This analysis targets three groups of patients with either emotional disorders 
(n = 97), neurodevelopmental disorders (n = 32), or both (n = 78). 
Results: Contrary to our expectations, no associations for symptom severity of depressive, 
anxiety sensitivity, and ASD with the AB were found across the groups for all networks. 
Only in the emotional disorders groups an association between ADHD symptoms and 
negative social AB was found. Symptoms of depression, anxiety sensitivity, and ADHD 
were moderately associated with each other. 
Conclusions: The association of negative AB found with symptoms of ADHD may provide 
evidence for the relevance of cognitive bias as a vulnerability factor for ADHD symptoms. 
Overall, the findings of the current study indicate that AB may not be a marker of severity of 
psychiatric symptoms in samples of psychiatric patients.
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Psychiatric disorders frequently co-occur: Twenty-eight percent of patients have two or 
more disorders, and 17% three or more (Kessler, Berglund, et al., 2005). Some of the most 
common psychiatric disorders can be divided into two categories: 1) Neurodevelopmental 
disorders [i.e., autism spectrum disorders (ASD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorders 
(ADHD)] and emotional disorders (i.e., depressive disorders, anxiety disorders). 
Neurodevelopmental disorders are characterized by an onset in the developmental period 
and can persist into adulthood (Harris, 2014; Ozonoff, Heung, Byrd, Hansen, & Hertz-
Picciotto, 2008). 2) Emotional disorders are defined by dysregulation of emotions (Brown, 
Di Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001) and generally have their onset during adolescence 
or early adulthood (Costello, Mustillo, Erkanli, Keeler, & Angold, 2003; Kessler, Berglund, 
et al., 2005). There is high comorbidity within as well as between these clusters. For 
instance the co-occurrence of depressive disorders and anxiety disorders ranges from 
40-80% (De Graaf, Bijl, Spijker, Beekman, & Vollebergh, 2003; Spinhoven, van Balkom, & 
Nolen, 2011) and the comorbidity between ADHD and ASD is estimated between 14-78% 
(Gargaro, Rinehart, Bradshaw, Tonge, & Sheppard, 2011; Sinzig, Morsch, & Lehmkuhl, 
2008). When it comes to the comorbidity between the clusters, we see for example a 15-
29% co-occurrence of anxiety disorders in ADHD (Gillberg et al., 2004; Simonoff et al., 
2008), and 53-77% depressive disorders in ASD (Hofvander et al., 2009; Joshi et al., 2013). 
The high prevalence of comorbidity between psychiatric disorders indicates a possible 
shared developmental trajectory and underscores the importance of investigating possible 
markers and processes which contribute to the onset and maintenance of (symptoms 
of ) psychopathology in general (Insel et al., 2010). Shared markers can be identified at 
different levels, from basic biology to cognitive processes and behavior (NIHM, 2008). 
Attentional bias (AB) may represent such a shared marker. 
As proposed by Beck (Beck, 1967; Beck & Haigh, 2014), adverse childhood events can 
result in the development of negative assumptions about the self, the world, and the 
future, which in turn lead to automatic negatively biased information processing. Negative 
cognitive biases are considered a risk factor for developing and maintaining (sub)clinical 
emotional symptoms and disorders (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
More specific, a negative AB is the tendency to preferentially focus attention towards 
negative information. Thus far, most bias research has been conducted in individuals 
with emotional disorders. Research has shown that depressed individuals have greater 
difficulty disengaging from negative social information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; LeMoult 
& Gotlib, 2019; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). AB towards negative threat-related 
stimuli is demonstrated in anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). Most of the extant research 
on AB in these emotional disorders has focused on differences between categorical 
diagnostic groups rather than associations with dimensional symptom levels. However, 
it is key to look beyond the traditional categorical classification systems and towards a 
dimensional approach which cuts across the diagnostic groups to identify potential shared 
markers and mechanisms (Curthbert & Insel, 2013; Insel, 2014; Watkins et al., 2015). The 
studies implementing a dimensional approach generally demonstrated an association 
between severity of (sub)clinical emotional symptoms and negative AB. For instance, 
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longer maintained attention towards negative social information has been associated with 
depressive symptoms (Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2010; Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014), 
whereas others found no association of negative AB with depressive symptoms (Beevers 
et al., 2019; Marchetti et al., 2018). A higher level of anxiety symptoms has been associated 
with attention towards threatening stimuli (Watts & Weems, 2006).  
More recently evidence for negative bias in neurodevelopmental disorders is also emerging. 
In ADHD, studies have found associations of negative memory bias with symptoms of 
ADHD (d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 2007; Vrijsen et al., 2018). In ASD mixed results 
are found for emotional stimuli: Mainly less pronounced negative bias or no difference 
in bias relative to controls (see: Bergman et al., 2020; Bergman et al., 2021) or more 
pronounced negative bias than controls (Unruh, Bodfish, & Gotham, 2018). Other studies 
in ASD found evidence for a diminished bias of social stimuli (Chita-Tegmark, 2016). Hence, 
there is evidence implicating that negative attentional bias for both social and non-social 
stimuli is present in different psychiatric disorders, and that AB may be associated with 
the severity of disorders. Collectively, these findings indicate that negative bias may be 
a transdiagnostic psychiatric marker for severity of psychopathology across disorders. 
Although bias research extended its field of interest from emotional to neurodevelopmental 
disorders, most of these studies, thus far, focused on single psychiatric disorders defined 
by the common classification systems [i.e., the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) or the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)]. However, due to this 
approach, the research findings are currently difficult to translate to comorbid patients in 
the clinical practice. More research in naturalistic patient samples are required. 
Because neurodevelopmental disorders generally develop during an earlier life phase 
than emotional disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), it is interesting to 
question whether emotional disorders with or without a comorbid neurodevelopmental 
disorder present are expressed differently. In addition, it is currently not known how 
this comorbidity influences cognitive functioning, specifically attentional processing of 
emotional information. To help answer these questions, we examined the associations of 
AB and the symptom severity of ASD, ADHD, anxiety sensitivity, and depression with each 
other in three groups of patients: Patients with either neurodevelopmental disorder(s), 
emotional disorder(s), or both (i.e., individuals with at least one emotional disorder and 
one neurodevelopmental disorder diagnosis) and, we investigated the association of AB 
with these symptom severity indices across the three patient groups. The investigation 
of an association of AB with symptom severity indices of the different disorders are more 
exploratory in the neurodevelopmental and comorbid groups, since bias has mostly been 
studied in emotional disorders so far.  
We used a network analysis as this statistical technique provides the estimation of 
empirical psychological networks (e.g., Borsboom, 2017; Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; 
Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas, & Borsboom, 2010). More specific, a network approach 
can be implemented to disentangle dynamic and complex systems of mutually interacting 
psychological processes (e.g., Robinaugh, LeBlanc, Vuletich, & McNally, 2014). This 
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technique can be used to investigate the importance (i.e., centrality) of the nodes of 
interest (here: AB variables) in the network, based on the pattern of connections the given 
nodes play a role in (Costantini et al., 2015). Thus, implementing a network analysis in 
the current study allowed us to also explore whether AB for social and non-social stimuli 
is associated with symptom severity across the given diagnostic groups. So, in turn, this 
could provide further evidence for AB as a possible transdiagnostic neurocognitive marker 
across different psychiatric disorders. This study offers a first insight into the possible 
relevance of AB for symptoms severity indices of ASD, ADHD, anxiety sensitivity, and 
depression, and, in turn, may encourage further research investigating AB as a potential 
shared marker in comorbid psychiatric disorders.
Methods 
Participants
Our study is part of the ongoing MIND-Set study (Measuring Integrated Novel Dimensions 
in Neurodevelopmental and Stress-related Mental Disorders) that is conducted at the 
department of Psychiatry of the Radboud university medical center. Adult psychiatric 
patients (18 years and older) with at least one clinical diagnosis of an emotional disorder 
(depression, anxiety), substance use disorder, and/or neurodevelopmental disorder 
(ASD, ADHD) were eligible to participate. Symptom severity was measured using self-
report questionnaires (see also the Supplementary Materials for details of the clinical 
and demographic measures used for diagnosis). The following exclusion criteria were 
used for the patients: current psychosis, sensorimotor handicaps, epilepsy (eye-tracker 
task), a full-scale IQ estimate < 70, inadequate command of the Dutch language or 
mentally incompetent to sign informed consent. The MIND-Set study has been approved 
by the Ethical Review Board of the Radboudumc (CMO Regio Arnhem-Nijmegen) and all 
participants signed informed consent prior to participating in this study.
For the current study we used a subset of the MIND-Set data that were collected from 
August 2016 to April 2019. The analytical sample consisted of patients with available 
diagnostic and the eye-tracking data. This subsample consisted of 207 adult patients (see 
for the demographic variables Table 1) and was divided into three groups: 1). an emotional 
disorders group (ED, n = 97), including only patients with one or more mood and/or anxiety 
disorders; 2). a comorbid group (CM, n = 78) including patients with at least one emotional 
disorder and one neurodevelopmental disorder; and 3). a neurodevelopmental disorders 




An eye-tracker was used to measure AB, which is a reliable measure (Gibb, McGeary, & 
Beevers, 2016). The included eye-tracking task and stimuli were similar as those used by 
Bergman et al. (2021). The task consisted of a total of 24 trials each consisting of four 
stimuli (i.e., a total of 96 pictures), selected from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997) and the Nencki Affective Picture System 
(NAPS; Marchewka, Żurawski, Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014). Because differences in AB 
for various stimuli (i.e., non-social, negative) are found across neurodevelopmental and 
emotional disorders, half of the stimuli were categorized as social (i.e., a couple hugging, a 
crying woman) and half as non-social (i.e., a tropical island, a mutilated dog). Each category 
corresponded to a separate block (i.e., a non-social and a social block). The stimuli within 
the social and non-social blocks were further divided into negative- and positive valenced 
stimuli based on their valence ratings (i.e., negative: M = 2.51, SD = 0.42; positive: M = 
7.79, SD = 0.33). Thus, the final groups were: negative non-social [NNS]; negative social 
[NS]; positive non-social [PNS]; positive social [PS]). See the Supplementary Materials for 
specific details of the ratings of the stimuli. After calibration, a 1000 ms centrally presented 
fixation cross was presented, followed by the eye-movement registration of the four stimuli 
(i.e., slide) for 30s. The projected stimuli appeared on a computer screen presented against 
a black background. The social and non-social blocks were presented in a random order 
across the participants. For an example of a slide, see Figure 1.
Eye-tracker
A screen-based eye-tracker (SMI RED500) was used for the registration of the eye-
movements, which allowed a free range of head movements. The sampling rate of the eye 
positions was at 2 ms (500 Hz). Eye-tracking data was computed using a velocity-based 
algorithm with a minimum fixation duration threshold of 100 ms within a 1◦ visual angle, 
and a peak velocity threshold of 40◦/s. Areas of interest (AOIs), which corresponded to the 
total area plus the outer corners of the four pictures, were designed for each trial. The four 
AOIs corresponded to the four stimulus categories (i.e., NNS, NS, PNS, PS). Preprocessing 
of the data was done in SMI BeGaze Version 3.7 (SensoMotoric Instruments, Inc., Teltow, 
Germany). Further, the visual inspection of abnormalities and checking of distributional 
anomalies of the data was performed, none of these were found. 
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Figure 1  Left: an example slide from the non-social block; right: an example slide from the social 
block.
Attentional bias score  
An attentional bias score (ABS) was derived from the eye-movement data based on the 
mean glance durations (i.e., mean fixation duration) for the stimuli. Glance duration can be 
informative regarding the difficulty of shifting attentional away from a given stimulus (e.g., 
Kellough, Beevers, Ellis, & Wells, 2008). The overall glance duration per stimulus category 
(NNS, NS, PNS, PS) was summed per participant across each trial and then averaged per 
stimulus category over all trials. The result was an average glance duration in ms per 
stimulus category for each participant. To compute the ABS, separate for the social and the 
non-social stimuli, the average glance duration for positive stimuli was subtracted from the 
average glance duration for negative stimuli. Thus, a positive score indicates that attention 
was maintained longer on negative social stimuli, whereas a negative score indicates the 
opposite: Longer mainted attention on positive social stimuli. This resulted in an ABS for 
the social and for the non-social stimuli. 
Procedure 
The participant was individually seated in a height-adjustable chair approximately 60 
cm in front of a 22’’ Dell TFT-monitor. The experimental session began when the eye-
tracker was successfully calibrated (i.e., the average error was 1.5◦ or less of the visual 
angle for each calibration point; in line with García-Blanco et al., 2014). The calibration 
procedure was repeated in between blocks. The participant was instructed to freely view 
the pictures. The eye-tracking task comprised of two parts: A free-viewing task followed 
by a recognition task, the participant was informed about this design beforehand. The 
recognition task comprised of all the identical stimuli of the first task, and it was included 
to stimulate the active viewing of the stimuli. In the recognition task, two out of the four 
stimuli have changed from the initial presented location compared to the previously 
presented slides, the participant was instructed to click on one of these stimuli. Since we 
are interested in attentional processing, only the results of the free-viewing task will be 
presented in this manuscript. The eye-tracking tasks including the calibration procedures 
took approximately 20 minutes to complete by the participants.
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Data analytic plan and preparation of the data 
Network visualization 
We used the R packages qgraph and bootnet (Epskamp, Borsboom, & Fried, 2018; Epskamp, 
Cramer, Waldorp, Schitmman, & Borsboom, 2012; R Core Team, 2019) for computation and 
visualization of the network. Each node represented the total score of one of the diagnostic 
instruments or of the ABS and each line (i.e., edge) represented the strength of association 
between two nodes connected by an edge. First an association network was computed, the 
edges represented zero-order correlations between pairs of nodes and provided an initial 
estimation of the structure of the network. Only the significant correlations appear in the 
graph (see Figure 2a, b, and, c). 
Further, we regularized the model by running the graphical LASSO (Least Absolute 
Shrinkage and Selection Operator; Friedman et al., 2008) algorithm. This algorithm firstly 
computes regularized partial correlations between pairs of nodes. Thus, controlling for 
spurious connections due to the influence from the other nodes in the network. Next, it 
shrinks all edges in the network, and sets small edges exactly to zero which leads to a 
sparse (i.e., parsimonious) network that explains the covariance among nodes with as few 
edges as necessary. Qgraph automatically implements the graphical LASSO regularization 
in combination with extended Bayesian Information Criterion (EBIC) model selection 
(Foygel and Drton, 2010). A hyperparameter gamma (γ) is chosen using the EBIC model. 
This tuning parameter is advised to be set between 0-0.5 (Foygel & Drton, 2010). A higher 
parameter results in a more parsimonious model with fewer edges. We opted to set the γ 
to 0.25, to increase specificity and interpretability (Epskamp & Fried, 2018). In addition, 
there is no clear consensus about the minimum size of the sample per parameter to create 
a stable and reliable network (Fried & Cramer, 2017), we, thus, applied a stability check of 
our concentration network following Epskamp et al. (2018), for more information about this 
procedure, see the Supplemental Material. When patients had missing data on one of the 
diagnostic measures, missing values were removed using the ‘exclude pairwise’ method 
(ASI: one patient; CAARS-SS: one patient; IDS-SR: one patient; AQ-50: no patients). 
Node centrality 
Several indices were calculated of node centrality to identify which variables are most 
important to the graphical LASSO network. Each centrality index was computed with the R 
package qgraph (Epskamp et al., 2012). We computed betweenness centrality, closeness 
centrality, and strength centrality. Betweenness is the number of times a node lies on the 
shortest path between two other nodes that pass through the given node. Thus, a high 
betweenness indicates how important the given node is in connecting other nodes in the 
network. Closeness is the inverse of the sum of all the shortest paths from the given node 
to all other nodes in the network. Therefore, closeness signifies how strong the node of 
interest is indirectly connected to all other nodes. Regarding strength centrality, it is the 
sum of all absolute weights a node of interest is directly connected to. Higher values reflect 
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greater strength of that node in the network. Note that the  interpretation of these indices, 
especially of closeness and betweenness, in terms of importance only holds under strict 
assumptions, for more information, see Bringmann et al. (2019) and Hofmann and Curtiss 
(2018). The centrality plots are arranged on the strength index and are depicted as z scores 
for better interpretation. For information about the stability checks performed on the 
centrality indices, see the Supplementary Materials.  
Results 
Study sample
An overview of demographic measures, clinical measures, and group comparisons of the 
emotional disorders, comorbid, and neurodevelopmental disorders groups can be found 
in Table 1. 
Table 1  Overview of demographic measures, clinical measures, and group comparisons of the 
emotional disorders (ED), comorbid (CM), and neurodevelopmental disorders (ND) groups. 
 
ED = emotional disorders group. CM = comorbid group. ND = Neurodevelopmental disorders group. SD = standard deviation. 
IDS-SR = Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology – Self Report; ASI = Anxiety Sensitivity Index; AQ-50 = Autism-Spectrum 
Quotient; CAARS-SS = Conners’ Adults ADHD Rating Scale-Self Report. 
 
1Adjusted classification based on the classification by Ikram et al. (2014). Low: no education or elementary education 
and lower vocational and general secondary education combined. Middle: intermediate vocational and higher secondary 
education. High: higher vocational education or university. 
Group ED (n = 97) CM (n = 78) ND (n = 32)
Demographic measures
Gender, female (%) 43 49 47
Age, mean (SD) 42 (13.76) 35 (11.58) 37.3 (13.72)
Education level1
      Low (%) 18 15 16
      Middle (%) 29 49 47
      High (%) 52 32 38
Clinical measures
IDS-SR 37.7 (13.08) 32.7 (10.71) 21.1 (12.58)
ASI 15.8 (9.87) 15.6 (8.44) 12.7 (8.07)
AQ-50 23.1 (8.79) 29.2 (9.12) 20.7 (10.76)
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Network visualization
Association network (zero-order correlations network) 
The association network depicts the zero-order correlations between pairs of nodes (see 
Figure 2). Besides the expected strong correlation between the ABS for non-social and 
social stimuli in all the association networks of the patient groups, positive moderate 
correlations are also apparent between severity scales for ADHD (CAARS-SS), depression 
(IDS-SR), and anxiety sensitivity (ASI) in all groups, the strongest of these association was 
between the CAARS-SS and IDS-SR (.38) in the emotional disorders group. In addition, a 
positive link is found between the ADHD severity scale (CAARS-SS) and the ABS for social 
stimuli in the ED group. As well as positive moderate correlation with the CAARS-SS and 
AQ-50, this correlation was not apparent in the association networks of the other two 
groups. In these groups (i.e., CM and ND) the AQ-50 were moderately correlated with the 
IDS-SR. 
Figure 2  The association network of the attentional bias scores for social and non-social stimuli 
and the symptom severity scales within (a) the emotional disorders group (N = 97), (b) the comorbid 
group (N = 78), and (c) the neurodevelopmental disorders group (N = 32). The thickness of an edge 
reflects the magnitude of the association (the thickest edge representing a value of .85 in the ND 
association network between ABS-S and AB-NS). Green lines represent positive correlations. ABS-S 
= the attentional bias score for the social stimuli. ABS-NS = attentional bias score for the non-social 
stimuli. ASI = symptom severity scale for anxiety sensitivity. AQ-50 = symptom severity scale for 
autism spectrum disorders symptoms. CAARS-SS = symptom severity scale for attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorders symptoms. IDS-SR = symptom severity scale for depressive disorders. 
Concentration network (Graphical LASSO network) 
Figure 3 shows the graphical LASSO network. The network was estimated using Graphical 
Gaussian Model in which the edges depict the regularized partial correlations between 
each pair of nodes after controlling for all other variables in the network (Epskamp & 
a b c
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Fried, 2018). Thus, this analysis removes spurious associations from the network. The 
networks were weighted and undirected. In the concentration network for the ED group 
all the associations between the nodes found in the association network remained in the 
concentration network. In the CM group, the association of AQ-50 with the IDS-SR and of 
the ASI with the CAARS-SS were likely spurious. In the ND group, again all the associations 
between the nodes found in the association network remained in the concentration 
network. However, a new positive association with CAARS-SS and AQ-50 appeared, as well 
as a weak negative association between both ASI and CAARS-SS with ABS for non-social 
stimuli, and a weak positive association between the AQ-50 and ABS for non-social stimuli 
appeared. To estimate the stability of the concentration network we performed a stability 
check (Epskamp et al., 2018). The result indicated that the ED and CM networks can be 
interpreted as relatively stable because many edge-weights exhibit values greater than 
zero, but more caution is needed when interpreting the ND network. A detailed description 
of the stability analysis is presented in the Supplementary Material.
Figure 3  The concentration network constructed with the graphical LASSO of (a) the emotional 
disorders (N = 97), of (b) the comorbid (N = 78), and of (c) the neurodevelopmental disorders group 
(N = 32). The thickness of an edge reflects the magnitude of the association (the thickest edge 
representing a value of .86 in the concentration network of the ND group between ABS-S and ABS-
NS). Green lines represent positive regularized partial correlations, the red lines negative regularized 
partial correlations. ABS-S = the attentional bias score for the social stimuli. ABS-NS = attentional 
bias score for the non-social stimuli. ASI = symptom severity scale for anxiety sensitivity. AQ-50 = 
symptom severity scale for autism spectrum disorders symptoms. CAARS-SS = symptom severity 




Centrality analysis of the concentration networks substantiate the findings (Figure 4). ABS 
for social stimuli showed the highest strength index for all the ND and CM groups, the 
CAARS-SS had the highest strength index for the ED group, followed by the ABS for 
a b c
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Figure 4 Centrality plots for graphical LASSO network depicting the strength, closeness, and 
betweenness of each node for (a) the emotional disorders, (b) the comorbid, and (c) the 
neurodevelopmental disorders group. ABS-S = the attentional bias score for the social stimuli. 
ABS-NS = attentional bias score for the non-social stimuli. ASI = symptom severity scale for anxiety 
sensitivity. AQ-50 = symptom severity scale for autism spectrum disorders symptoms. CAARS-SS = 
symptom severity scale for attention deficit hyperactivity disorders symptoms. IDS-SR = symptom 
severity scale for depressive disorders.
social stimuli. The highest scoring edge on the strength index indicate that this edge has 
the highest absolute sum of edge-weights this node is directly connected to. The highest 
closeness index shows the CAARS-SS as highest scoring in the ED group, the IDS-SR in 
the CM group, and AQ-50 in ND group. The closeness index of the highest scoring nodes 
– respectively: CAARS-SS in the ED group, IDS-SR in the comorbid group, and AQ-50 in 
the ND group – imply that they are at the shortest distances (closest) to all other nodes, 
meaning these nodes are the most strongly indirectly connected to all other nodes. A note 
of caution for the interpretation of the closeness index in the comorbid group: Since the 
network of this group is not fully connected (Figure 3b), this index becomes unsuitable for 
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index, all three groups show different edges. In the ED group the CAARS-SS has the highest 
betweenness index, the IDS-SR in the CM group, and the ABS for social stimuli in the ND 
group, indicating that the given node lies on the shortest path between any combinations 
of two other nodes in the network. This suggests that these three highest scoring nodes 
have a high amount of influence over the flow of information in the network. 
The person-dropping bootstrap procedure revealed that strength was the most stable 
centrality across the networks of the three groups pursuant to other studies (e.g., Beard 
et al., 2016; McNally, Heeren, & Robinaugh, 2017). Closeness and betweenness should be 
cautiously interpreted for the figures, see the Supplementary Material. The CS-coefficients 
of strength for the ED group is: .20, for the CM group: .28, and for the ND group: .13.  
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to explore the associations of the symptom severity indices 
of ASD, ADHD, anxiety sensitivity, and depression in three common psychiatric disorder 
groups (neurodevelopmental disorders, emotional disorders, and a comorbid group) and 
whether attentional bias (AB) was associated with the symptom severity indices in the 
given disorder groups. The AB indices (both ABS for non-social and social) were not clearly 
or strongly associated with symptom severity across the groups. Only ADHD symptom 
severity was positively associated with negative AB for social stimuli in patients with at 
least one emotional disorder (i.e., depression or anxiety). In the neurodevelopmental 
group different associations between the severity measures (i.e., CAARS-SS, AQ-50, and 
ASI) and AB were apparent. Nevertheless, due to the instability of these edges (see the 
Supplementary Material), we do not take these into further consideration. Further, across 
all disorder groups the severity indices for anxiety sensitivity (ASI), ADHD (CAARS-SS), and 
depression (IDS-SR) showed a strong association with each other. The second aim was to 
investigate if AB had a central position in the networks. No evidence for a central role of 
AB was found. Collectively, we found in this study no evidence that AB may be a marker 
of severity of psychiatric symptoms in samples of psychiatric patients with emotional and 
neurodevelopmental disorders. 
Contrary to our expectations, no associations of AB for negative stimuli (social and/or 
non-social) with depressive or anxiety sensitivity symptoms were found in the emotional 
disorders group. However, this is in line with other recent studies that did not find an 
association between negative AB and depressive symptoms (Beevers et al., 2019; Marchetti 
et al., 2018). This implies that AB may not be marker for depressive symptoms. The lack 
of association between AB and symptoms of anxiety sensitivity could be due to the way 
AB was operationalized in this study. The attentional bias score (ABS) was based on the 
gaze durations for the valenced social and non-social stimuli, nevertheless, associations 
are mainly found with initial attentional allocation and for specific health-threat related 
stimuli (e.g., a person in a wheelchair; Keogh, Dillon, Georgiou, & Hunt, 2001; Lees, Mogg, 
& Bradley, 2005). The AB task used in the present study includes health-threat related 
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pictures (e.g., wounded or hospitalized individuals), however, because we did not aim to 
study bias for threat specifically, these stimuli were not counterbalanced across trial and 
hence cannot be studied separately. So it might be that for anxiety sensitivity symptoms 
bias is only manifested for disorder-specific stimuli. 
Our finding that symptom severity of ADHD was associated with negative AB for social 
stimuli in the emotional disorders group is in accordance with Vrijsen et al. (2018), who 
found that symptoms of AHDH in healthy individuals were related to negatively biased 
memory. These findings provide further evidence for the possible relevance of Beck’s 
cognitive model for neurodevelopmental symptoms as well. Alternatively, studies have 
shown that individuals with ADHD are more vulnerable to the distracting effects of high-
arousing emotional stimuli than controls (e.g., López-Martín, Albert, Fernández-Jaén, & 
Carretié, 2013). Thus, the longer gaze durations towards negative (social) stimuli found 
in the current study might be due to an increased distractability by the higher emotional 
arousing (i.e., salience) content of the stimuli (see also the Supplementary Material for 
specific details of the ratings of the stimuli). Future studies could further differentiate the 
stimuli to examine if the possible bias found in higher symptoms of ADHD is due to the 
negatively valenced stimuli or the salience of the stimuli. Important to note is that the 
association of ADHD and AB was not shown for the other groups, however, the pearson 
correlation (see appendix S1a and S1b) found for this link in in both groups (ED and CM) are 
of comparable magnitude.  
A moderate relationship between the severity symptoms of ADHD, anxiety sensitivity, and 
depression was found across nearly all groups of the networks. This corroborates evidence 
showing a substantial overlap in emotional and neurovegetative symptoms of ADHD, 
anxiety (sensitivity), and depression, specifically symptoms of irritability, concentration 
(Diler et al., 2007), social withdrawal, and fatigue (Garber & Weersing, 2010). Our 
results are also consistent with Mansour, Dovi, Lane, Loveland, and Pearson (2017), who 
demonstrate that higher symptom levels of ADHD, but not ASD, is associated with a higher 
prevalence of comorbid psychiatric symptoms (e.g., depressive and anxiety disorders). The 
overlap of symptomatology and high comorbidity of ADHD symptoms with internalizing 
symptoms could indicate a shared etiology, possibly through stress reactivity. The stress-
psychopathology link is most commonly investigated in depression and anxiety disorders 
(e.g., Hammen, 2005; Shin & Liberzon, 2010), and is related to the onset of internalizing 
symptoms (Côté et al., 2009; Mathiesen, Sanson, Stoolmiller, & Karevold, 2009) and 
anxiety sensitivity (McLaughlin & Hatzenbuehler, 2009). Recent evidence suggest that 
very high stress-exposure in persisting ADHD combined types (i.e., both inattention 
and hyperactivity/impulsivity are present) were associated with increased anxiety and 
depressive symptoms (Hartman, Rommelse, van der Klugt, Wanders, & Timmerman, 2019). 
Thus, stress reactivity might be an alternative shared marker for developing additional 
emotional disorders in ADHD. Further, we found strong associations with symptom severity 
of ASD and ADHD, pursuant to studies showing this high comorbidity (Mayes, Calhoun, 
Mayes, & Molitoris, 2012). Remarkably, the lack of association of ADHD and ASD symptoms 
in the comorbid group were not apparent in the networks of the other groups. The latter 
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might be due to the presence of additional comorbidity, more research is needed to clarify 
this. The associations of the symptom clusters found suggests a shared pathophysiological 
overlap.  
The current study has strengths and limitations. An important strength is the inclusion 
of a well-defined naturalistic patient sample facilitating generalization of the findings to 
the clinical population in which comorbidity is highly prevalent (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & 
Walters, 2005). However, the sample size of the neurodevelopmental group was small, 
resulting in less stable network models and, hence, difficulty interpreting the findings. 
Limitation of this study is the inclusion of self-report measures to assess symptom 
severity of the psychiatric disorders. Individuals with current depressive disorders with a 
previous history of psychiatric comorbidity tend to overestimate their depressive symptom 
severity (Dorz, Borgherini, Conforti, Scarso, & Magni, 2004). In contrast, individuals with 
ADHD tend to underestimate their ADHD symptoms and functioning deficits (Manor et al., 
2012). Nevertheless, the diagnostic measures included are demonstrated to have good to 
acceptable validity and reliability to measure symptom severity (see methods section for 
details). Related to this, the anxiety sensitivity index is not the equivalent of a measure of 
symptom severity (e.g., IDS-SR for depressive symptoms) and the observed associations 
(or lack thereof ) cannot be used to draw direct conclusions about symptoms of anxiety. 
Noteworthy, the possible influencing effect of comorbid psychiatric disorders on self-
report measures are currently unknown.
In conclusion, we found no evidence for AB as possible transdiagnostic neurocognitive 
marker for symptom severity levels of psychopathology. However, it may be a marker of 
symptom severity of ADHD in emotional disorders. Nevertheless, these conclusions may 
be limited to the scope of the type of attentional bias assessed, limited sample sizes, 
and the inclusion of clinical psychiatric samples restricting the range of symptom severity 
levels. This finding is relevant in view of expanding the current knowledge about potential 
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Clinical and demographic measures 
The present study was conducted during the transition period from DSM-IV to DSM-5. 
Therefore, ADHD was diagnosed following the DSM-IV criteria with the Diagnostic Interview 
for Adult ADHD (DIVA; Kooij & Francken, 2010) and ASD was diagnosed according to DSM-
5 criteria with the Dutch Interview for Diagnosing Autism Spectrum Disorders (in Dutch: 
‘Nederlands Interview ten behoeve van Diagnostiek Autismespectrumstoornissen’; NIDA; 
Vuijk, 2014). Both mood and anxiety disorders were diagnosed according to the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I; First et al., 1996). 
All patients completed online self-report questionnaires to assess the severity of 
emotional disorders and neurodevelopmental disorders. Severity of depressive symptoms 
was measured with the Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology self-report version (IDS-
SR; Rush, Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, & Trivedi, 1996).  The IDS-SR has good psychometric 
properties and internal consistency (Rush et al., 1996). The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; 
Rodriguez, Bruce, Pagano, Spencer, & Keller, 2004) measures the fear of anxiety-related 
physical symptoms due to a belief that these symptoms may be dangerous or harmful. 
(Weems, Hayward, Killen, & Taylor, 2002). The psychometric properties and predictive 
validity of the ASI have been well established (Peterson & Reiss, 1992). For assessing 
ASD symptoms, the Autism-Spectrum Quotient-50 (AQ-50; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) was used. The internal consistency and test–retest 
reliability of this questionnaire were rated as satisfactory (Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, 
& Boomsma, 2008). The self-report short version of the Connors’ Adult ADHD Rating 
Scale (CAARS-SS) is a standardized self-rating questionnaire to measure current ADHD 
symptomatology (Connors, Erhardt, & Sparrow, 1999). This scale has shown good internal 
consistency, inter-rater reliability, and sensitivity to treatment outcome (Adler et al., 2008). 
Sociodemographic information about age, sex, and education level were obtained by using 
online questionnaires. 
Affective ratings of the stimuli included in the eye-tracking task 
The stimuli groups were: negative non-social (NNS), positive non-social (PNS), negative 
social (NS), and positive social (PS). An independent-samples t-test was performed on 
the valence ratings of negative (NNS & NS; M = 2.51, SD = 0.42), and positive pictures 
(PNS & PS; M = 7.79, SD = 0.33), showing a significant effect of valence; t (95) = 19.06, 
p < .001. A separate ANOVA was conducted for the arousal ratings of NNS (M = 6.78, 
SD = 0.42), NS (M = 6.36, SD = 0.81), PNS (M = 3.79, SD = 0.82), and PS (M = 4.73, SD 
= 0.72) demonstrating a significant effect of arousal; F (3,92) = 92.79, p < .001. Post-
hoc analyses showed that all pair-wise comparisons were significant (p < .048). The 
negative stimuli included in this study were rated with higher arousal levels compared to 
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positive stimuli, since for instance a picture of a tropical island is less arousing than of a 
mutilated animal. 
Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals of the concentration networks 
We used the R bootnet package (Epskamp et al., 2018; R Core Team 2019) to measure the 
accuracy of the estimated edge-weights. A non-parametric bootstrap approach was used to 
calculate 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for the edges. The model is repeatedly estimated 
(in our case with 1000 iterations) which creates a distribution of the values of the edge 
weights, this displays the sampling variation. The wider a CI the lower the stability, and the 
narrower the CI the higher the stability. A note is that the edge-weight bootstrapped CIs 
should not be used as a test of significance of an edge being different from zero. 
Person-dropping bootstraps of the centrality indices
The stability of the centrality indices were evaluated by implementing a subset bootstrap 
procedure (Costenbader & Valente, 2003). Therefore we conducted person-dropping 
bootstraps to check if the order of the indices found is stable by re-estimating the network 
with fewer persons by using the R bootnet package (Epskamp et al., 2018; R Core Team 
2019). The bootstraps were set to 1000. This bootstrap was applied for various proportions 
of persons dropped, thus to assess the correlation between the centrality indices of 
the original dataset and those calculated from a subsample. If this correlation dropped 
substantially while removing patients, this indicates that the centrality index is less 
stable. Next, to quantify the stability of the centrality indices using subset bootstraps, 
we calculated the centrality stability correlation coefficient (CS-coefficient). It represents 
the maximum proportion of persons that can be dropped while with 95% probability the 
correlation between centrality metrics from the original dataset and the subset are at least 
0.7. The recommended CS-coefficient is .25 for interpreting centrality indices, nevertheless, 
this cut-of score should be taken as a recommendation and not as a definite guideline 
(Epskamp et al., 2018). See Figure S3 for the results of this procedure. 








Figure S1  Pearson correlation matrices of (a) the emotional disorders, (b) the comorbid, and (c) the 
neurodevelopmental disorders group. 
ABS-S = the attentional bias score for the social stimuli. ABS-NS = attentional bias score for the non-social stimuli. ASI = 
symptom severity scale for anxiety sensitivity. AQ-50 = symptom severity scale for autism spectrum disorders symptoms. 
CAARS-SS = symptom severity scale for attention deficit hyperactivity disorders symptoms. IDS-SR = symptom severity scale 
for depressive disorders.
Figure S2  Stability of the concentration network of the patient data: bootstrapped 95% confidence 
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The figures shows the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (CIs) of estimated edge-
weights for the graphical LASSO network (i.e., concentration network). On the x-axis all 
edges are shown (the names of the edges have been removed for readability), on the 
y-axis the distribution of the bootstrapped estimations of the CIs. The red line signifies 
the calculated edge weights in the network; the grey area is the 95% CIs. Noteworthy the 
overlapping CIs indicate that the edge-weights possibly do not significantly differ from 
each other, thus the order in which the edge-weights are presented should be interpreted 
with caution. Important for interpreting the figures is that many edges have an edge weight 
larger than zero have wide CIs which contain a zero, meaning we should interpret the 
network with caution. This holds especially true for the ND network which has particular 
wide overall CIs compared to the ED and CM groups. 
 
Figure S3  Mean correlation between centrality indices betweenness, closeness, and strength of 
the concentration networks estimation of (a) the emotional disorders, (b) the comorbid, and (c) the 









































































The effect of alexithymia on attentional bias 
toward emotional stimuli in depression:  
An eye-tracking study
 
Bergman, M. A., Vissers, C. T. W. M., Collard, R. M., van Eijndhoven, P., Schene, A. H., 
& Vrijsen, J. N. (2021). The Effect of Alexithymia on Attentional Bias Toward Emotional 
Stimuli in Depression: An Eye-Tracking Study. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 11, 1597. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2020.569946
Abstract
Alexithymia—reflecting deficits in cognitive emotion processing—is highly prevalent in 
individuals with depressive disorders. Subsequently, mixed evidence for attentional 
bias is found in these individuals. Alexithymia may be a potential influencing factor for 
attentional bias in depression. In the current study, 83 currently depressed (CD) and 
76 never-depressed (ND) controls completed an eye-tracker task consisting of valenced 
(non)-social pictures. Alexithymia scores were also included as a moderator as both a 
continuous and categorical measure (so high vs. low alexithymia). No group difference 
or moderating effect of alexithymia was found on attentional bias. Thus, alexithymic 
symptoms, included both dimensionally and categorically, may not influence biased 
attentional processing in depression compared to ND individuals. Thus, it is important 
to explore other potential explaining factors for the equivocal results found on biased 
attentional processing of emotional information in depression.
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Alexithymia reflects a deficit in the cognitive processing of emotions (Taylor, 2000). 
Alexithymia has two components. The emotional component is a reduced ability 
to identify, describe, and express emotional feelings of oneself and others, as well 
as describing somatic experiences. On the other hand, the cognitive component of 
alexithymia is reflected by poor introspective thinking that is considered to be an 
externally oriented cognitive style (Taylor & Bagby, 2012; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1991).
In the general population, 8–13% of persons show alexithymic traits (Lane, Lee et al. 
1996, Salminen, Saarijärvi et al. 1999, Honkalampi, Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. 2001).. 
Moreover, these traits are more prevalent across a wide range of somatic and psychiatric 
disorders (Bankier, Aigner, & Bach, 2001; Berardis et al., 2008; Leweke, Leichsenring, 
Kruse, & Hermes, 2012; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997a) and are particularly high (26–
50%) among patients with depressive disorders (Leweke, Leichsenring et al. 2012, 
Li, Lu et al. 2016). Depressed patients with alexithymia show more severe depressive 
symptoms and more overall psychopathology compared to depressed non-alexithymic 
patients (Honkalampi, Saarinen, Hintikka, Virtanen, & Viinamäki, 1999). Deficits in 
identifying and recognizing emotional feelings due to co-occurring alexithymia could 
lead to misinterpretation of depressive symptoms as symptoms of a somatic disorder. 
It could also result in depressive symptoms staying undetected and, thus, possibly 
develop into more severe or chronic depressive symptoms (Li, Zhang, Guo, & Zhang, 
2015). This increase of depressive symptoms that may be due to comorbid alexithymia 
underscores the need to investigate possible factors that could play a role in the strong 
relation between alexithymic symptoms and depression. 
Since individuals with alexithymia experience deficits in recognizing and describing 
internal and external emotional feelings, the effects of alexithymia can be reflected in 
the person’s cognitive (automatic) processing of emotional information (Taylor, 2000). 
This implies that emotional cues are less attended and, thus, alexithymia may result 
in reduced attentional bias for emotional information compared to neutral information. 
Hence, these individuals may allocate less attention toward (i.e., they spent less time 
looking at) emotional stimuli (i.e., negative or positive) relative to neutral stimuli. 
In the few studies that focus on the association between alexithymia and cognitive 
biases for emotional stimuli in community or student samples, strong indications are 
observed for a stronger association between high levels of alexithymia and less cognitive 
bias for negative stimuli [e.g., (Meltzer & Nielson, 2010; Mueller, Alpers, & Reim, 
2006; Suslow, 1998; Suslow, Junghanns, Donges, & Arolt, 2001)] or less attentional 
bias toward dysphoric (e.g., sad, hopelessness) stimuli in highly external orienting 
alexithymic individuals (Wiebe, Kersting, & Suslow, 2017). Conversely, others did not 
find an association of alexithymia and bias for negative stimuli in their entire community 
sample (Lundh & Simonsson-Sarnecki, 2002) or demonstrated decreased processing of 
positive stimuli in high alexithymic (HA) relative to low alexithymic  (LA) individuals (Tull, 
Medaglia, & Roemer, 2005). Hence, evidence exists that high levels of alexithymia may 
possibly influence biased information processing of emotional stimuli. Nevertheless, 
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this might be specific for negative information (i.e., threatening or dysphoric). Thus far, 
most studies investigated the effect of alexithymia on biased information processing in 
non-clinical samples. However, cognitive biases for especially negative information are 
present in diverse clinical populations (e.g., anxiety disorders) but are most prominently 
found in depressive disorders (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). 
A leading cognitive model of depression posits a mood-congruent bias in which negative 
affect provokes enhanced attention toward negative stimuli (Beck, 1967; Beck & Haigh, 
2014). Such a bias may stem from adverse childhood experiences resulting in the 
development of dysfunctional cognitive schemata, which can form the base for a cognitive 
vulnerability for developing depression. The empirical findings for negative attentional 
bias in (sub)clinically depressed individuals are equivocal (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; 
LeMoult & Gotlib, 2019). Studies have demonstrated more negative (i.e., allocating 
more attention toward negative compared to positive and neutral stimuli) as well as 
less positive attentional bias (i.e., attending less to positive information compared to 
negative information) in currently depressed (CD) individuals compared to nondepressed 
individuals [e.g., (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Peckham et al., 2010)]. Thus, depressed 
individuals tend to focus more on negative material than non-depressed individuals. 
However, lack of associations of negative attentional bias with (sub)clinical depression has 
also been reported (Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2017; Marchetti et al., 2018; Mogg & Bradley, 
2005). Considering inconclusive evidence is found for negative attentional processing of 
information in depression, examining possible influencing factors on this relationship is 
necessary. This is important because negative attentional bias is considered to be a risk 
factor in the development, maintenance, and recurrence of (symptoms of) depression 
[e.g., (Baert, De Raedt, & Koster, 2010; De Raedt & Koster, 2010)].
The current study will investigate whether alexithymia influences attentional bias in 
depression. To this aim, CD and never-depressed (ND) individuals were included in 
the study, and a free-viewing eye-tracking task was used, allowing the measurement 
of preferential attentional allocation toward valenced stimuli (i.e., attentional bias). 
Free-viewing eye-tracking paradigms have been established to have good reliability 
for measuring attentional bias (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). In 
depression, attentional bias is associated with a general negative bias (Naranjo et al., 
2011). Thus, in the current study, general negatively and positively valenced pictures 
(e.g., a family hugging vs. a couple crying; a litter of kittens vs. a neglected dog) were 
included. Further, to assess alexithymia, the 20-item self-report Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale [TAS-20 (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994)] was used, which is the most commonly 
used questionnaire for assessing alexithymia. Important to note is that differences in 
the inclusion of alexithymia symptom scores in studies exist: Both a dimensional and 
a categorical approach in which a cutoff score (i.e., by using a median split, extreme 
scores, or the clinical cutoff scores) is used in research (Sekely, Bagby, & Porcelli, 
2018; Taylor, Bagby, & Luminet, 2000). Therefore, in the current study, we will include 
both a categorical (i.e., using extreme groups representing the top and bottom 33% of 
alexithymia in the sample) and dimensional approach (i.e., using a continuous measure 
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of alexithymia) to examine whether alexithymia influences the presence of negative 
attentional bias in depression.
We hypothesized that the depressed individuals would show more negative relative to 
positive attentional bias compared to ND individuals. In addition, based on previous 
findings in HA ND individuals, we expect HA depressed patients and ND controls 
to show less negative relative to positive attentional bias compared to LA depressed 
patients. Put differently, we expected the HA depressed individuals to resemble the ND 
controls. Additionally and fully in line with this, we expected the continuous measure 
of alexithymia to moderate the group effect (depressed vs. controls) on attentional 
bias. If substantiating evidence is found, this could indicate that the presence of co-
occurring alexithymia may partially account for the mixed results found in the attentional 
bias literature for depression. Since discrepancy exists in the current literature in the 
approach of including alexithymic symptoms (i.e., categorical vs. dimensional), we will 
additionally explore if alexithymic symptoms, asmeasured with the total scores of the 
TAS-20, could be a possible moderator on attentional bias in patients with a current 
depressive disorder and ND controls.
Materials and methods
Participants
This study is part of the ongoing cross-sectional MIND-Set study (Measuring Integrated 
Novel Dimensions in Neurodevelopmental and Stress-related mental disorders) at the 
Department of Psychiatry of the Radboud University Medical Center (Radboudumc), 
Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Adult psychiatric patients (18 and older) with at least one 
clinical diagnosis of a stress-related disorder (depression, anxiety, and/or substance 
use disorders) and/or neurodevelopmental disorder [autism spectrum disorder (ASD) 
and/or attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)] were eligible to participate. 
The ND controls were recruited by promotion of the study in the community e.g., social 
media, flyers, and websites) via the Radboud Research Participation System as well as 
verbally through researchers’ own networks. The ND received a small fee for taking part 
in the study. Participants with current psychosis, sensorimotor handicaps, epilepsy 
(only for the eye-tracker task), inadequate command of the Dutch language, a full-scale 
IQ estimate of below 70, and/or mental incompetence to sign the informed consent form 
were excluded from participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The study has been approved by the Ethical Review Board of the Radboudumc, 
and all participants signed an informed consent prior to  participating in this study. 
Patients with a diagnosis of a current depressive disorder [i.e., major depressive disorder 
(MDD) and/or dysthymic disorder; CD] and ND were included as an analytical subsample 
of the MIND-Set study in the current paper, given that the diagnostic and demographic 
measures were fully assessed, and data of the eye-tracking task were complete. The data 
of this subsample were collected between August 2016 and July 2019. Eye-tracking data 
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of nine CD and four ND were excluded due to poor calibration. A total of 83 CD and 76 ND 
were included in the final sample of this study. See Table 1 for the demographic variables 
of all the participants. 
Diagnostic procedure
To classify the depressive patients (and also for the possible presence of comorbid 
psychiatric disorders) and to check for the absence of a lifetime history of psychiatric 
disorders in the ND participants, the following diagnostic screeners as well as semi-
structured interviews were used for all participants. The diagnostics were carried out 
face-to-face during the transition period from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM)-IV to DSM-5 at the Radboud University Medical Center, Psychiatry 
Department. The ND participants were screened via telephone. Depressive disorders, 
anxiety disorders, substance use disorders, and ADHDs were diagnosed according 
to DSM-IV; ASDs, according to DSM-5 criteria. Depressive and anxiety disorders were 
diagnosed with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders [SCID-I; (First 
et al., 1996)] and substance use disorders with the Measurements in the Additions for 
Triage and Evaluation and Criminality [MATE-Crimi; (Schippers & Broekman, 2010)]. 
To diagnose ADHD, we used the interview for ADHD in Adults Version 2.0 [Dutch: 
Diagnostisch Interview voor ADHD bij volwassenen 2.0; DIVA 2.0 (Kooij & Francken, 
2010; Ramos-Quiroga et al., 2016)] and, for ASD, the Dutch Interview for Diagnosing 
Autism Spectrum Disorders [in Dutch: “Nederlands Interview ten behoeve van 
Diagnostiek Autismespectrumstoornissen ” (NIDA); (Vuijk, 2014)] was used. See Table 2 
for the comorbid disorders present in the CD patients. 
All participants in this study completed online questionnaires to assess depressive 
symptom severity and alexithymia. Symptom severity of depression was measured with 
the 30-item Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology self-report version (DS-SR; Rush, 
Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, & Trivedi, 1996). Total scores ranging from 0 to 84, scores ≤13 are 
considered within the normal range; scores of 14–21 indicate mild depression; 22–38 
moderate MDD; ≥39 severe depression. The IDS-SR has good psychometric properties 
and internal consistency (43). The TAS-20 (Bagby, Parker, et al., 1994) was used to 
assess alexithymia (range 20–100). Higher scores on the TAS-20 indicate higher levels 
of alexithymia. The TAS-20 has good reliability and validity (Bagby, Parker, et al., 1994; 
Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994).
Materials and apparatus
Free-viewing task
The free-viewing eye-tracking task implemented in this study is similar to the task used 
in Bergman et al. (2021). The stimuli included a total of 96 pictures selected from the 
International Affective Picture System [IAPS; (46)] and the Nencki Affective Picture System 
[NAPS; (Marchewka, Żurawski, Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014)]. One half of the pictures 
displayed were negatively or positively valenced social pictures (i.e., a hugging family; a 
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crying woman); the other half negatively or positively valenced non-social pictures (i.e., a 
neglected dog; a litter of kittens). Thus, the 24 trials contained four images on each slide 
either of the social or non-social category, with the constraint that two pictures of the 
same valence were not presented next to each other. The two blocks (i.e., one block was 
composed of all the social and one block of all the nonsocial stimuli) were presented in a 
random order across the participants. For the purpose of this study, the valenced social 
and non-social pictures were compiled into two categories of general positive or general 
negative stimuli. See Figure 1 for an example of a social and a non-social slide.
Eye-tracker
A screen-based eye-tracking system (SMI RED500) was employed to measure the 
participants’ eye movements, allowing a free range of head movements. The direction 
of gaze within the screen, measured with x and y coordinates, was sampled every 2ms 
(500Hz). Data were collected using a velocity-based algorithm with a minimum fixation 
duration threshold of 100ms and a peak velocity threshold of 40◦/s. Areas of interest 
(AOIs) were also identified for each slide and corresponded with the total area for each 
of the four images including the outer corners to include possible recording noise. A 
total of two AOIs were constructed: a positive and a negative one. The eye movement 
data were preprocessed with the SMI BeGaze software version 3.7 (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, Inc., Teltow, Germany). In addition, the data were visually inspected for 
abnormalities and checked for distributional anomalies, which were not found.
Table 1 Group comparisons of the final sample on demographic variables and TAS-20 (total and 
subscale) scores (means and standard deviations [SD]) including test statistics for the group 
comparisons.
CD = currently depressed patients. ND = never depressed controls. TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale. IDS-SR = Inventory of 
Depressive Symptomatology (self-report).
1Adjusted classification of Ikram et al. (2014). Low: no education or elementary education and lower vocational and general 
secondary education were combined. Middle: intermediate vocational and higher secondary education. High: higher 
vocational education or university. 
Group
Variable CD (n = 83) ND (n = 76) Group comparisons
IDS-SR 40.0 (11.95) 4.9 (4.1) F (1,149) = 559.53, p < .001
TAS-20 56.6 (12.32) 38.7 (6.3) F (1,157) = 102.05, p < .001
Gender, female (%) 42.6 54.7 χ2(1) = 4.50, p = .034.
Age, mean (SD) 40.5 (14.87) 38.29 (15.99) F (1,157) = .82, p = .367
Education level1 χ2(2) = 6.41, p = .041.
     Low (%) 17.8 5.8
     Middle (%) 33.7 37.2
     High (%) 42.6 57.0  
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Table 2  Prevalence of comorbid psychiatric disorders in the currently depressed patients group.
 
CD = currently depressed patients. ADHD = attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. ASD = autism spectrum disorder. 
Relative gaze duration
The relative gaze duration (i.e., the sum of time participants looked at negative or positive 
stimuli relative to the total gaze duration) was computed as the sum of time participants 
looked at negative or positive stimuli divided by the total time the participants spent 
looking at the screen. Subsequently, the negative relative gaze duration was subtracted 
from the positive relative gaze duration resulting in one relative gaze duration difference 
score [i.e., relative attentional bias score (ABS)] per participant. This ABS was used in 
all analyses (i.e., the one-way ANCOVAs and the moderation analysis). Negative values 
for relative ABS indicated a negative bias (i.e., individuals gazed longer at negative 
compared to positive stimuli), whereas positive relative ABS values reflected a positive 
bias (i.e., individuals gazed longer at positive compared to negative stimuli).
Procedure
A participant was seated in a height-adjustable chair approximately 60 cm in front of a 
22′′ Dell TFT-monitor on which the stimuli were presented. The experimental task started 
when the 9-point calibration procedure was successfully completed (i.e., the average 
error was a maximum of 1.5◦ of the visual angle for the calibration points; in line with 
García-Blanco et al., 2014). This calibration procedure was rerun in between every block. 
All participants were instructed to minimize head movements, avoid speaking, and to 
look freely at the pictures on the screen. The eye-tracking task consisted of two parts, 
which the participant was instructed about beforehand, the free-viewing task described 
before and the recognition task. The recognition task was included to encourage 
active viewing of the pictures and mask the  purpose of the free-viewing task. During 
the recognition task, two out of four pictures of the previously presented slides have 
switched positions and the participant was asked to indicate which one out of these 
two. The total duration of the whole eye-tracking procedure was approximately 20 min.
Group
Comorbid disorder CD (n = 83)
ADHD (%) 22
Anxiety disorder (%) 23
ASD (%) 21
Substance use disorder (%) 19
Number of comorbid disorders (%) 1 = 47, 2 = 13, 3 = 4
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Statistical analysis
Firstly, we wanted to examine if the depressed individuals differed from the ND controls 
on ABS. Thus, a one-way between-subjects ANCOVA analysis was conducted with Group 
(CD and ND) as the independent variable and relative ABS as the dependent variable. 
Age, gender, and education level were included as covariates. Next, a separate analysis 
was conducted to investigate if depressed patients with HA symptoms differed from 
patients with LA symptoms and ND controls on ABS. Therefore, we divided the patient 
sample into two groups: LA (lowest 33%, TAS-20 < 54) CD (LA-CD), HA (highest 33%, TAS-
20 > 63) CD (HA-CD) and compared them to the ND controls. To ensure that the ND and 
LA-CD groups were equally distributed on the alexithymia scores, we omitted ND with a 
TAS-20 score of 54 or more (n = 9), which formed the new ND group (NDA) included in 
this specific analysis. In this second ANCOVA analysis, Group (LA-CD, HA-CD, and ND-A) 
was included as the independent variable. Relative ABS was the dependent variable, 
and age, gender, and education level were included as covariates.
In the moderation analysis, the TAS-20 total score was investigated as a moderator 
(W) on the group (i.e., all CD and ND individuals; X) and relative attentional bias score 
(relative ABS; Y) relationship using the PROCESS 3.4 macro tool for SPSS (Hayes, 2017). 
The PROCESS macro tool examines the outcome of (X), the proposed moderator (W), and 
the interaction of the two. There is evidence for moderation when the 95% confidence 
interval does not include zero (Hayes, 2012), 1,000 bootstrap samples were performed. 
See Figure 2 for the specific details of the moderation model.
Results
Group comparisons on symptoms and demographics
The CD and ND group did not differ significantly with respect to age. However they 
differed significantly on TAS-20 total scores, depressive symptoms, education level, and 
gender identification (Table 1).
The effect of high and low alexithymia in depressed vs. never-depressed 
groups on attentional bias
CD individuals (M = −0.012, SD = 0.257) and ND controls (M = −0.028, SD = 0.173) did 
not differ significantly on relative ABS, F(1, 158) = 0.33, p = 0.564. The one-way between-
subjects ANCOVA including differentiation on alexithymia level was aimed to investigate 
if alexithymia level obscured group differences on attentional bias. Therefore, the 
following groups were compared: CD patient with high (top 33%) alexithymia levels 
(HA-CD, n = 29), CD with low level of alexithymia (bottom 33%; LA-CD, n = 28), and ND 
individuals with low level of alexithymia (ND-A, n = 47). However, Group did not show 
a significant difference in relative ABS, F(2,100) = 0.05, p = 0.950; see also Figure 3 
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for more details. Thus, the groups (i.e., HA-CD, LA-CD, and ND-A) showed comparable 
attentional biased processing of valenced stimuli. Because the 95% CI of the group 
comparison including the alexithymia subdivision (i.e., comparing LA-CD, HA-CD, and 





Figure 1  Left: an example slide from the non-social block; right: an example slide from the social 
block. All stimuli in this study, including the ones depicted in these example slides, have been 
obtained from two public databases, namely, the Nencki Affective Picture System (Marchewka, 
Żurawski, Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014) and the International Affective Picture System (Lang, 
Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997).
 
 
Figure 2  Moderation model with group [currently depressed (CD) individuals vs. never depressed 
(ND) controls] as predictor (X), total TAS-20 score as the moderator (W), and the relative attentional 
bias score as the outcome (Y) variable.
The moderating effect of alexithymia on attentional bias 
To assess if TAS-20 scores moderated the relationship of CD and ND groups and the 
relative ABS, a moderation analysis was conducted; see Figure 2 for the specific details 
of the moderation model. No main or interaction effects were significant (p > 0.232); 
see Table 4 for the t-statistics of the moderation analysis. Important to note is that the 
groups did not significantly differ on ABS (p = 0.231), indicating no differential bias 
dependent on depression status. Further, no moderation effect of alexithymia on ABS 
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score includes zero, see also Table 4, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no group 
differences.
 
Figure 3  The graph represents the mean relative attentional bias scores for each group with indivi-
dual data points: HA-CD, high alexithymia currently depressed (n = 29); LA-CD, low alexithymia 
currently depressed (n = 28); ND-A, never depressed controls (n = 47). Error bars represent standard 
deviations.
 
Table 3  The means (M) with standard deviations (SD) and adjusted means (Madj) with standard 
errors (SE) of the one-way between-subjects ANCOVA comparing the relative attentional bias score of 
the depressed individuals with high or low alexithymic symptoms and never-depressed controls on 
the relative attentional bias score with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals
 
Group: HA-CD = high alexithymia depression. LA-CD  = low alexithymia depression patients. ND-A = never depressed 
controls. Means (M), standard deviations (SD), adjusted means (Madj), standard errors (SE), and 95% confidence intervals 
(CI) for relative attentional bias score (ABS) for the three groups.
Group M SD Madj SE 95% CI
HA-CD -.038 .262 -.038 -.044 [-.126, .050]
LA-CD -.019 .248 -.021 -.038 [-.096, .055]
ND-A -.012 .182 -.021 -.030 [-.080, .037]
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Table 4  Moderation of alexithymia on the effect of group on relative attentional bias score (ABS).
R2 = .08. Group include currently depressed and never depressed controls. Standard Error (SE ) and 95% Confidence 
Interval (CI ). * p < .05.
Discussion
In the current study, we aimed to examine whether alexithymia could influence the 
relationship between depression and biased attentional processing of valenced 
information. If alexithymia indeed affects attentional bias processing in depressed 
individuals, then this might partially explain the mixed results in attentional bias 
research in depression. First, the present study found no differences in attentional 
bias for valenced emotional stimuli in CD and ND controls. This result is pursuant to 
others demonstrating no differential attentional bias processing in these groups (e.g., 
Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2017; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000). 
In contrast, others did demonstrate more negative as well as less positive attentional 
bias (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Peckham et al., 2010). The present study adds to the 
growing body of research suggesting that attentional bias may not be a robust marker for 
(symptoms of) depressive disorders (e.g., Beevers et al., 2019).
Second, alexithymia did not moderate the depressed group differences on attentional 
bias for positive and negative stimuli. These results corroborate the study of Lundh 
and Simonsson-Sarnecki (2002), who found no differences in attentional bias when 
investigating the entire participant sample, which was a community-based sample. 
However, a post hoc power analysis revealed that in order to detect a significant effect 
at 5% with a statistical power at the recommended 0.80 level (Cohen, 1988), a sample 
of 196 participants would be required. Future studies with larger sample sizes are thus 
needed to detect a possible influence of alexithymic symptoms on biased attentional 
processing in depressed individuals. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
alexithymic symptoms may not influence biased attentional processing in depression. 
However, considering the limited studies available, further research is needed to 
confirm these findings. 
b 95% CI SE B T p-value
Constant .04 [-.14, .21] .09 .40 .691
Group -.05 [-.13, .03] .04 -1.20 .231
TAS-20 score (centered) -.01 [-.01, .01] .01 -.97 .337
Group x TAS-20 score .01 [-.01, .01] .00 -.45 .655
Gender .11 [.04, .18] .03 3.18 .002*
Age .001 [-.01, 01] .01 .48 .632
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In the current study, a direct effect of alexithymia on biased attentional processing was 
not  demonstrated. Possibly, this might be due to an indirect influence of alexithymia on 
attentional bias by a moderating effect of, for instance, deficits in executive functioning 
(EF). EF is interrelated with other cognitive processes such as attentional bias (Bardeen & 
Orcutt, 2011; Zhou, Yuan, & Yao, 2012) and alexithymia (Koven & Thomas, 2010; Santorelli 
& Ready, 2015; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhu, Wang, Huang, Yao, & Tang, 2006). Deficits in EF 
are also connected with depressive disorders  (see: Fossati, et al., 2002; Snyder, 2013). 
An aspect of the self-regulatory action of “self-directed emotion/motivation” of Barkley’s 
EF theory is emotion regulation. This EF represents the inhibition of strong emotions and 
to downregulate or otherwise moderate them (Barkley, 1997, 2012). Research confirms 
that alexithymia is associated with poor emotion regulation strategies (e.g., Swart, 
Kortekaas, & Aleman, 2009). Specifically, suppression (i.e., to inhibit an emotional 
response) has been found to decrease positive and not negative emotion experience. 
Future studies could advance our knowledge of this interplay by including (self-report) 
measures of executive functioning, specifically for emotion regulation.
Strength of this study is the inclusion of a naturalistic, well-defined patient sample, 
which facilitates the generalizability of the current findings to the clinical population. 
Another strength is the use of an eye tracker, which is proven to be a reliable measure 
to assess attentional bias toward valenced stimuli in depressed individuals, especially 
compared to more traditional measures such as a the dot-probe and emotional Stroop 
tasks (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Waechter et al., 2014). In addition, we examined both 
approaches (i.e., categorical and dimensional) for including the TAS-20 measure in our 
study, thus, to thoroughly investigate a potential effect of alexithymic symptoms on 
attentional bias. It is important to note that the TAS-20 solely relies on self-assessment, 
which can pose as a problem since it is shown that alexithymic individuals have a poor 
general ability of self-reflection (Taylor et al., 1997b). Nevertheless, the TAS-20 has been 
proven to be a valid measure of alexithymia in several common psychiatric disorders, 
and it has good discriminative validity between healthy and clinical individuals (Taylor, 
2000).
In conclusion, we did not find evidence for a negative attentional bias in depressed 
patients, contributing to the mixed findings on attentional bias in depression. Moreover, 
alexithymia did not seem to explain the lack of negative bias in depression in our 
sample. Thus, it would be of importance to explore other potential explaining factors for 
the equivocal results found on biased attentional processing of emotional information 
in depression, such as the influence of psychiatric comorbidity (e.g., anxiety disorders, 
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High comorbidity within and between emotional disorders (e.g., depression and anxiety 
disorders) and neurodevelopmental disorders (e.g., attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder [ADHD] and autism spectrum disorder [ASD]) is highly prevalent (Kessler, 
Berglund, et al., 2005). Identifying possible shared markers of these two groups of 
disorders can contribute to a better understanding of why this comorbidity is high. Such 
a marker can be negative attentional bias because it is considered to be a cognitive 
risk factor for developing and maintaining (symptoms of) depression (e.g., Baert, De 
Raedt, & Koster, 2010; De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Elgersma et al., 2018). Recent evidence 
has shown that negative bias can also function as a marker for neurodevelopmental 
disorders such as ADHD (Vrijsen et al., 2018) and ASD (Unruh, Bodfish, & Gotham, 2018). 
This means that biased processing of negative information may be viewed as a potential 
transdiagnostic marker for (comorbid) psychiatric disorders. However, more research is 
needed to confirm the potential role of biased attentional processing as a transdiagnostic 
marker. Thus, the general aim of this thesis is to systematically study if negative 
attentional bias is indeed also characteristic of (symptoms of) neurodevelopmental 
disorders. This will add to the growing literature indicating negative cognitive bias as 
possible transdiagnostic psychiatric marker.
In Chapters 2 and 3 our emphasis is on the comorbidity of ASD and depression, because 
of the following reasons. First, depression frequently co-occurs with ASD and, if both 
disorders are manifested in the same patient, the clinical diagnostic process can be 
complicated. This can be due to, for instance, overlap in symptomatology and masking 
of depressive symptoms as a result of impaired verbal and non-verbal communication 
which are characteristics of ASD (Chandrasekhar & Sikich, 2015; Stewart, Barnard, 
Pearson, Hasan, & O’Brien, 2006). Second, the personal and societal impact of this 
comorbidity is high (Joshi et al., 2013; Mazefsky, Pelphrey, & Dahl, 2012) and there is 
also an increased suicide risk (De-la-Iglesia & Olivar, 2015). Despite this high impact, 
potential (cognitive) markers and mechanisms contributing to this comorbidity (i.e., 
to gain insight into how depression can develop alongside ASD) are lacking. Recently, 
tentative evidence for biased information processing in ASD has been reported (Ghosn 
et al., 2019; Unruh et al., 2018; Wagner, Keehn, Tager-Flusberg, & Nelson, 2020). We 
build on this new timely research direction by investigating how an attentional bias 
for emotional stimuli, if present, is manifested in ASD with and without comorbid 
depression. Mechanistic knowledge could facilitate the earlier detection and treatment 
of depression in ASD as well as expand the limited number of current treatment options. 
Third, we choose to zoom in on these specific disorders and their comorbidity as a 
first more specific exploration of potential evidence for a negative attentional bias in 
a neurodevelopmental disorder (i.e., ASD) and possibly providing further evidence for 
negative attentional bias as a transdiagnostic neurocognitive marker. 
We first investigated in Chapter 2 whether negative cognitive bias, a known vulnerability 
factor for both the onset and the maintenance of depression (De Raedt & Koster, 2010; 
Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), is also present in individuals with ASD. If so, this could 
strengthen the existing evidence of an increased risk for developing depression in ASD 
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due to this similar cognitive vulnerability as for depression. In our systematic review, we 
found, based on the included empirical studies (N = 31), that negative attentional bias 
might not be a cognitive marker for ASD since half of the studies showed no differential 
bias processing of emotional information between individuals with ASD and neurotypical 
controls. In the studies where there were differences in cognitive biases, individuals with 
ASD mainly showed less pronounced negative biases than the controls. Importantly, 
certain limitations of these studies were raised. For instance, the small sample sizes, 
the lack of (fully) assessed comorbidity, the use of less reliable paradigms, and the fact 
that the presented stimuli were not specifically designed for autism research. Thus, the 
included studies – which were not all primarily designed to investigate cognitive biases 
in ASD – may not be sensitive enough to capture the presence of possible cognitive 
biases for emotional stimuli. 
With these limitations in mind, we designed the study of Chapter 3, which included a 
free-viewing eye-tracking task with relevant stimuli for ASD individuals, namely pictures 
depicting non-social versus social scenes. The aim of this chapter was to examine 
whether ASD is characterised by a negative attentional bias and whether this bias can 
be explained by comorbid (sub)clinical depression. To assess attentional bias, a reliable 
paradigm was included which directly measures the allocation of attention for positively 
and negatively valenced non-social and social stimuli. We included individuals with 
current depression (CD) or remitted depression (RD) and/or ASD (n = 116), and non-
psychiatric controls (n = 64). The results replicated previous studies showing a negative 
attentional bias in both CD and RD individuals (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). 
However, this negative bias was not apparent when these groups were compared to the 
non-psychiatric control group. Additionally, this study demonstrated that a negative 
attentional bias is a marker for CD in ASD and does not seem to be present in ASD 
without a current depression. Hence, a negative bias may not persist after the recovery 
of a depressive episode, and this bias might thus only be a depressive state-specific 
marker in individuals with ASD.  
In Chapter 4, we included disorder-specific symptom severity indices of depression, 
anxiety sensitivity, ASD and ADHD, because according to the Research Domain Criteria 
(RDoC) framework (Cuthbert, 2014), symptom-level investigations (e.g., a dimensional 
approach) may provide a better understanding of affective markers and mechanisms 
underlying psychopathology than a traditional classification approach. A relatively 
new research direction approaches disorders as systems of causally interrelated 
symptoms (Borsboom & Cramer, 2013; Fried et al., 2017). These network approaches 
conceptualize psychological problems as mutually interacting, mostly reciprocally 
reinforcing, elements of a complex network. This inspired us to explore, using a network 
analysis, whether attentional bias for valenced stimuli is associated with symptom 
severity levels of different psychiatric disorders. We conducted network analyses 
in three groups of psychiatric patients: 1) patients with only emotional disorder(s) 
(n = 97), 2) patients with only neurodevelopmental disorder(s) (n = 32), and 3) patients 
with both types of disorders (n = 78). This methodology might provide further evidence 
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for attentional bias as a possible transdiagnostic neurocognitive marker across different 
psychiatric disorders. In the emotional disorders group, we found an association 
between ADHD symptom severity and negative social attentional bias, substantiating 
the possible relevance of Beck’s cognitive model (Beck, 1974; Beck & Haigh, 2014) for 
other psychiatric disorders besides the well-investigated emotional disorders. However, 
and contrary to our expectations, there were no associations between symptom severity 
levels of depression, anxiety sensitivity, and ASD and attentional bias. Recent evidence, 
however, has shown no association between depressive symptoms and negative 
attentional bias (Beevers et al., 2019; Marchetti et al., 2018), which is pursuant to our 
results. Thus, these findings indicate that negatively biased attention processing may 
not be a marker of severity of psychiatric symptoms in samples of (comorbid) psychiatric 
patients.  
Finally, because equivocal evidence exists for the presence of negative attentional bias 
in depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), the final aim of this thesis was to investigate if 
alexithymia might be a protentional influencing factor on this relationship. Alexithymia 
is a deficit in the cognitive processing of emotions. It is characterized by the difficulty 
to identify and describe emotions experienced by one’s self or others and is highly 
prevalent in depressive disorders. It has been suggested that alexithymia may be 
reflected in the processing of emotional information (Taylor, 2000): less attention 
might be allocated towards emotional cues. This, in turn, may result in a reduced 
biased attention for valenced information. Thus, it could be that high alexithymic traits 
may be a potential influencing factor of aberrant attentional processing in depression. 
So, in Chapter 5, we investigated the possible moderating effect of alexithymia on 
attentional bias in depressed (n = 83) compared to never-depressed individuals 
(n = 76). Differences in how alexithymia severity scores are included exist in the current 
literature, so we used both a categorical (e.g., extreme groups) and dimensional 
approach (e.g., all participants). In this study, we first showed that there is no differential 
biased information processing between depressed and non-psychiatric controls. This 
finding, combined with the evidence of others (e.g., Beevers et al., 2019), suggests 
that attentional bias is not a robust marker for patients with (symptoms of) depressive 
disorders. Additionally, we found no moderation effect of alexithymic symptoms, as well 
as no differential attentional processing in the extreme groups (i.e., high-alexithymic 
depressed individuals vs. low-alexithymic depressed individuals) versus non-psychiatric 
controls. This might indicate that there is no direct influence of alexithymia on negative 
attentional bias and depression.
Attentional bias as a neurocognitive marker of (symptoms of) 
depression
In the eye-tracking studies of this thesis (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) equivocal evidence 
was shown for differential attentional bias processing in both remitted and currently 
depressed patients. Attentional processing can be divided into several attentional 
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indices such as initial allocation and (dis)engagement of attention (i.e., later stages 
of attention). Biased attentional processing in depressed individuals, when present, 
mainly appears in the later stages of attention processing and not in the initial stages 
(see: Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). The finding in Chapter 3 underscores this by showing 
that no evidence was found for a differential initial attentional bias in the depressed 
groups (both remitted and currently depressed patients) as well as in others (i.e., 
non-psychiatric controls, never depressed ASD, depression with comorbid ASD). Both 
remitted and current depressed patients only demonstrated a maintained attentional 
bias for negative information, which substantiates previous findings (e.g., Armstrong 
& Olatunji, 2012; Caseras et al., 2007; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; 
Leyman et al., 2011; Peckham et al., 2010). Interestingly, this aberrant processing of 
emotional information in depressed individuals was not found when compared to non-
psychiatric controls. In Chapter 5, we also demonstrated no differential attentional 
processing of valenced stimuli between currently depressed individuals (including both 
major depressive disorder and dysthymic disorders) and non-psychiatric controls, which 
is in line with others (e.g., Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2017; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Mogg, 
Millar, & Bradley, 2000). 
Studies finding a similar result, suggest that an attentional bias is mainly apparent, 
or more activated, for negative, self-relevant stimuli in depression which enables the 
activation of associated negative self-schemata (e.g., De Raedt & Koster, 2010; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2005; Wisco, 2009). This is a key feature of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression, 
which posits that cognitive schemata are latent until activated by negative self-relevant 
stimuli (Beck & Clark, 1988). Even though evidence exists for the presence of a general 
negative attentional bias in depressed individuals (Naranjo et al., 2011), our stimuli 
might have been less congruent with the concerns or current mood of the depressed 
individuals for enhanced activation of attentional bias for negative information to occur 
(for more information, see the Methodological Considerations section below).
In line with previous evidence, this thesis demonstrates that negative attentional 
bias, as measured with a reliable eye tracking paradigm (Waechter, Nelson, Wright, 
Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014), may not be a (robust) marker for (remitted) depressed 
patients compared to non-psychiatric controls (Lichtenstein-Vidne et al., 2017; Mogg 
& Bradley, 2005; Vrijsen, van Oostrom, Isaac, Becker, & Speckens, 2014). Additionally, 
a recent longitudinal study showed that attentional bias did not play a critical role in 
the underlying mechanisms for developing recurrent depressive episodes in a large 
sample of remitted depressed individuals (Elgersma et al., 2019). Altogether, mixed 
evidence has been found for the relevance of negative attentional bias for (remitted) 
depression, suggesting that negative attentional bias is not a stable and robust marker 
for depression (see also: Marchetti et al., 2018).  
In this thesis we also investigated the association between (subclinical) depressive 
symptoms and attentional bias in different psychiatric disorders. When including these 
depressive symptoms in groups of only emotional disorders (ED; depressive disorders 
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and anxiety disorders), only neurodevelopmental disorders (ND; ADHD and ASD), 
and comorbid patients, no associations of severity levels of depressive symptoms 
with attentional bias were found (Chapter 4). Moreover, in Chapter 3, we included 
the IDS-SR total scores (i.e., a self-report depressive symptom measure) to examine a 
possible influence of subclinical depressive symptom levels on the gaze patterns of the 
individuals with ASD and/or (remitted) depression. This additional analysis showed that 
the results of this study were independent of the presence of subclinical depression. 
These results (Chapters 3 and 4) and recent findings from colleagues (e.g., Beevers et 
al., 2019; Marchetti et al., 2018) who report no or weak associations between depression 
symptom severity and negative attentional bias, are in contrast to others showing group 
differences between individuals with a current depression and non-psychiatric control 
individuals (e.g., Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). A possible 
explanation for this result is that when using a categorical classification approach, the 
included participants lie in general at the higher or extremes of the symptom severity 
levels, thus providing different information, and most likely different research outcomes, 
as opposed to including participants on the whole spectrum of symptom severity levels 
(including subclinical depressive symptoms). Maladaptive schema might be either less 
pronounced or less frequently activated in subclinical depression, resulting in weaker 
negative bias compared to (severely) depressed individuals. However, for understanding 
underlying markers, and more generally, the pathophysiology of (comorbid) psychiatric 
disorders, a dimensional approach is more suitable (Kircanski, LeMoult, Ordaz, & Gotlib, 
2017). 
Remarkably, when an association of negative attentional bias with depression symptom 
severity was demonstrated, this was more pronounced in individuals with higher 
symptom severity levels (i.e., moderate to severe depressive symptoms; Baert et al., 
2010; Everaert, Duyck, & Koster, 2014). In the studies that demonstrated no association 
of depression symptom severity and negative attentional bias, the participants had 
minimal to moderate depressive symptoms (Beevers et al., 2019; Bergman et al., 2021; 
Bergman et al., Submitted; Marchetti et al., 2018,). Thus, the association of attentional 
bias with subclinical depression is not robust. Attentional bias for negative information 
is perhaps not a (strong) marker of low(er) depressive symptom severity. 
Collectively, the results presented in this thesis indicate that negative attentional bias 
is not a robust characteristic of (sub-)clinical depression. It might therefore be assumed 
that negative attentional bias is also not a robust transdiagnostic neurocognitive marker. 
Of importance is that methodological limitations, which characterize current attentional 
bias paradigms, may have contributed to inconsistencies in the results found (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010; see for more details also the Methdological Considerations section below). 
In addition, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, (2007) propose that attentional bias 
might have a more indirect effect on depressive symptoms. For example, the maintained 
attentional bias towards negative stimuli in depression may be connected to deficits 
in updating the contents of the working memory as part of attentional control (i.e., an 
effortful process of allocating attention towards goal-relevant information in the face 
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of conflicting or competing attentional demands; Sarapas, Weinberg, Langenecker & 
Shankman, 2017). Depressed individuals have difficulty removing negative content from 
working memory, so when these updating deficits occur, it might be that maintained 
attentional bias towards negative stimuli might also occur (Armstrong & Olatunji, 
2012). Because there is mixed evidence for attentional bias processing in (remitted) 
depressed individuals, future studies are encouraged to examine possible moderators 
of attentional bias including working memory and broader executive functions (see also: 
Everaert et al., 2017). 
Alexithymia as a moderator of the relationship of attentional bias and 
depression
In Chapter 5, we examined the potential influencing effect of alexithymia, which is highly 
prevalent in depression and other psychiatric disorders, on attentional bias in depressed 
patients. This relationship may partially explain the mixed results demonstrated in the 
attentional bias research in depression. The results of Chapter 5 showed, as mentioned 
before, no differences in attentional bias between the currently depressed (major 
depressive disorder and dysthymic) and non-psychiatric control participants. Given that 
there are differences between studies in the inclusion of alexithymia symptom scores, 
we included both a continuous (i.e., dimensionally) and categorical (so high versus low 
symptoms of alexithymia) alexithymia measure. No group difference or moderating effect 
of alexithymia was found on attentional bias. Thus, alexithymic symptoms, included 
both dimensionally and categorically, did not seem to explain the lack of negative bias 
in depression in this study sample. It is therefore possible that alexithymia might not 
directly influence biased attention in depression.
Executive functions (EF) are related to alexithymia (Koven & Thomas, 2010; Santorelli & 
Ready, 2015; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhu, Wang, Huang, Yao, & Tang, 2006), attentional biases 
(Bardeen & Orcutt, 2011; Zhou, Yuan, & Yao, 2012), and (current) depressive disorders 
(Snyder, 2013; see also a meta-analysis by Ahern & Semkovska, 2017 demonstrating 
that shifting, processing speed, among other EFs, return to baseline after remission from 
depression). Therefore, it could be possible that the relationship between alexithymia 
and attentional bias is indirectly influenced by deficits in EF. According to Barkley’s theory 
(Barkley, 1997, 2012), emotion regulation is part of EF. Emotion regulation difficulties 
(e.g., suppression, rumination), offen occur in depressed individuals (Joormann & 
Siemer, 2004; Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007) and can interact with cognitive biases 
(e.g., Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007). Future studies could advance our knowledge 
of the possible interplay of alexithymia and EF on attentional bias by including (self-
report) measures of executive functioning, specifically for emotion regulation. 
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Attentional bias as a transdiagnostic neurocognitive marker in 
other (symptoms of) psychiatric disorders
Attentional bias in (symptoms of) ASD  
Both the structured review (Chapter 2) and the eye-tracking studies (Chapters 3 and 4) 
showed no clear evidence for the presence of a negative attentional bias in (symptoms 
of) ASD without a current depressive disorder. It might be that, when a depressive 
episode is not present, individuals with ASD have a pre-existing positive bias as shown 
by the results of Chapter 3 in both remitted and never depressed ASD individuals. A 
negative attentional bias was only found in individuals with ASD and a current depression 
compared to individuals with ASD and a remitted depression, as well as in individuals 
with current and remitted depression without ASD, but not compared to the other groups 
(ASD with depression and non-psychiatric controls). Thus, individuals with ASD might be 
less affected by the lingering effect a depressive episode can have. This might be due to 
these ASD individuals exhibiting a pre-existing positive, or at least not a depressotypic, 
processing style.  
However, a recent study (Unruh et al., 2018) investigating differences in attentional 
gaze patterns, using a preferential viewing task, in individuals with depression and 
in never-depressed ASD, demonstrated that both groups had a bias towards angry 
(i.e., threatening) and no bias towards happy faces compared to controls. Uniquely, 
individuals with ASD prioritized looking at sad images, an effect not found in the other 
groups. Others also showed an attentional bias towards threatening images in ASD 
individuals (scenes, but not for faces: Ghosn et al., 2019; faces: Wagner et al., 2020), but 
not for sad stimuli (faces and scenes: Ghosn et al., 2019). This is in contrast with earlier 
studies that found no differences in attentional biases for angry and sad faces in ASD 
compared to typically developing individuals (Hollocks, Ozsivadjian, Matthews, Howlin, 
& Simonoff, 2013; May, Cornish, & Rinehart, 2015; Monk et al., 2010). However, only two 
of these studies did include an eye-tracker (Unruh et al., 2018 and Wagner et al., 2020) 
which is a more reliable attentional bias measure (Waechter et al., 2014). In conclusion, 
the findings from both the studies included in this thesis and the studies mentioned 
above suggests that negative attentional bias might not be a robust neurocognitive 
marker of (symptoms of) ASD in the absence of a current depressive episode. 
Other cognitive deficits could be more central to the aetiology of depression in ASD 
rather than attentional biases (only). For instance, the vulnerability for developing 
depression in ASD could be due to shared alterations of common neuropsychological 
processes. These neuropsychological deficits could be, for instance, deficits in 
executive functioning (e.g., flexibility) and in social cognition (i.e., Theory of Mind) as 
proposed in our structured review in Chapter 2. Alternatively, depressive disorders or 
symptoms in case of depression/ASD comorbidity may be regarded as secondary to 
ASD. Specifically, as a direct reactivity to the increased stress resulting from the typical 
deficits that characterize ASD, like social problems (i.e., bullying by peers and social 
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misunderstandings) and alterations in sensory sensitivity (hypo- and hypersensitivity), 
which might pose an (added) vulnerability factor for developing depression (Bitsika, 
Sharpley, & Mills, 2016; Tebartz van Elst, Pick, Biscaldi, Fangmeier, & Riedel, 2013). 
However, to develop a full picture of which specific (cognitive) processes may be 
contributing to the onset and maintenance of depression in ASD, additional studies are 
required. 
Attentional bias and symptoms of ADHD and anxiety sensitivity 
In Chapter 4, the association of anxiety sensitivity severity (among other disorder-
specific symptom severity indices) with attentional bias was investigated in emotional, 
neurodevelopmental, and comorbid disorders. Anxiety sensitivity refers to the fear of 
anxiety-related physical symptoms or behaviors due to a belief that these symptoms 
may be dangerous or harmful (Reiss, 1987, 1991) and may function as a risk and 
maintaining factor for anxiety disorders (Mantar, Yemez, & Alkin, 2011). The results of 
Chapter 4 showed that negative attentional bias is perhaps not a (robust) marker for 
the level of symptom severity of anxiety sensitivity (see Chapter 4). Recent studies 
corroborate this finding (Lang & Sarmiento, 2004; McNally, Hornig, Hoffman, & Han, 
1999), whereas others (Keogh, Dillon, Georgiou, & Hunt, 2001; Lees, Mogg, & Bradley, 
2005) demonstrated associations of ASI symptom severity levels with initial attentional 
allocation for specific health-threat related stimuli (e.g., a sick or injured persons, a 
person in a wheelchair or hospital bed). So, perhaps general negative stimuli are less 
relevant when investigating symptoms of anxiety sensitivity opposed to disorder-
specific stimuli (i.e., health-threat related), because the latter are more prone to activate 
an attentional bias related with the specific concerns of individuals with high levels of 
anxiety sensitivity. 
With regard to the relationship of attentional bias and symptoms of ADHD, the results 
of Chapter 4 provide evidence for an association between negative attentional bias for 
social stimuli and the severity of symptoms of ADHD in individuals with at least one 
emotional disorder. This finding adds to the growing evidence of the possible relevance 
of Beck’s cognitive theory for (symptoms of) ADHD (e.g., Ahmadi et al., 2011; Pishyareh et 
al., 2012; Shapero, et al., 2021; Vrijsen et al., 2018). More specifically, negative cognitive 
schemata, originated by childhood adversities, might also be relevant for ADHD and not 
only for the emotional disorders (Vrijsen et al., 2018; Vrijsen et al., 2017). However, the 
results found in this thesis might also be related to the higher distractibility of the high 
arousing negative compared to positive stimuli in the study, since ADHD individuals 
tend to be more distracted by high arousing stimuli (López-Martín, Albert, Fernández-
Jaén, & Carretié, 2013) due to inhibition problems (Friedman-Hill et al., 2010) that are 
characteristic for ADHD (Rommelse, 2008; Slaats-Willemse, Swaab-Barneveld, De 
Sonneville, Van Der Meulen, & Buitelaar, 2003). One recent study including patients with 
ADHD and/or depression compared with non-psychiatric controls demonstrated that 
ADHD patients show no extended positive attentional bias (based on the revisits index) 
when presented with emotional facial expressions. Moreover, the negative bias found 
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in ADHD may be due to (sub)clinical comorbid depression (Schuthof et al., Submitted), 
which is in line with the result found in Chapter 4. 
Concluding, the results of Chapter 4 suggests that negative attentional bias might not 
be a transdiagnostic marker of severity of disorder-specific symptoms (i.e., ASD, anxiety 
sensitivity, and depressive symptoms) in samples with common psychiatric disorders 
(emotional, neurodevelopmental, and comorbid disorders). However, and consistent 
with others (e.g., Vrijsen et al., 2018; Vrijsen et al., 2017), negative attentional bias 
might only be relevant for (symptoms of) ADHD. Therefore, further work is required to 
establish the presence of negative attentional bias in (symptoms of) ADHD for emotional 
(disorder-specific) stimuli and to investigate if this bias is driven by depressive disorders 
and/or symptoms.
Methodological considerations
Eye-tracking paradigm and stimuli 
As mentioned earlier, it might be that the inclusion of disorder-specific stimuli in 
the attentional bias paradigms is relevant for certain disorders or symptoms such as 
anxiety sensitivity (e.g., health-threat related stimuli versus general negative stimuli). 
For depression, most support has been demonstrated for stimuli which are specifically 
associated with features of the disorder or are related to the concerns of the depressed 
individual (e.g., Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000; Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004). Due to the 
aim of this thesis to examine negative attentional bias as a potential transdiagnostic 
neurocognitive factor, general negative stimuli were used, rather than disorder-specific 
stimuli, to increase sensitivity for all disorders included. In Chapter 3, depressed 
individuals showed more maintained attention towards negative than positive stimuli. 
However, in the other Chapters (4 and 5), this result was not found, perhaps due to other 
methodological considerations explained below.
For future research, the content of the stimuli included is of key importance. So, when 
investigating attentional bias in depression (and other disorders) the types of stimuli 
need to be sensitive enough to capture possible attentional biases which have to relate 
to the associated [personal] cognitive schemata. An important consideration is to take 
symptom severity into account (see: Baert et al., 2010), as well as comorbidity with other 
psychiatric disorders such as ASD (for more, see the clinical implications of this thesis) 
and anxiety (see: Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000; Hankin, Gibb, Abela, & Flory, 2010, but 
see also: Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van Ijzendoorn, 2007; 
Peckham et al., 2010). Moreover, we found no evidence for bias in engagement and 
shifting of attention, which substantiates existing research indicating that maintained 
attention (or difficulty disengaging from negative information) is mainly associated with 
depression (e.g., Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). 
150 Chapter 6
Relatedly, we should develop stimuli sets relevant for ASD. An example is by including 
dynamic stimuli depicting social interactions and situations. Evidence exists in 
individuals with ASD, compared to typically developing individuals, that there is 
differential processing of dynamic videos of social scenes compared to static pictures 
of an isolated person (Speer, Cook, McMahon, & Clark, 2007).  Moreover, research has 
demonstrated that aberrant information processing was more pronounced when the 
social content of the stimuli was higher, i.e., increasing the number of persons depicted 
instead of presenting an isolated person (Chita-Tegmark, 2016). Thus, the included static 
(non-)social stimuli in our studies may be insensitive for detecting group differences 
(see also: Chevallier et al., 2015 and Boraston & Blakemore, 2007). The stimulus type is 
an important issue for future research to shed light on possible alterations in (valenced) 
social attention in ASD.
Implementing mobile eye-tracking devices are also a promising new research direction. 
These wearable eye-tracking glasses create opportunities to measure attentional bias 
in naturalistic social settings (outside a clinic or lab) as opposed to the screen-based 
methodology that is most commonly used, but where there is a lack of real-world 
interaction. Including mobile eye-tracking technology is of importance because attention 
deploys differently in screen-based compared to real-world settings (Allen et al., 2019). 
Recent studies are already showing the important (clinical) implications for ASD (Rehg, 
Rozga, Abowd, & Goodwin, 2014), as well as for measuring in vivo attentional bias in 
other disorders such as social anxiety disorders (Allen et al., 2019) and depression 
(Woody et al., 2019). 
Statistical approach of analysing attentional bias
It is important to also consider the statistical approach of analysing attentional bias. 
For instance, with a repeated measures ANCOVA (Chapter 5) no differential attentional 
processing of emotional stimuli was found between the depressed and the non-
psychiatric control groups. In contrast, with a linear mixed effects analysis (Chapter 3) 
with a random intercept effect included, differential processing of attentional bias was 
found in the (remitted) depressed individuals, however, not relative to controls. It might 
be that including, for instance, the average gaze durations and average reaction times 
are too crude parameters to measure (maintained) attentional bias considering the 
fluctuating temporal variability which is inherent to attention (i.e., changing attentional 
focus such as towards or away from the stimulus of interest over longer time periods) 
and varies within individuals. In the linear mixed effects analyses, as done in Chapter 
3, the individual differences in gaze patterns were included, but this was not part of 
the ANCOVA, which might partially explain the difference in the results found between 
the two chapters. However, to capture the fluctuating temporal variability quality of 
attention more closely, including a temporal dynamic approach to measure attentional 
bias indices may demonstrate less null-findings and might be a more appropriate 
approach as shown also by Zvielli, Bernstein, and Koster (2015); Zvielli, Vrijsen, Koster, 
and Bernstein (2016). 
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Clinical implications
Depressive disorders and elevated levels of depressive symptoms can be characterized 
by cognitive biases (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). To assess potential therapeutic efficacy of 
adjusting these biases, cognitive bias modification (CBM) is developed (Hertel & Mathews, 
2011). CBM refers to computerized (add on) training methods aiming to manipulate or 
reverse biases by using systematic practice of an alternative processing style (MacLeod 
& Mathews, 2012). CBM procedures aiming at altering attentional processes are termed 
attentional bias modification (ABM; Bar-Haim, 2010). Limited studies assessed the 
effectiveness of ABM in (remitted) depressed individuals (Beard, Sawyer, & Hofmann, 
2012; Mogoaşe, David, & Koster, 2014). Some studies demonstrated that (dot-probe) ABM 
reduced negative attentional bias and, in turn, symptoms of depression in individuals 
with depressive disorders or symptoms (Beevers, Clasen, Enock, & Schnyer, 2015; Wells 
& Beevers, 2010; Yang, Ding, Dai, Peng, & Zhang, 2015; Yang, Zhang, Ding, & Xiao, 2016). 
Whereas three meta-analyses found no or small clinical effects of ABM on individuals 
with depressive symptoms (Cristea, Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Fodor et al., 2020; Jones & 
Sharpe, 2017). Based on the evidence found in Chapter 3, ABM might be a potential add-
on therapy for current depressed patients regardless of comorbid ASD. However, and of 
importance is that no attentional bias differences were found when these groups were 
compared to controls. In addition, the other studies in this thesis (Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5) as well as other recent studies (Beevers et al., 2019; Marchetti et al., 2018) found no or 
limited evidence for the presence of a negative attentional bias in depressive disorders 
and/or symptoms, thus providing no target for ABM treatment.  
Equivocal evidence exists not only for attentional bias for depression-congruent material, 
such as stimuli featuring themes of sadness, loss and, self-worthlessness (Peckham et 
al., 2010), in the depressive sample in this thesis mixed results for a negative attentional 
bias for general negative stimuli was also found. Due to the heterogeneity and prevalence 
of comorbidity in emotional disorders, the direction of this bias might differ based on 
the given disorders. It might thus be interesting to study whether personalized valenced 
stimuli (i.e., a dataset based on different categories of stimuli rated as most negative/
threatening beforehand by the patient, thus, activating their self-relevant schemata) 
reveal a robust personalized self-referential attentional bias which is more congruent 
with their personal concerns and insecurities (e.g., stimuli related to disconnection and 
rejection). In turn, if more stable evidence is found, this personalized dataset could be 
a used to target negative attentional bias in an individualized ABM (add-on) treatment.  
Strengths & limitations 
A strength of this thesis is the systematic investigation by means of a structured review 
to determine current evidence for biases in ASD and to additionally investigate the 
limitations and possible influencing factors (e.g., ToM, use of medication) of these 
studies. The knowledge gained was used to design the free-viewing eye-tracking task 
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and taking into account certain methodological properties (e.g., adjusting for possible 
influencing differences in participant characteristics, the choice of including [non-]
social stimuli). Another strength is the inclusion of a reliable eye-tracker paradigm in the 
empirical studies to measure biased attentional gaze patterns (Waechter et al., 2014). An 
additional strength is the inclusion of different clinical groups such as comparing remitted 
depressed individuals with currently depressed individuals, since differential attentional 
processing of emotional information may occur depending on the presence or absence 
of a depressive episode (see: Isaac, Vrijsen, Rinck, Speckens, & Becker, 2014). A final 
strength is related to the sample characteristics: the inclusion of a well-defined naturalistic 
patient sample in the empirical studies in this thesis. This is crucial for the generalization 
of the research findings to the clinical population in which comorbidity is highly prevalent 
(Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005). Moreover, investigating psychiatric disorders at 
both a (traditional) categorical level as well as at a dimensional – symptom severity – level 
to examine bias as a possible risk factor in one sample is also a strength. 
One of the most important limitations of this thesis concerns the sample sizes and 
the related problem of possible underpowering of the included studies. In Chapter 3, 
the never-depressed ASD group may have been underpowered (n = 15) opposed to the 
other groups (hereafter smallest group of n = 24 and the largest group of n = 64). A 
larger sample size would also be recommended in the study of Chapter 4, specifically 
of the neurodevelopmental group. Because large sample sizes are needed to insure 
the stability of the networks and to facilitate the interpretation of the results. However, 
as yet, no clear consensus about the minimum size of the sample per parameter to 
create a stable and reliable network has been achieved (Fried & Cramer, 2017). Thus it 
is advisable to check the stability of the networks found (Epskamp, Borsboom, & Fried, 
2018). These were performed in the study and were generally deemed reliable. Another 
limitation, which might especially concern the individuals with ASD (symptoms), is 
that the eye-tracker task was designed with a blocked design. This design consisted of 
separate blocks of social and of non-social stimuli, opposed to presenting these stimuli 
in a competing manner. As a result, it might be that no differences were found in these 
groups in the (non-)social stimuli (see also Chita-Tegmark, 2016). However for this first 
exploration we made use of a blocked design since our primary focus was on finding 
possible attentional bias for emotional stimuli. To develop a full picture of attentional 
bias for emotional (social) stimuli in ASD, additional studies will be needed that include 
a competing design of these stimuli (i.e., valenced (non-)social). 
Future directions
An important topic for future research is to advance our knowledge about transdiagnostic 
markers and mechanisms for developing comorbid psychopathology pursuant to 
research initiatives and models (RDoC; NIHM, 2008, HiTOP; Kotov et al., 2017). Thus, it 
may be recommend to investigate, for instance, different neuropsychological processes 
simultaneously since they are highly interrelated with attentional bias. For instance, as 
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proposed by Unruh et al. (2018) repetitive cognition (related to problems in flexibility) 
is both present in individuals with ASD (i.e., restricted interests and preference for fixed 
routines and rituals) and depression (i.e., rumination) and share neural mechanisms. 
The results showed that these repetitive cognitive patterns correlate with the negative 
attentional biases found in both groups and, thus, might pose as a susceptibility in ASD 
for developing depression. Therefore, it would be interesting to further investigate if 
such communalities are also relevant for different highly comorbid psychiatric disorders 
or symptom clusters, in line with the RDoC initiative (Insel, 2014). This shift to exploring 
shared underlying markers and mechanisms in psychiatric disorders is necessary to 
improve personalized assessment and treatment. An ultimate goal would be to focus on 
individualized cognitive profiles, so relevant (neuro)cognitive factors can be identified 
and specifically targeted (such as attentional bias, executive dysfunctions). 
Conclusions of this thesis
In this thesis evidence is presented for negative attentional bias in depression. Negative 
attentional bias might not be a neurocognitive marker for ASD. It may be that comorbid 
depressive symptoms drive the negative attentional bias found in ASD.  Further, no 
evidence was found for attentional bias as marker for symptom severity levels of ASD, 
depression, or anxiety sensitivity. However, evidence was shown for associations of 
negative attentional bias with symptoms of ADHD in individuals with an emotional 
disorder, providing additional evidence for the relevance of the cognitive theory of Beck 
(Beck, 2008; Beck & Bredemeier, 2016) for ADHD. However, this negative attentional bias 
might be driven by a comorbid depression. In addition, alexithymia might not moderate 
the relationship of attentional bias and depression, but perhaps, has an indirect link via 
executive (dys)functions on biased information processing. This requires further research. 
Conclusively, if negative attentional bias is present, is seems to be a depressotypic 
marker. For future studies, more uniformity in the way attentional bias is measured as well 
as assessing psychiatric disorders and/or symptoms is of key importance. 
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Een negatieve aandachtsvertekening als een transdiagnostische 
psychiatrische marker
Iedereen heeft wel eens een dag waarop hij of zij  zich somber of neerslachtig voelt. De 
situatie waarin wij ons op het moment van schrijven al geruime tijd bevinden wegens 
de COVID-19 pandemie draagt hier in het leven van veel mensen aan bij. De beperkende 
overheidsmaatregelen trekken een sterke wissel op economische en sociale activiteiten, 
met vaak ingrijpende gevolgen in het dagelijks leven. 
Zowel in de samenleving als in mijn behandelkamer is een algehele tendens van 
versterkte neerslachtigheid en gevoelens van uitzichtloosheid merkbaar. Deze zullen 
echter naar verwachting weer afnemen of verdwijnen zodra de (aangescherpte) 
overheidsmaatregelen te zijner tijd weer worden ingetrokken. Vooral wanneer de 
uitgestelde buitenlandse vakantie weer geboekt kan worden of het (jubileums)feest 
weer gevierd kan worden, zal het betrekkelijke leed van de lockdown snel geleden zijn.   
De hierboven beschreven gevoelens van somberheid en uitzichtloosheid zijn in dat 
opzicht te onderscheiden van depressie. Bij depressie is er sprake van een niet aflatende 
sombere stemming gedurende het grootste gedeelte van bijna elke dag. Daarnaast omvat 
depressie ook een verminderd plezier en interesse in activiteiten die men doorgaans 
wel als plezierig heeft ervaren (ook wel anhedonie genoemd), en vaak is er ook sprake 
van lichamelijke klachten, zoals slaapproblemen, gewichtsproblemen, problemen 
met de eetlust en psychomotorische vertraging. Andere zeer vaak voorkomende 
hoofdkenmerken zijn vermoeidheid, gevoelens van waardeloosheid of schuldgevoelens, 
geheugen- en concentratieproblemen, en terugkomende (recidiverende) gedachten aan 
de dood of suïcide. Dit alles zorgt voor een hoge lijdensdruk. 
Hoewel depressie een veel voorkomende aandoening is, zijn de beschikbare behandel-
opties niet altijd succesvol en is er bovendien ook nog een grote kans op terugval. 
Dit kan duiden op de mogelijkheid dat er onderliggende kwetsbaarheidsfactoren zijn 
die een rol spelen bij zowel het ontstaan als de instandhouding van depressie, en 
dat de huidige therapievormen hier niet voldoende rekening mee houden. Wat hierbij 
ook een rol speelt, is dat bij depressie ook veelal tegelijkertijd voorkomt met andere 
stoornissen (ook wel comorbiditeit genoemd) zoals bij autisme spectrum stoornis (ASS). 
ASS is een neurobiologische ontwikkelingsstoornis die gekenmerkt wordt door onder 
meer problemen in de sociale omgang, onhandigheid in (non-)verbale communicatie, 
beperkte interesses waarin men zich veelal in kan verliezen, sensorische over- of onder 
gevoeligheid en cognitieve problemen. 
Wanneer er gelijktijdig een depressie aanwezig is bij individuen met ASS, kan dit een 
verergering van bestaande ASS klachten geven. Hierbij valt bijvoorbeeld te denken 
aan een individu met een preoccupatie (zeer sterke interesse) met het heelal, die 
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door een depressie een meer morbide of duistere toon gaan krijgen. Dit kan zich 
bijvoorbeeld manifesteren in een preoccupatie met de vraag hoe het is om te sterven in 
de ruimte. Hoewel depressie en ASS vaak tegelijkertijd voorkomen, is het lastig om dit 
te diagnosticeren, bijvoorbeeld doordat depressieve symptomen gemaskeerd worden 
door de symptomen van ASS, of doordat er sprake is van een verminderd zelfinzicht is 
bij deze individuen. 
Veelal wordt een individu met meer dan één aandoening gediagnosticeerd, zoals de 
eerder genoemde hoge prevalentie van depressie in ASS. Uit onderzoek is gebleken 
dat in circa 70% van de individuen met depressie er ook sprake is van een gelijktijdige 
aanwezige diagnose (comorbiditeit) van bijvoorbeeld een angststoornis, ADHD en/
of ASS. De hoge onderlinge comorbiditeit tussen deze aandoeningen kan er dus op 
duiden dat hieraan overlappende onderliggende neurobiologische en/of cognitieve 
mechanismes ten grondslag kunnen liggen. De laatste tijd is hier meer aandacht voor 
binnen de onderzoekswereld, maar voorheen werden aandoeningen vaak enkelvoudig 
in onderzoeken geïncludeerd. Er werd, met andere woorden, rekening gehouden met 
de aanwezigheid van één stoornis (bijvoorbeeld alleen depressie) en vergeleken met 
individuen die geen psychiatrische aandoening hebben. Er is dus nog meer onderzoek 
nodig om een verklaring kunnen geven voor de hoge comorbiditeit tussen de hierboven 
genoemde aandoeningen en te achterhalen welke specifieke onderliggende factoren 
daaraan ten grondslag kunnen liggen. 
Een mogelijke kwetsbaarheidsfactor kan de vertekening in de informatieverwerking zijn. 
Individuen met depressie hebben de neiging om negatieve informatie gemakkelijker 
te verwerken dan individuen zonder depressie, en wordt positieve informatie 
minder gemakkelijk verwerkt. Deze cognitieve vertekeningen – of biases – kunnen 
in verschillende domeinen een rol spelen, waaronder in de aandacht, interpretatie 
en geheugen. Een negatieve (aandachts)bias is dus een sterkere voorkeur voor het 
automatisch verwerken van negatieve ten opzichte van neutrale of positieve informatie.
Ter illustratie: iemand met een depressieve episode kan, alvorens hij naar een feest 
gaat, vooral focussen op alles wat mogelijk mis kan gaan. Daarbij kan de aandacht 
bijvoorbeeld vooral uitgaan naar het feit dat er op dat feest veel onbekenden zullen zijn, 
waardoor de kans aanwezig is dat er momenten zijn dat je niet weet wat je moet zeggen, 
of iets verkeerds zegt. Dit kan ertoe leiden dat deze persoon ertoe kan neigen om niet 
te gaan, ook al komen er bijvoorbeeld ook bekenden of goede vrienden. Mocht hij wel 
besluiten om naar het feest gaan, dan kan bijvoorbeeld het in lachen uitbarsten van 
een groep worden geïnterpreteerd als uitlachen. Een ander voorbeeld van negatieve 
aandachtsbias is het focussen op mensen die er niet blij uitzien, of je vooral herinneren 
dat de taart van de gastheer niet helemaal gelukt was, terwijl een ander zich eerder 
herinnert hoe smakelijk de taart was, ook al was die een beetje ingezakt.
Met betrekking tot aandacht is aangetoond dat depressieve individuen relatief meer 
moeite hebben met het wegkijken van negatieve informatie (zoals droevige gezichten of 
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huilende mensen) wanneer dit hun aandacht heeft getrokken. Deze negatieve biases zijn 
ook aanwezig bij individuen die geen huidige depressieve episode hebben, maar ook bij 
individuen die hersteld zijn van een depressie (in remissie zijn). Deze biases kunnen 
worden getriggerd door een sombere stemming of door stressvolle situaties. Onderzoek 
heeft uitgewezen dat biases een onderliggende cognitieve kwetsbaarheidsfactor voor 
depressie zijn, maar ook aanwezig zijn bij andere aandoeningen als angststoornissen 
en – hoewel dit nog in mindere mate is onderzocht – ook recent bij ADHD en ASS. Het 
is dus mogelijk dat deze negatieve biases niet alleen een kwetsbaarheidsfactor voor 
specifiek depressie vormen, maar ook relevant kunnen zijn voor andere aandoeningen 
(transdiagnostisch). 
In dit proefschrift is onderzocht of een aandachtsbias ook in patiënten met andere 
aandoeningen kan voorkomen. Specifiek is er in eerste instantie gefocust op de 
comorbiditeit van depressie met ASS en daarna is er ook nog gekeken naar andere 
veelvoorkomende psychiatrische aandoeningen, namelijk,  ADHD en angststoornissen. 
Om een aandachtsbias te meten hebben we in dit onderzoek gebruik gemaakt van een eye 
tracker. Dit is een instrument waarmee de oogbewegingen van onderzoeksparticipanten 
door middel van een computer kunnen worden gevolgd, en de kijktijden automatisch 
worden geregistreerd en opgeslagen. Zodoende kan op deze manier nauwkeurig 
gemeten worden waar, wanneer en hoe lang er door een participant naar bepaalde 
stimuli gekeken wordt en dus de aandacht gemeten. 
Ten behoeve van dit onderzoek is een speciale eye-tracking taak geprogrammeerd  Deze 
taak (zie Figuur 1 voor twee voorbeeld slides) zelf bestaat uit twee blokken met sociale 
en non-sociale stimuli. Binnen deze blokken is er nog een onderverdeling in positieve 
en negatieve stimuli. Zodoende zijn er vier stimulus-categorieën: negatief sociaal 
(huilende mensen of een persoon in nood); negatief niet-sociaal (bedorven voedsel of 
een gewonde hond); positief sociaal (spelende kinderen, of een blije moeder met kind) 
en positief niet-sociaal (een strandlandschap of een nestje jonge poesjes). 
Deze stimulus-categorieën zijn specifiek toegespitst op de hoofd stoornissen van 
dit onderzoek. Bij ASS is er namelijk vaker sprake van een sociale bias (men kijkt 
bijvoorbeeld minder lang naar sociale stimuli dan niet-sociale stimuli) en bij depressie 
is er over het algemeen een negatieve aandachtsbias gevonden. In dit de experimentele 
onderzoeken van dit proefschrift wordt bias gemeten met drie aandachtsbias maten. De 
aangehouden aandachtsbias is de belangrijkste in dit proefschrift. Deze maat betreft 
de totale kijkduur in milliseconden (ms) naar een specifieke stimulus-categorie door 
een participant. Wanneer een participant gemiddeld langer naar negatieve (niet-)
sociale stimuli kijkt dan naar positieve (niet-)sociale stimuli, dan is er sprake van een 
aanhoudend negatieve aandachtsbias (maintained negative attentional bias).
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Figuur 1  Schematisch overzicht van de eye-tracking taak en twee voorbeeld slides van de stimuli.
Bevindingen bij individuen met een depressie (in remissie)  
De onderzoeken in hoofdstuk 3, 4 en 5 laten gemengde resultaten zien. Hoofdstuk 3 laat 
zien dat wanneer bij metingen een negatieve aandachtsbias gevonden wordt, dat dit 
uitsluitend in de vorm van een negatieve aanhoudende aandachtsbias, en uitsluitend bij 
individuen met een huidige depressie en individuen met een depressie in remissie.  In 
hoofdstuk 5 werd er geen bewijs gevonden dat individuen met een depressie (in remissie) 
een negatieve aandachtsbias vertonen. In hoofdstuk 4 wordt er geen bewijs gevonden 
dat symptomen van depressie (ongeacht welke stoornis iemand heeft) samenhangt met 
negatieve aandachtsbias. Deze resultaten komen overeen met die van andere recente 
onderzoeken die steeds meer evidentie vinden voor een zwakke of geen directe relatie 













Niet-sociaal blok (positief en negatief)
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tussen (symptomen van) depressie en een negatieve aandachtsbias. Op basis van de 
resultaten in dit proefschrift kan gesteld worden dat negatieve aandachtsbias een niet 
robuuste marker is voor depressie en symptomen van depressie.  
Bevindingen bij individuen met andere psychiatrische aandoeningen
Bevindingen bij individuen met ASS
In de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 wordt er geen duidelijk bewijs gevonden dat een negatieve 
aandachtsbias aanwezig is bij individuen met ASS, of dat er een relatie is tussen 
symptomen van ASS en een negatieve aandachtsbias. Dit geldt voor zowel de sociale 
als de niet-sociale stimuli. Dit is in de eerste plaats onderzocht door middel van een 
literature review van recente onderzoeken die bias in ASS hebben onderzocht. Dit onder-
zoek is in dit proefschrift opgenomen als hoofdstuk 2. Het literatuuronderzoek wees 
uit dat er weinig bewijs is voor het bestaan van een negatieve aandachtsbias in ASS. 
Daarnaast bleek dat er sprake van enige methodologische problemen in de meerderheid 
van de onderzoeken. Deze methodologische problemen wij in onze onderzoeksartikelen 
geprobeerd zoveel mogelijk te ondervangen. Zo hebben wij onder andere ervoor gekozen 
om metingen te verrichten met een eye-tracker, omdat dit een meer betrouwbare taak 
is dan traditioneel gebruikte bias taken. De conclusie van hoofdstuk 3 is, dat er bij 
individuen met ASS alleen een negatieve aandachtsbias gevonden wordt wanneer er 
sprake is van een huidige depressieve episode, maar niet wanneer de depressie reeds 
is opgeklaard. Dit betekent dat een negatieve aandachtsbias bij individuen met ASS 
waarschijnlijk alleen een depressie-specifieke marker is, en dat deze bias verdwijnt 
wanneer de depressie opgeklaard is.
Bevindingen bij individuen met symptomen van angst-sensitiviteit
In hoofdstuk 4 is er gekeken of er een samenhang is in individuen met symptomen 
van angst-sensitiviteit en een aandachtsbias in individuen met depressie, angst-
stoornissen, ASS en/of ADHD. Angst-sensitiviteit verwijst naar de neiging om bang te 
worden van aan angst gerelateerde lichamelijke symptomen of gedragingen, omdat 
diegene bang is dat deze signalen gevaarlijk of schadelijk kunnen zijn. Angst-
sensitiviteit kan een risico- en onderhoudende factor zijn voor angststoornissen. Er 
werd in ons onderzoek geen bewijs gevonden dat symptomen van angst-sensitiviteit 
samenhangen met een negatieve aandachtsbias. Dit wordt ook door andere studies 
geconcludeerd. Overigens zijn er studies waarin wel een aandachtsbias bij symptomen 
van angstsensitiviteit wordt aangetoond, vermoedelijk omdat zij in hun bias-taken 
gebruik hebben gemaakt van gezondheidsbedreigende stimuli, zoals een patiënt 
met een infuus, of een ziekenhuisbed. Het feit dat ons onderzoek geen samenhang 
tussen angst-sensitiviteit en een negatieve aandachtsbias heeft aangetoond zou 
verklaard kunnen worden doordat wij in onze studie gebruik hebben gemaakt van meer 
generalistische negatieve en positieve stimuli om de sensitiviteit te vergroten om bij alle 
geïncludeerde stoornissen een bias te kunnen vinden. 
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Bevindingen bij individuen met symptomen van ADHD
Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat negatieve biases relevant zijn voor ADHD. 
Vandaar dat we in dit proefschrift ook ADHD hebben meegenomen. Specifiek hebben wij 
in hoofdstuk 4 gekeken naar een eventuele samenhang tussen symptomen van ADHD 
en aandachtsbias in individuen met depressie, angst, ASS en/of ADHD. De analyses 
laten een samenhang zien tussen negatieve aandachtsbias voor sociale stimuli en 
symptomen van ADHD in individuen die een depressie en/of angststoornis hebben. 
Aangezien er tot op heden slechts enkele onderzoeken zijn die bewijs vinden voor de 
aanwezigheid van bias in ADHD, is hier meer onderzoek voor nodig, en daarbij is de 
mogelijkheid dat deze gedreven wordt door (symptomen van) depressie een belangrijk 
aandachtspunt. 
Depressie en alexithymie
In hoofdstuk 5 hebben we de vraag onderzocht waarom in de bias literatuur van depressie 
zulke gemengde resultaten worden gevonden. Om dit te kunnen achterhalen hebben we 
bekeken of er sprake is van een variabele die de relatie van depressie en aandachtsbias 
mogelijk beïnvloedt. Zo een mogelijke variabele kan symptomen van alexithymie zijn. 
Alexithymie wordt in de literatuur beschreven als het ervaren van problemen met het 
identificeren, beschrijven en omgaan met de eigen of andermans gevoelens. Iemand 
met alexithymie kan het dus moeilijk vinden om zijn gevoelens uit te drukken of de 
gevoelens van iemand anders zijn gezicht te lezen. Alexithymie komt veelal voor bij 
depressie. Tevens kan alexithymie als gevolg hebben dat er minder aandachtsbias is 
voor positieve of negatieve informatie. 
In ons onderzoek hebben we gekeken of symptomen van alexithymie de relatie tussen 
een eventueel aanwezige aandachtsbias in depressie kan beïnvloeden. Zoals eerder 
genoemd heeft dit onderzoek geen evidentie voor de aanwezigheid van een negatieve 
aandachtsbias in mensen met een depressie (in remissie) aangetoond. Tevens vonden 
we geen bewijs voor de hypothese dat het ontbreken van een negatieve aandachtsbias 
in deze individuen verklaard kan worden door een aanwezigheid van alexithymie. 
We hebben dan ook geconcludeerd dat op basis hiervan er gesteld kan worden dat 
alexithymie geen directe invloed uitoefent op de relatie tussen bias en depressie. 
Conclusie 
In dit proefschrift is enig bewijs gevonden voor de aanwezigheid van een negatieve 
aandachtsbias in depressie. Een negatieve aandachtsbias is waarschijnlijk geen 
cognitieve marker voor ASS. Het kan zo zijn dat een comorbide huidige depressieve 
stoornis in ASS deze negatieve aandachtsbias veroorzaakt. Tevens is er geen bewijs 
gevonden voor een negatieve aandachtsbias als marker voor symptomen van ASS, 
depressie en angst-sensitiviteit. Wel is er bewijs gevonden dat er een associatie is 
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van symptomen van ADHD en een negatieve aandachtsbias in individuen met een 
depressie en/of angststoornis, maar deze relatie kan wellicht worden veroorzaakt door 
de comorbide aanwezige depressie. Verder hebben we aangetoond dat alexithymie 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk de relatie tussen een aandachtsbias en depressie niet beïnvloedt. 
Geconcludeerd kan dus worden dat, wanneer er een negatieve aandachtsbias aanwezig 
is, dit waarschijnlijk een typische marker voor depressie is. 
Hopelijk stimuleert dit proefschrift om meer onderzoek naar cognitieve markers en 
mechanismes van psychiatrische comorbiditeit te gaan doen en is het nodig dat er meer 
uniformiteit wordt toegepast in de manier waarop aandachtsbiases gemeten worden 




Waarschijnlijk is dit de eerste, en voor sommige de enige pagina’s die jullie lezen van 
mijn proefschrift. In dit gedeelte wil ik graag alle mensen die direct of indirect hebben 
bijgedragen bij het tostandkomen van dit proefschrift bedanken. 
Als eerste zou ik graag mijn begeleidingsteam bedanken. Aart, wat een geweldig en 
relevant onderzoek heb je met MIND-set neergezet. Ik vond het erg fijn en leerzaam om 
vanaf het eerste moment betrokken te zijn geweest bij de opzet en verdere uitvoering 
van dit grootschalige project. Ik waardeer de klinisch inhoudelijke discussies die we 
tijdens onze een-op-een afspraken konden voeren, en jouw kritische blik op mijn 
stukken. Constance, ik waardeer het dat je de rol van Iris overgenomen hebt als destijds 
co-promotor en met jouw neuropsychologische kennis bijgedragen hebt aan mijn 
proefschift en we altijd gezellig konden sparren zelfs in de avonduren. Tevens vond ik 
het erg fijn dat ik in jouw praktijk mijn klinische ervaring verder kon uitdiepen voordat 
ik als psycholoog ging werken. Janna, wat fijn dat je mijn co-promotor was. Je bent een 
betrokken begeleider die altijd de vinger aan de pols houdt en een kritische blik heeft. Ik 
heb veel van je geleerd in onze wekelijkse begeleidingsgesprekken. Daarnaast wil ik Iris 
nog bedanken voor jouw rol als co-promotor in de eerste jaren van mijn promotietijd, ik 
vond het fijn dat we samen zoveel werk hebben kunnen verzetten met het review artikel 
en dat ik van je klinische kennis en ervaring heb mogen leren. 
Alle honderden deelnemers aan het MIND-Set onderzoek die hele dagdelen van hun 
tijd gestoken hebben aan het meedoen, zou ik ook graag willen bedanken. Zonder alle 
vrijwillige deelnemers kan er geen onderzoek tot stand komen. De heftige verhalen 
die ik van vele van jullie gehoord hebben, hebben mij helpen realiseren dat ik naast 
onderzoeker ook als psycholoog wilde gaan werken en ben jullie daar ook dankbaar 
voor!
Ook mijn oud-collega’s van het Radboudumc zou ik graag willen bedanken. Jeetje Sophie, 
wat hebben wij samen veel meegemaakt. Vanaf letterlijk dag 1 hebben we samen gewerkt 
en lief en leed gedeeld van het opzetten van het onderzoek, de data-verzameling, tot 
de programmeer frustraties (met name van mijn kant, hah!). Nog steeds, nadat we al 
een langere tijd niet meer samen werken, kan ik nog altijd van je op aan. Ik vond onze 
motorrij clinic toch wel een heel stoere ervaring en onze dagen in Parijs voor een congres 
samen vond ik erg gezellig, naast alle gezamenlijke uitjes, feestjes en borrels die we 
hebben gedaan. Rachel, wat fijn dat jij ook later in onze ‘onderzoekskelder’ erbij kwam. 
Ik vond het altijd gezellig met je; ook buiten werk om tijdens onze lunches, motorritjes 
en fijne kaasfondue-momenten. Naast het delen van de publicatie-frustraties die we 
beide zo goed kennen haha. Ook wil ik graag mijn (in)directe oud-collega’s van het 
MIND-Set team bedanken, Fleur, Eva, Jan, Jasper, Joosje, Rose, Indira en Philip. Fleur, 
Eva en Jan bedankt voor al onze gezamenlijke lunches en vele gesprekken, of ze nou 
werk-inhoudelijk waren of niet. Het was altijd gezellig met jullie! Jet, ik wil jou ook nog 
bedanken voor de bereidheid om altijd te helpen met het inplannen van alle afspraken 
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en de gezellige sfeer die jij altijd meebrengt! Hubert, bedankt voor alle uren die je hebt 
gespendeerd om me te leren hoe ik de eye-tracker taken moest programmeren, of als er 
weer een stressvolle onverwachte error kwam waar ik zelf niet uitkwam!  
Graag wil ik ook al mijn collega’s van HSK Den Bosch bedanken. Wat een warm bad was 
het om bij jullie te komen werken, en ook de steun die ik ervaren heb in het laatste 
staartje van mjin PhD die ik tijdens mijn eerste jaar bij jullie naast het werk heb moeten 
afronden. Er is altijd wel een luisterend oor, meedenkende woorden maar ook veel plezier 
samen! En het samen naar huis fietsen (en borrelen) is altijd een gezellige afsluiting van 
de dag geweest, Linne, Joris en Anouk! En Frederieke wat fijn dat je mijn werkbegeleider 
bent en dat je altijd een luisterend oor hebt geboden tijdens de laatste struggles van 
mijn pormotietraject en straks ook weer bij mijn traject als PIOG. 
Lieve Karen, je was altijd een geweldige huisgenoot in Leiden en nu mijn paranimf. Ik 
had geen beter iemand kunnen bedenken. Je bent altijd meedenkend, lief en ik vind het 
altijd fijn om je weer te zien, ook al is de afstand nu iets groter dan 2 deuren. Daarnaast 
wil ik ook graag een aantal van mijn oud-huisgenoten uit Leiden en studentenvereniging 
vrienden bedanken voor al de fijne borrels en gesprekken die we samen hebben, ook al 
wonen we nu niet meer in dezelfde stad: Lisette, Shai, Maikel, Yorim, Sander, Berend, 
Cathy, Kristian, Guido en alle anderen. Tijdens de vele inspannende dagen en avonden 
was het altijd erg fijn dat ik met jullie mijn gedachten van mijn promotie kon afleiden 
in het altijd mooie ‘Leiduh’! In het bijzonder ook nog Charlotte. Jij weet als geen ander 
hoe het is om een promotietraject te doen. Nog even doorbijten babe en dan ben je er! 
Ik waardeer al onze gesprekken over de academia maar ook de fijne meiden-onder-ons 
gesprekken. 
Suzanne, poeh wat zijn we al lang vriendinnen, in vind het altijd weer fijn om samen te 
zijn om met een heerlijke nuchtere Twentse blik weer naar de wereld te kijken en je altijd 
klaar stond op mij te steunen tijdens dit traject (en daarvoor natuurlijk). Ik hoop dat 
we nog vaker samen op vakantie kunnen gaan en natuurlijk borrelen en BBQ’en samen 
met Teun! Chantal wat fijn dat we samen in Nijmegen na mijn lange werkdagen konden 
sporten en de vele gezellige thee-momenten samen. Yrla, wat fijn dat je zo’n leuke buuf 
bent om mee te kletsen in Den Bosch, en straks ook in Rosmalen! We gaan nog veel 
planten samen kopen, hah! Joost, wat ben je een toch een leuke vriend, we kennen 
elkaar al een eeuwigheid, en het blijft gezellig met jou. Ik vond het fijn dat ik altijd bij 
je terecht kon en je in Nijmegen ook vaker langs kwam om na werk te kletsen! Maike, 
ook wij kennen elkaar al heel lang, van logeerpartijtjes als tienermeiden in Nijverdal, 
lunches en feestjes in Leiden tot nu weer stadsgenoten in Den Bosch. Ik hoop nog vele 
gezellige koffiemomentjes en creatieve middagen met jou te hebben nu we straks weer 
15 minuutjes fietsen vanaf elkaar wonen.  
Ook wil ik nog graag een aantal dankwoorden richten aan mijn lieve (schoon)familie. 
Mam en pap, jullie verdienen wel echt een ereplekje. Zonder jullie had ik dit nooit gekund. 
Ik wil jullie bedanken voor jullie tomeloze inzet, geduld en onvoorwaardelijke liefde die 
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nooit op lijkt te raken (net zoals het beltegoed van al onze lange telefoongesprekken). 
Al op de weg naar mijn promotie, tijdens en nu ook erna. Richard, ik vind het fijn dat we 
altijd kunnen bellen, je me steunt en mij advies geeft als ik dat nodig heb. Je bent echt 
een grote broer! Marly en Bert, wat fijn dat jullie mijn schoonouders zijn. Jullie staan 
altijd klaar met een warm Limburgs onthaal als wij op visite komen waarbij een grote 
hoeveelheid ‘vloai’ niet ontbreekt! Tenslotte, lieve Fons, mijn promotie is altijd wel een 
rode draad geweest in onze relatie, wat fijn dat het nu af is! Je staat altijd voor mij klaar 
om mij te helpen, bij de toch wel vele stressmomenten die er zijn geweest. Ik vind het 
zo fijn dat wel altijd zoveel lol samen hebben. Nu kunnen we ons volledig richten op 
de toekomst, ook in de meest praktische zin door het inrichten en afmaken van onze 
nieuwe woning die binnenkort afgebouwd is!
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